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The oil & gas industry has a history of projects not achieving the outcomes promised at sanction. It is 
well-known that good Front End Loading (FEL) will increase the likelihood of project success. 
However, despite this, a significant number of projects proceed with insufficient FEL. This research 
aims to find out why this is, and to develop ways of influencing decision makers so that FEL will be 
used more effectively in future. 
Making high quality decisions is the best way of maximising the likelihood of achieving desirable 
outcomes. Decision Analysis (DA) is a pragmatic methodology  for making high quality decisions that 
has been around for many decades. However, it is not always used when making key decisions on oil 
and gas projects. This research aims to determine why this is, and to find ways to influence decision 
makers to use DA more effectively.  
Interviews and a survey were carried out with senior personnel from oil and gas companies to 
determine their knowledge and understanding of FEL and DA, how they think they should be used 
and how they are used in practice. These studies demonstrated a strong belief that FEL must be 
carried out if a project is to be successful, and that DA needs to be applied for major decisions - but 
these only happen in practice around half of the time. 
A follow up survey was carried out to clarify issues outstanding from the interviews and the initial 
survey, and to determine the likely uptake of proposals to encourage better use to be made of FEL 
and DA. There was strong support for the proposals which included developing a simple tool to give 
a pragmatic assessment of FEL, having performance incentives based on achieving good FEL and high 
Decision Quality, and undertaking training on project decision making. 
An experiment was set up to investigate how training, and the way a decision is framed, influence the 
approach taken for project decision making. Half of the participants received training by watching 
three short online videos, the other half received no training. They all then answered questions on 
three decision making scenarios for projects. The results showed that training influenced decision-
makers to take a more structured and process-based approach, and that the way a decision is framed 
by an authority figure has a strong influence on the approach taken for project decision making. 
An alternative way of assessing FEL has been developed to encourage FEL to be used more effectively 
and increase the likelihood of delivering better project outcomes. It is a simple, decision-based 
approach to assessing FEL which can be carried out in-house. It is proposed that it is used in 
conjunction with FEL benchmarking to gain the benefits of both approaches, provide a better 
understanding of FEL, and have a stronger basis for decision-making. 
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1. Contextual Statement 
1.1 Introduction 
Oil and gas projects have often failed to live up to expectations, with higher costs, longer schedules 
and, most importantly, lower production than forecast (Nandurdikar and Wallace 2011, Preis, 
Burcham et al. 2014, Whitfield 2014). There are also projects where value has been lost, owing to the 
concept selected (i.e. the development plan chosen) not being the best match for the subsurface 
structure (Crager 2011). So, why do key decisions for oil and gas projects often miss out on value, or 
produce outcomes that are systemically worse than predicted? 
Merrow, in the foreword of Industrial Megaprojects (Merrow 2011) provides his perspective on this: 
“After more than 40 years working in the capital projects arena, I remain mystified by the 
extreme reluctance of very intelligent business and technical leaders to pay attention to validated 
past experience. It is my opinion that failing to accept that there are project best concepts, 
strategies, and practices that, when executed in a disciplined manner, deliver predictably good 
results makes no business sense. Over the course of my career, I have struggled to find the right 
way to communicate this and show the business value was so obvious that the use of proven 
approaches should be a no-brainer. But, until now I’ve been woefully unsuccessful, even on 
projects for businesses that have experience failures in the past.” 
The concept of Front End Loading (FEL) has been around for over 30 years. There have been a number 
of papers written advocating the importance of FEL, e.g. (Gibson, Kaczmarowski et al. 1995, Smith 
2000, Jones 2004). Independent Projects Analysis (IPA), a research and consultancy organisation, have 
been measuring FEL and analysing projects for over 30 years. They have determined that having a 
good level of Front End Loading (FEL) will increase the likelihood of project success, in terms of the 
cost, schedule and production attained (Merrow and Croker 1995, Merrow 2011, Nandurdikar and 
Kirkham 2012). However, despite this, a significant number of projects are permitted to pass through 
decision gates with insufficient FEL. There appears to be little or no research on why this is the case. 
This research aims to address this gap and find out why projects are allowed to proceed with 
inadequate FEL, and to use this information to develop ways of influencing decision makers to use FEL 
more effectively. 
Similarly, Decision Analysis (DA) has been around for over 50 year (Howard 1966). It is based on the 
axioms of decision science, and is an optimal approach to decision making. A plethora of books, such 
as (Goodwin 2004, McNamee and Celona 2005) and research papers, such as (Brown 1970, Keeney 
1982, Thomas 1984, Howard 1988, Davidson 2001, Lev and Murphy 2007) have been written on it. 
However, there is little literature on why there is not a wider adoption of DA on oil and gas projects. 
This research aims to address this gap and to find out why DA is not used more frequently, and to use 
this information to develop ways of influencing decision makers to use it more effectively 
The Decision-Gated Framework, Front End Loading, Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are key 
elements of this research, and so descriptions of these are given in section 1.2. If you are familiar with 
these, you may wish to skip this section and move on to section 1.3 which provides the background 
for the five studies carried out, and how these studies link up with the five papers.  
The first two studies, interviews followed by a survey, were with senior oil and gas personnel with 
project experience. These were used to investigate how FEL and DA are used, and why they are used 
that way. The third study was a survey to assess the likely uptake of proposals to encourage FEL and 




focused training on decision making, and the fifth study was the development of a simple, pragmatic 
way of assessing the level of FEL. Further information on these is given in section 1.3. 
1.2 Descriptions 
1.2.1 Decision-Gated Framework 
The original concept for a decision-gated framework was created by Cooper (1990) in the USA in  
the 80's, as a tool for development of new products. Since then the decision-gated framework (also 
known as a stage-gate process) has been changed and adapted for different types of industries around 
the world.  
The oil and gas industry have fully embraced this methodology with most companies using similar 
decision gated frameworks to manage and control their projects. In 1991 Chevron (Woodruff 1997) 
were the first of the majors to do this, and developed a 5 step process called the Chevron Project 
Development and Execution Process (CPDEP). This has been the model that subsequent oil and gas 
companies have built their decision gated frameworks on. These typically has five phases, with each 
phase separated by a decision gate. An example of a decision-gated framework is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1 A typical decision-gated framework 
Each phase has a specific purpose and it ends with a decision to proceed to the next phase, to carry 
out further work in the current or earlier phases, or to stop the project. The purpose of the individual 
phases is as follows:  
Appraise: Determine whether this an opportunity worth pursuing 
Select:  Generate alternatives and select the best option 
Define:  Fully define the scope, develop the implementation plan and prepare the business case 
Execute:  Implement the project execution plan  
Operate:  Operate the asset to deliver the value 
The focus for this research is on two key project decisions: the Concept Select decision at the end 
of the Select phase, and the Final Investment Decision (FID) [also known as Sanction or Authorisation 
for Expenditure (AFE)] at the end of the Define phase.  
A fuller description of how the decision-gated framework should be implemented is given in Paper 
2: Why are decisions for oil and gas projects not always made the way they ‘should’ be? (see page 49). 
1.2.2 Front End Loading (FEL)  
FEL covers the phases of a project that lead up to FID (see Fig. 1) and necessitates investing 
significant effort during these phases (Weijde 2008). FEL is defined by the Construction Industry 
Institute (CII) as the process of developing sufficient strategic information with which owners can 
address risk and make decisions to commit resources in order to maximize the potential for a 




Note that maximizing the potential for a successful project means different things for different 
phases. For the Select phase, the emphasis is on creating value, by selecting the concept that will 
maximize value. If there has been insufficient FEL, value may be lost in two ways: a better concept 
may be overlooked if the range of alternatives is too narrow; or a wrong choice may be made if it is 
based upon information that is incomplete. If the true range of uncertainty is not assessed, it may lead 
to under-investment in further information gathering or in developing flexible designs to mitigate the 
risks and capture the opportunities that arise from uncertainty.   
During the Define phase the emphasis is on developing sufficient definition (i.e. completing 
sufficient FEL), so that the outcomes predicted at FID will be accurate, and value will not be lost during 
execution dues to changes required. In summary: success in the early phases is about maximizing 
value; for the later phases it is about preserving value and achieving predicted outcomes. 
FEL benchmark scores are assessments of the level of Front End Loading, e.g. Independent Project 
Analysis (IPA) have a Front End Loading Index (Needham and Merrow 2003) and CII have a Project 
Definition Rating Index (PDRI) (Wang 2002, Gibson Jr 2004). FEL benchmark scores are determined 
using a set of factors which typically include: 
• Quality and uncertainty of data 
• Status of technical deliverables 
• Conformance with regulatory requirements 
• Status of planning for future phases 
These are evaluated, and then combined in a weighted way to come up with a numerical FEL 
benchmarking score. The weighting of the factors is determined from a database of past projects so 
that it reflects the observed relative importance of the factors. A lot of oil and gas companies use IPA 
to assess their level of FEL. 
1.2.3 Decision Analysis (DA) 
DA is the discipline of making good decisions and describes how people should logically make 
decisions. It is a structured approach for creating and evaluating choices, by using a pragmatic 
application of tools and processes tailored to the needs of the decision. It is a methodology that 
provides the means for a dialogue between the decision maker and the project team so that 
objectives, uncertainties, concerns, expectations, assumptions and meaning can brought into the 
open and clarified, leading to a compelling course of action. 
The fundamental aspects of DA can be represented using the image of the man on the three-legged 
stool (Fig. 2), as adapted from Howard (2007). Where the stool is placed represents the frame, namely, 
what is the correct background, setting and context for the decision? The legs of the stool represent 
the decision basis: 
Objectives:  What you want, i.e. what is valuable to you, and how you would trade-off between 
conflicting values. 
Alternatives:  What you can do. Are there creative, doable alternatives? If there are no 
alternatives, then there is no decision to be made. 
Information:  What you know, how well you ‘know’ it (and clarity on what you don’t know). 
These are held together by the seat, which is the sound reasoning to determine which alternative 
best meets the objectives of the decision maker. Then commitment is required to move the decision 






Fig. 2 The six elements of Decision Analysis 
 
1.2.4 Decision Quality (DQ) 
In order to make good decisions, a first step is to define what ‘good’ means. This is where DQ is 




Fig. 3 The Decision Quality wheel 
The DQ wheel was developed in the 1980s (Spetzler 1991), and expanded on in the book by 
Spetzler, Winter et al. (2016). It was originally presented in the form of a chain, because this signifies 
that all six elements are important, and that the quality of a decision is only as good as its weakest 
link. However, many companies now present DQ in the form of a DQ wheel. 
The six elements of DQ are: 
(1) Appropriate frame: what is the issue being addressed, including what is the purpose in making 
the decision, what is the scope, and how will the decision be approached? 
(2) Clear values: is there clarity on the values that the decision will be assessed against? Is there 




(3) Creative alternatives: is there a range of creative and compelling alternatives? 
(4) Useful information: is all relevant information available for the decision? Is it trustworthy and 
unbiased? 
(5) Sound reasoning: is sound reasoning being applied, i.e. which alternative gives you the most 
of what you want, based on the information that you have? 
(6) Commitment to action: is there commitment to action the decision? 
The quality of a decision is assessed by reviewing the six elements in turn, to see whether they 
each achieve the 100% rating required for a good decision. Note that 100% is not perfection. As 
explained in Spetzler et al. (2016): 
100% is the point at which the cost of further improvement – in terms of effort and delay – isn’t 
worth it. At 100%, the value from improving the requirement is outweighed by the cost. So, 100% 
is not perfection; it is a judgment that the incremental cost of improvement is greater than the 
additional value that would result. 
Hence, DQ should be assessed at the start of a phase to determine what work needs to be 
completed to achieve 100% for each element. The work should then be completed, and another 
assessment of DQ should be made before the decision, to confirm that 100% has been achieved. 
In summary, DQ is a simplified way of applying the principles of DA, and a way of assessing the 
readiness for making a decision. DQ is a pragmatic tool; it directs you to do only the work that has the 
potential to change the decision. 
1.3 Studies 
1.3.1 Interviews 
The first phase of this research program was a series of interviews with oil and gas personnel 
involved in developments and projects in a variety of roles (e.g. decision makers, development 
managers, analysts, subject matter experts). The interviews used mainly open questions to determine 
the following from the participants: 
• Their level of knowledge and understanding of FEL, DA and DQ. 
• How important they consider FEL, DA and DQ to be. 
• How they think these should be used. 
• How they are used in practice in their companies. 
Interviews were carried out with 34 senior personnel from 6 oil and gas companies. The 
participants were all Australian based, except for two based in the UK. This was a highly experienced 
group with an average of 29 years in oil and gas and 24 years on projects. 11 of the interviewees were 
executives (i.e. at the vice-president level or equivalent), 19 were managers and 4 were professionals. 
Based on the outcomes of the interviews, the first paper was written: Front End Loading – 
misunderstood or misapplied? which was presented at the 2016 APPEA conference and published in 
the APPEA Journal by CSIRO Publishing.  
1.3.2 First Survey 
In parallel with the interviews, a literature review was undertaken to investigate the human side 
of decision making and the reasons, from both a psychological and neuroscience perspective, why 
decisions may not always be made in an optimum way. The information gained from the interviews 




statistical analysis of the outcomes.  As for the interviews, the target group was personnel from oil 
and gas companies who are involved in developments and projects. 
The survey questions were broadly similar to those asked in the interviews. These covered their 
level of knowledge, the actions they take, and their opinions about various aspects of FEL, DA and DQ. 
They also explored differences between what the participants consider should be done, compared 
with what is actually done in their companies. 
78 people participated in the survey, which had been sent to 123 people in 10 oil and gas 
companies. The participants were highly experienced: nearly three-quarters had over 25 years in oil 
and gas, and more than 80% had over 15 years on projects. 
The outcomes from the survey were used to test the following propositions: 
(1) DA and DQ are not well understood. 
(2) DA and DQ are perceived to be complicated. 
(3) People rely mainly on experience and judgment for decision making. 
(4) Projects are schedule driven. 
(5) There is a lack of clarity on the requirements of the decision maker. 
(6) DQ is not assessed at the start of the phase to inform the work to be undertaken. 
The outcomes of the survey, and the results of testing the propositions, are reported in the second 
paper: Why are decisions for oil and gas projects not always made the way they ‘should’ be? which 
was presented at the 2018 APPEA conference and published in the APPEA Journal by CSIRO Publishing. 
1.3.3 Second Survey 
A follow up survey was carried out to determine reasons why FEL and DA/DQ may not be used 
more, to assess the likely uptake of methods designed to encourage more effective use to be made of 
FEL and DA/DQ, and to clarify issues not addressed by the interviews and first survey, 
The proposals for encouraging better use to be made of FEL and DA/DQ were as follows: 
• Development of a simple tool to give a pragmatic assessment of FEL. 
• Feedback on key areas to focus on to achieve good FEL and high DQ 
• Information on the likely impact (in terms of cost, schedule and production) of not 
completing FEL. 
• Having performance incentives based on achieving good FEL and high DQ 
• Undertaking training on how to achieve good FEL and high DQ, if given convincing evidence 
that it leads to better project outcomes 
Further information on the second survey is given in the third paper: Improving outcomes for oil 
and gas projects through better use of Front End Loading and Decision Analysis which was presented 
at the 2018 SPE Asia Pacific Oil and Gas Conference and Exhibition and published in the Conference 
Proceedings. 
1.3.4 Experiment on decision making training for projects 
The second survey had indicated a willingness by participants to undertake training, if it could be 
shown to be effective in improving project outcomes. It was felt, though, that when the time came, 
senior personnel may not be willing to devote 1, 3 or more days on a decision-making course; but they 




training. Hence, an experiment was set up to determine whether some short, focused training just 
prior to a key project decision would be effective in encouraging decision makers to take a structured, 
data-driven approach, which is more likely to deliver good outcomes.  
Three online training videos were developed, each around 15 minutes long: 
• Training Video 1: This video looks at the psychological side of decision making. It highlights 
why we do not always make good decisions, and why relying on our experience and intuition 
is not appropriate for important decisions. 
• Training Video 2: This video is about making good decisions. It explains why it is important 
to distinguish between decisions and outcomes. It describes how to judge the quality of a 
decision by assessing the six elements that make up a good decision. 
• Training Video 3: This video describes some important aspects of decision making for 
projects, including what typically goes wrong on projects, and some ways of overcoming this 
to improve the likelihood of good outcomes. 
153 people took part in the experiment. Half of the participants received training by watching the 
three online videos, the other half received no training. They all then answered questions on three 
decision making scenarios for projects. The aim of the experiment was twofold: 
• To determine whether short, focused training would influence decision makers to take a 
more structured and process-focused approach to project decision making. 
• To check the impact on project decision making of the way a decision is framed by an 
authority figure, i.e. whether a process driven approach or a schedule/opinion driven 
approach is advocated. 
Further information on the experiment is given in the fourth paper: Can one hour of training lead 
to better project decision making? which has been submitted to the EURO Journal on Decision 
Processes. 
1.3.5 A decision-based approach to assessing Front End Loading 
FEL for oil and gas projects is usually evaluated by an external consultant who carries out FEL 
benchmarking using an activity-based approach. However, despite that approach being well proven, 
the outcomes from the interviews and surveys showed that it may not be used very effectively for 
reasons such as distrusting assessments by an external party, particularly where there is lack of 
transparency on how the FEL benchmark score is derived. 
One of the outcomes of the second survey was strong support for the development of a simple 
tool to give a pragmatic assessment of FEL. Hence an alternative method of assessing FEL is being 
proposed which is decision-based, which can be carried out internally and which provides clarity on 
the factors that drive good FEL. In addition to it being an assessment of the status of activities carried 
out in the phase, the decision-based approach emphasises value-creation by considering key factors 
that could influence an increase or decrease in DQ and thus the value created by the final outcome. 
The FEL benchmarking approach focuses on achieving a good level of definition at FID, and hence 
increasing the likelihood of meeting forecast outcomes. However, it does not have a decision-making 
making focus, which could help with developing other options that might lead to higher value 
outcomes. It is an activity-based approach which assesses very similar activities during both the Select 




By contrast, the alternative approach looks at FEL through a decision-making lens and so focuses 
on what is required for good FEL for that particular decision. Hence the requirements are different for 
the Concept Select decision and FID. 
Further information is given in the fifth paper: A simplified, decision-based approach to assessing 





2. Literature Review  
There is little literature on why the decision-gated framework, used to manage the development of 
projects in the oil and gas industry, has frequently failed to deliver the expected project outcomes. A 
notable exception is the paper on the Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Stage-Gate Project 
Management Process (Walkup and Ligon 2006) which provides a good description of how the decision-
gated framework should work, and the reasons why it often fails in practice. These include: 
• The Decision Review Board (DRB) not owning Decision Quality (DQ).  
• Focus more on schedule than value creation - “It is not uncommon for over 50% of projects to 
be fast-tracked.” 
• Project teams overplaying their role and develop an advocacy position, believing they should 
make a recommendation to be approved by the DRB. 
• Most stage gate process implementations have become activity driven rather than decision 
driven. 
• Value is lost as there is a strong motivational bias for teams to focus on project approval, as 
opposed to value maximisation. Teams are rewarded for completion, usually the faster the 
better. 
Unfortunately, these findings seem to still be valid now, more than a decade after that paper was 
written. This research aims to change this by influencing decision makers to: take more ownership of 
DQ; focus on completing sufficient FEL rather than on meeting schedule driven targets; and to have a 
decision-gated framework that is decision driven rather than activity driven. 
This literature review starts by considering what decision making is and the two ways that decisions 
are made. Decision Analysis is then reviewed, followed by consideration of why we don’t always make 
good decisions. Front End Loading is next, followed by an examination of when to trust expert 
judgment. Then there is a review of why it is hard to be a good decision maker for oil and gas projects. 
Finally, there is information on the premortem, which is a useful check prior to finalizing a decision. 
2.1 Decision making 
What is decision making? Howard (1980) explains that making decisions is what you do when you do 
not know what to do. This can be restated as follows: if you know what to do, then there is no decision 
to be made. Interestingly, this was expressed when Klein interviewed firefighters (Klein, Calderwood 
et al. 1986) as part of his research on decision making. Klein asked a fireground commander to tell him 
about some difficult decisions he had made, with the reply being as follows: 
I don’t make decisions; I don’t remember when I’ve ever made a decision. 
The fireground commander insisted that fireground commanders never make decisions, as it is usually 
obvious what to do in any given situation (Klein 1998). However, this is a special case. A fireground 
commander is someone who has frequently experienced similar situations, and who has received quick 
and reliable feedback on the outcomes of decisions made in those situations. Hence, the ‘decision’ 
has moved from one that requires conscious thought and effort, to one that has become intuitive and 
automatic. This is one of the two ways we make decisions. 
2.2 Two ways we make decisions 
Kahneman (2011), describes the following two different processes that our brains use to make 
decisions: 
• System 1: intuitive and automatic: effortless – thinking fast. 




This is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4 Two ways we make decisions 
Stanovich (2011) (who originally proposed the terms System 1 and System 2, but now prefers Type 1 
process and Type 2 process)  explains the differences and why each is useful, as follows: 
System 1/Type 1 process 
• Low on computational power but quick. 
• Does not allow high accuracy (except in certain, constrained conditions). 
• Does not interfere with other ongoing cognition. 
System 2/Type 2 process 
• Great computational power. 
• Enables high accuracy. 
• Slow and interferes with other thoughts and actions. 
However, humans are cognitive misers and, therefore, default to Type 1. Evolution has developed our 
brains to be effective and efficient organs for certain tasks. It enables as many processes as possible to 
be set to automatic and keeps its computational power available for ‘important’ actions. However, in a 
decision-making context such as oil and gas, our brain may need a nudge to remind it which actions are 
‘important’, and, hence, to deliberately engage Type 2. 
2.2.1 Two neural pathways for making decisions 
The two ways we make decisions (i.e. Type 1 and Type 2) can be looked at from a neuroscience 
perspective. LeDoux (2003) showed that there are two neural pathways in mammals. 
• One goes direct from the thalamus (the part of the brain responsible for relaying sensory 
and motor signals) to the amygdala (the part of the brain that has primary role in the 
processing of memory, and emotional reactions). It is very quick and has minimal processing. 
It is an early warning system. For example, if you see a coiled snake-like object ahead of you 
on the path, it causes you to jump back and stop. This happens before you recognise the 
object. 
• The other pathway goes from the thalamus to the cortex (responsible for processing and 
thinking) then to the amygdala. It is slower, but with more detailed analysis of information. 
It causes you to realise that the snake-like object is a coiled rope. 





2.2.2 Pattern recognition and emotional tagging 
For Type 1 decision making we depend primarily on two hardwired processes. Our brains assess 
what is going on by using pattern recognition. We react to that information, or ignore it, because of 
emotional tags that are attached to our memories. Both processes help us make excellent decisions 
most of the time. They have survived evolutionary selection because they give us advantages over 
other animals in the food chain (Mattson 2014, Brusman 2017). But under certain circumstances, both 
can mislead us, resulting in poor judgments and bad decisions. 
Pattern recognition is a complex process that integrates information from as many as 30 different 
parts of the brain (Campbell, Whitehead et al. 2009). When faced with a new situation, we make 
assumptions on the basis of prior experiences and judgments. For example, a chess master can assess 
a chess game and choose a high-quality move in as little as 6 seconds by drawing on patterns he or 
she has seen before (Bilalić, Langner et al. 2010). But pattern recognition can also mislead us. When 
we are dealing with seemingly familiar situations, our brains can cause us to think that we understand 
them when we do not. For example, if you catch a glimpse of someone walking by, you may instantly 
‘recognise’ them as a friend. But when you look again more closely, you realise that it is someone else. 
Emotional tagging occurs when the brain stores a memory of an event or action, and it also stores an 
associated emotion with it. Actions we have previously taken, whether they were driven by rational 
decision-making or not, are filed in our brains with emotional tags that serve as markers that can affect 
subsequent thinking. When we make a decision, our brain will recall past situations that seem similar 
to the current one and access the emotions that are tagged to them (Finkelstein, Whitehead et al. 
2009). 
At the psychological level, there is a long-accepted view that emotionally charged events are likely 
to be remembered better (Bergado, Lucas et al. 2011). Emotions, such as fear, anger, pleasure and 
love, are elevated states of arousal that enhance memory and recall of the events occurring during 
those emotional states. The translation of this into neuroscience has led to the proposal of the 
‘emotional tag’ concept, whereby the amygdala is activated by emotionality, resulting in changes to 
the brain regions involved in forming the memory of the emotional event (Richter-Levin and Akirav 
2003). This is an explanation for the availability bias; emotional tagging causes greater ‘availability’ for 
such events, which leads to overestimating the likelihood of them occurring. Under the right 
circumstances, pattern recognition and emotional tagging are very helpful. For example, this is the 
case with the fireground commanders interviewed by Klein (Klein, Calderwood et al. 1986), as 
mentioned earlier. They had attended many fires, and going into a fire situation gives you an elevated 
state of arousal. The experience and feedback they received led to pattern recognition and associated 
emotional tags. Hence, as far as they were concerned, they just ‘knew’ what to do. 
Compounding the problem of high levels of unconscious thinking is the lack of checks and balances 
in our decision making (Campbell, Whitehead et al. 2009). Our brains do not naturally follow the 
optimal model, i.e. to define the objectives, determine the alternatives, and assess each alternative 
against each objective. Instead, we use pattern recognition, which takes cues from the environment 
to recognise the situation, and arrive at a decision to act or not, guided by emotional tags. The two 
processes happen almost instantaneously. Indeed, as Klein (1998) shows, our brains leap to 
conclusions and are reluctant to consider alternatives, and we are particularly bad at revisiting our 





2.3 Decision Analysis 
The term Decision Analysis (DA) was coined in 1966 by Howard (1966) and, since then, a plethora of 
books, such as (Goodwin 2004, McNamee and Celona 2005, Newendorp and Schuyler 2013, 
Charlesworth 2017) and research papers, such as (Brown 1970, Keeney 1982, Thomas 1984, Howard 
1988, Davidson 2001, Lev and Murphy 2007) have been written on it, advocating its use and describing 
how it should be used and applied. DA is a pragmatic methodology which is adaptable and can be 
tailored to meet the needs of the decision. It can be applied simply for more straightforward decisions 
or more fully for decisions which are complex, have uncertainty and high consequences.  
Although it has been around for 50 years, the uptake of DA has not been good. Keeney (2004), one of 
the pioneers of DA with over 40 years of experience, estimated that of 10 000 decisions 
• 9000 are no brainers or of small consequence (e.g. what shall I have for lunch, what shoes shall 
I wear?). 
• 1000 are worthy of careful thinking. 
• Only 40 get systematic thought. 
Of the 40 that get systematic thought, 
• 30 are resolved using qualitative concepts of decisions analysis to guide clear thinking about the 
problem, objectives and alternatives. 
• 10 are resolved using quantitative analysis. 
By contrast, Keeney (2004) indicated how he thought the 1000 decisions requiring careful thought 
should be made. Namely, of the 1000 that are worthy of careful thinking, 
• 750 should be resolved by clear thinking consistent with DA. 
• 200 should be resolved using partial DA (i.e. explicitly addressing specific complexities of the 
decision. This may involve writing out a clear list of objectives, determining relevant 
probabilities, or specifying a value trade-off). 
• 50 should be resolved using complete DA (i.e. all 6 elements of DA should be rigorously 
addressed, to ensure that the best decision is made and will be acted on). 
Keeney is not saying that partial or complete DA should be used for all decisions. He estimated that 
90% of decisions are either no-brainers or have small consequences. The principles of DA should be used 
for the rest, but only 20% of these should use partial DA and 5% complete DA. However, this is still a 
much larger percentage than the current use of DA, according to the estimates of Keeney (2004). 
All major oil and gas project decisions have high levels of uncertainty; the decisions are generally 
complex with multiple, often competing, objectives; and they have high-consequence outcomes. 
Therefore, according to Keeney’s advice, they should use complete DA. Other oil and gas project 
decisions, with lower levels of uncertainty and complexity, would be best handled using partial DA, or 
the principles of DA. 
2.3.1 Dialogue Decision Process 
The need for discussions to take place between the decision makers and the project team to ensure 
that there is clarity and alignment on all aspects of the decision has long been recognized. This is 
particularly important for addressing decisions with organisational complexity, such as field 
development planning for an oil and gas project. A structured approach to this was developed over 30 
years ago known as the Dialogue Decision Process (Fig. 5) and is described in (McNamee and Celona 
2005). A version of this was adopted by General Motors as their decision making process, as described 





Fig. 5 The Dialogue Decision Process. 
Although the decision makers and the project personnel all work together as one team, there are 
distinct roles for each of these, which are as follows: 
• Decision makers: ‘declare’ decisions, approve frame, provide objectives and trade-offs, and 
make decisions. 
• Project team: develop frame and alternatives, assess information, evaluate alternatives, plan 
implementation. 
Unfortunately, the Decision Dialogue Process does not always occur. Instead, project teams 
sometimes adopt an advocacy position, and promote their selected alternative to the decision maker, 
as shown in Fig. 6. 
.  
Fig. 6 The advocacy process 
Walkup and Ligon (2006) cited the advocacy process as one of the key failure modes for oil and gas 
projects, with advocacy occurring both internally within the operator and externally with partners and 
other stakeholders. 
2.3.2 Barriers for wider adoption of Decision Analysis 
Karakaya (2012) reviewed the literature on DA tools, and stated that it suggested the following 
three broad categories of barriers to a wider adoption of DA: 
• Theoretical foundation: complex theoretical foundation, varying solution techniques, lack of 
understanding of underlying assumptions and applicability. 
• Practical applicability: computational challenges, absence of available tools to produce 
required inputs, organisational difficulties. 
• Perceived lack of value: unfavourable cost–benefit posture, unproven in practical domain, 






2.4 Why we don’t always make good decisions 
2.4.1 Heuristics and biases 
Behavioural economist Richard Thaler coined the terms Econs and Humans to distinguish between 
two types of decision makers (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Econs comes from the assumption made by 
economists that people are logical when they make their decisions, and thus choose options that are 
in their own best interests. 
Behavioural economists, by contrast, draw on psychological research, which has repeatedly 
demonstrated that is not the case and that, as humans, people make illogical choices that may not be 
in their best interests due to being subject to a number of heuristics and biases. 
Heuristics are simple procedures, ‘rules of thumb’, that provide quick answers to questions 
(Baddeley, Curtis et al. 2004). For example, it may be difficult to judge how good a wine is by looking at 
information on the label, so we may use the heuristic of price, i.e. cheap = poor quality, expensive = 
good. Heuristic methods are used to speed up the process of finding a solution via mental shortcuts to 
ease the cognitive load of deciding. Sometimes heuristics provide a satisfactory answer, and 
sometimes not (e.g. not all expensive wine might be ‘good’ for the decision maker, and vice versa). 
Problems occur when heuristics cause biases that are systematic deviations from a standard of 
rationality or good judgment. 
Heuristics and biases result from our tendency to rely on Type 1 processes; our use of heuristics 
leads to predictable, systematic biases, as demonstrated by the research of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) 
Examples of biases that may affect decision making on oil and gas projects include the following: 
Availability 
Availability prompts us to overestimate the probability of occurrence of recent or most vivid 
events, i.e. those which are most easily recalled. (Tversky and Kahneman 1973)  
Hindsight bias  
The effect whereby people think that past events were predictable, or at least more predictable 
than they really were and, specifically, that they themselves made better predictions than they 
really had (Roese and Vohs 2012). 
Anchoring 
Anchoring occurs when people consider a particular value for an unknown quantity before 
estimating that quantity. An example of this for an oil and gas project could be where executives 
have given target dates for FID for first oil to the project team. Decades of research has 
demonstrated that people are anchored by values they see prior to making their estimate, such 
that their estimates tend to be closer to the anchoring value than they should be—even if the 
anchoring value is irrelevant (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995) 
Optimism and overconfidence 
People are prone to overestimate how much they understand about the world, and to 
underestimate the role of chance in events. Overconfidence is fed by the illusory certainty of 
hindsight whereby the causes of events, so uncertain prior to the event’s occurrence, seem 
inevitable (and thus easily predictable) once they have occurred (Kahneman 2011). 
The optimism bias focuses on success while underestimating the potential for mistakes and 




Inside view versus outside view 
An example from Kahneman (2011) will be used to illustrate this bias. Despite being an expert on 
biases, Kahneman found that he was not immune to biases in his own work. He and his colleagues 
had a project to design a curriculum and write a textbook on decision making and judgment. They 
felt they had made a good start, which included constructing a detailed outline of the syllabus, 
writing a couple of chapters, and running a few sample lessons. With this in hand, they estimated 
the time to complete the project. 
• Their estimate (inside view): two years to complete the project. 
Kahneman asked one of the team, a curriculum expert, on how long similar teams had taken on 
this task. 
• His reply (outside view): 40% gave up, others took 7–10 years. 
Although the team knew that seven years and a 40% failure rate was a plausible forecast, they 
did not acknowledge what they knew. They ignored the base-rate information and carried on. 
The book was eventually completed eight years later. 
Kahneman says he learned two lessons from this. The first is the distinction between two 
profoundly different approaches to forecasting: the inside view and the outside view (Kahneman 
and Lovallo 1993). The second is that their forecasts exhibited a planning fallacy. 
Planning fallacy 
The planning fallacy occurs when an estimate represents a best-case scenario rather than a 
realistic assessment of the schedule (Kahneman and Tversky 1977).  
Suggestions for helping overcome these biases include the following: 
• Education: forewarned is forearmed. Although we cannot stop being affected by biases, the 
more we understand the way our minds work and are aware of the possibility of biases, then 
the better placed we are to avoid these psychological traps. 
• Checklists: using checklists designed to highlight biases, and help avoid them, can improve 
decision making, particularly for important decisions such as key project decisions. Examples 
of checklists to use are the 12-question checklist from ‘Before you make that big decision’ 
(Kahneman, Lovallo et al. 2011),  and the identifying red flags checklist from ‘Why Good 
Leaders Make Bad Decisions’ (Campbell, Whitehead et al. 2009). 
2.4.2 Lessons from neuroscience 
Burton (2008) described several reasons why we should be cautious about trusting our memories 
and our ‘knowledge’ when making decisions. These include the following: 
• We have defective memories (Loftus and Loftus 1980). The study conducted by Neisser on 
the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster (Neisser and Harsch 1992) demonstrated this. Neisser 
asked 106 students to write down their memories of what happened, where they were and 
how they felt about the event and details of the event. They did this 1 day after the disaster 
and 21/2 years later. Of the two accounts, 25% were strikingly different, 50% had lesser 
errors, less than 10% had all details correct. Prior to being handed their original scripts, most 
students assumed their memory was correct. This is a related effect to the hindsight bias 
described above, which results because our ‘memory’ of an event is updated over time as 
we gain new information, which we did not have at the time. 
• We are fooled by the ‘feeling of knowing’, i.e. we feel we know things that are objectively 
false (Koriat 2000). The feelings of knowing, correctness, conviction and certainty are not 




activated by direct stimulation of an area of the brain or by electrical manipulation, but it 
cannot be triggered by conscious thought (Maril, Simons et al. 2005). 
Wilson showed that each human mind operates largely out of view of its owner (Wilson 2002, 
Wilson and Bar-Anan 2008). This may be because that was the way it evolved initially, and because 
that is the way it works best, under many circumstances. Without such a quick and effective way of 
understanding and acting on the world, it would be difficult to survive. We would be stuck mulling 
over every little decision, such as whether to put our left or right foot forward, as the world sped by. 
However, as a result we are strangers to ourselves, unable to observe the workings of our own minds. 
This means that we believe that we know ourselves; we believe falsehoods to be facts, we believe 
that we are making good judgments and we ‘know’ when we have made a good decision, when none 
of this is, necessarily, the case (Kida 2009). This reinforces the importance of taking an ‘outside view’, 
to avoid bias in our decision making. 
2.5 Front End Loading  
IPA, a benchmarking and research organisation, have been measuring FEL and analysing projects for 
more than 20 years (Merrow and Croker 1995). They have shown that the level of FEL is a good indicator 
of how likely a project is to achieve the promises made at the FID (Griffith 2006, Nandurdikar and 
Wallace 2011, Merrow 2012, Nandurdikar and Kirkham 2012). They have shown that FEL drives cost 
predictability and schedule predictability, and reduces operability problems (Merrow 2011). 
Of particular interest is Nandurdikar and Wallace’s (2011) paper on the impact of schedule 
aggressiveness on project outcomes. This shows that when people plan to achieve speed by 
compromising on front end development time, this typically results in poorer outcomes; that is, a later 
start up and lower production attained. Counterintuitively, it seems that one needs to go slow to go 
fast. That is, the way to achieve an earlier start up time is to “slow down” the project in the front end 
phase to gather all the necessary appraisal data so that an optimal level of definition can be achieved.  
Fig. 7 has been created to illustrate the impact of schedule aggressiveness. The top line (plan) shows 
a typical case where aggressive target dates have been set. The second line shows what happens when 
a project is schedule driven, and FID is taken before sufficient FEL has been completed. This means 
that key decisions are based on incomplete and inaccurate information, leading to changes and rework 
required, and frequently resulting in a late start up and reduced production. The third line shows what 
would happen if optimal FEL had been completed. Note that, despite FEL being optimal, start up is still 
later than the target date and production is lower than planned. This is because the aggressive targets 
set were unrealistic and are an example of the planning fallacy and not taking the outside view, as 





Fig. 7 Impact of schedule aggressiveness 
Of course, there are circumstances where holding a project until a pre-determined level of definition 
is achieved could be considered to be counter-productive (Lowes and Van Driel 2004). Examples of 
this could include: 
• Missing a market opportunity that might be critical to the project’s business success, especially 
for gas projects. 
• Missing a commercial opportunity, for example, a heavy lift vessel or a drill rig at favourable 
rates. 
• Contractual obligations with onerous penalties if schedule commitments are not met, for 
example, a licence expires. 
In such cases, it is suggested that an assessment is made based on value: will the value lost by not 
completing project definition be more than compensated by the value gained from the opportunity; 
for example, hiring a heavy lift vessel at favourable rates. 
It is important to be realistic in the assessment of the impact of an earlier FID.  As per Fig. 7, there can 
be unintended consequences of chasing schedules. The result of not completing definition (FEL) could be to 
delay start up such that the opportunity is missed, and hence there could be the double hit of losing the value 
of the opportunity, as well as losing value due to an incomplete project definition. 
2.5.1 Relationship between FEL and DQ 
There appears to be little literature which relates FEL and DQ, with the possible exception of the 
paper by Walkup and Ligon (2006) which advocates the use of both of these. One similarity between 
FEL and DQ is that they are both measures of readiness to take a decision. Another similarity is that 
neither are an exact science, there is judgment required in assessing both of these. As stated in section 
1.2.4. on DQ: 100% is the point at which the cost of further improvement – in terms of effort and delay 
– isn’t worth it. The same principle applies to FEL. The optimal level of FEL, which IPA call ‘Best 
Practical’ (Merrow and Croker 1995), is the point at which the value from improving the requirement 
is outweighed by the cost. 
There is a strong connection between FEL and DQ in terms of readiness to make a key project 
decision. Perhaps the simplest way to relate these two is to consider FEL as a key part of the 




2.5.2 Cognitive dissonance and FEL 
Cognitive dissonance is the psychological stress experienced by someone who holds two or more 
contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values at the same time. This is triggered when an existing belief clashes 
with new evidence perceived by that person. When confronted with facts that contradict personal 
beliefs, ideals, and values, people will find a way to resolve the contradiction in order to reduce their 
discomfort. This could be by adding new parts to the reasoning causing the psychological dissonance, 
or by actively avoiding situations and contradictory information likely to increase the magnitude of 
the cognitive dissonance. 
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962) centres around the idea that if a person 
knows various things that are not consistent with one another, they will try to make them more 
consistent. Two items of information (about behaviour, feelings, opinions etc) that do not fit together 
psychologically are said to be in a dissonant relation to each other. It is ‘cognitive’ because the theory 
deals with ‘thinking’ about relations between items of information in the brain. 
Cognitive dissonance may be experienced in a company when it receives a report on the status of 
FEL that does not align with their own perceptions, expectations or desires, e.g.: 
• An external benchmarking organisation has stated that FEL is incomplete and only at a ‘Fair’ 
level, and recommend the project is not yet ready to take FID.  
• The project team believe that they are in good shape, have done all the necessary work and are 
ready to take FID. 
A description of what might result from the cognitive dissonance experienced after receiving such 
an assessment from an external benchmarking organisation is given in this extract from a paper by 
Smith (Smith 2000). 
“The biggest challenge, however, is getting commitment and buy-in from the project team and 
company to the IPA assessment. In many instances, IPA reports have been summarily destroyed 
when they identified significant organizational or communication gaps or biases in project 
development. In addition, the downside of using an "impartial" third party is that they will be 
considered an outsider and will have only the information that a member of the project team has 
provided. 
If IPA identifies project weaknesses or gaps, the business unit or project team may consciously or 
unconsciously side-track the IPA assessment by selectively discrediting one area of the analysis 
where - due to limitations in project data - the conclusion may be marginal. This one area will 
then be exploited to trash the entire effort, rather than building on the report to improve project 
performance.”  
2.5.3 Statistical predictions versus expert judgment 
In 1954 Meehl (1954) examined the relationship between expert judgment and statistical prediction. 
He reviewed the results of 20 studies that had analysed whether clinical predications by experts were 
more accurate than statistically based methods of prediction. The experts were trained professional 
clinical psychologists relying on their expert judgement to diagnose patients with various disorders. The 
statistical predictions, by contrast, were made by combining a few scores or ratings according to a rule. 
The results showed that, even when using a small amount of information and a simple rule, the statistical 
predictions were significantly more accurate than expert judgement. 
Since then around 200 studies – for example Grove, Zald et al. (2000) and Kuncel, Klieger et al. 




wines (Ashenfelter 2008), longevity of cancer patients (Chow, Harth et al. 2001) and advertising page 
sales forecasts for Time magazine (Ashton 1984). About 60% have shown significantly better accuracy 
for predictions using algorithms rather than by expert judgment, and the other comparisons generally 
score a draw (Kahneman 2011). 
Dawes (1979) developed Meehl’s work further, showing that even a non-statistically based model 
is good enough to outperform expert judgment. The research leads to a counterintuitive conclusion: 
to maximise the likelihood of achieving predicted outcomes, decisions should be based on formulae 
rather than by using expert judgment. 
This has interesting implications for the FEL scores calculated by IPA. IPA have shown - across 
thousands of projects - that the FEL score is a good indicator of the likelihood of a successful project 
outcome. Meehl’s and Dawes’ research show that even simple models are better at predicting 
outcomes than expert judgment. The IPA model is much more than a simple model, and has statistical 
validity (Nandurdikar and Kirkham 2012), suggesting that its predictions are likely to be significantly 
better than those using expert judgment. 
2.6 When to trust expert judgment 
The research into prediction and the biases cited in the previous sections portrays expertise in a poor 
light. This, however, is not the case for all research into expertise. Klein is a research psychologist who 
pioneered the field of naturalistic decision making (Klein 2008) and whose recognition primed decision 
(RPD) model has provoked changes in the ways the Marines and Army train their officers to make 
decisions. Klein studied how decisions are made in the field under typical conditions, using 
experienced people such as fireground commanders. Note that the decisions that he studied were in 
very different situations from those on an oil and gas project. Klein was generally looking at situations 
where the decision maker was under intense time pressure, and there was not the option of taking 
time out to do some considered decision analysis. 
Klein rejected the focus on biases in the heuristics and biases approach, criticising this mode as overly 
concerned with failure and driven by artificial experiments rather than by the study of real people 
doing things that matter. Given this, Kahneman and Klein started poles apart, but agreed to 
collaborate to answer the question: When can you trust an experienced professional who claims to 
have an intuition? 
In Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree (Kahneman and Klein 2009) and in the 
interview When can you trust your gut? (Kahneman and Klein 2010), they debated when you can trust 
intuition or gut-instinct. 
They agreed on the definition of intuition, which is the one developed by Simon (1992):  
‘The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to information stored in 
memory, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less 
than recognition.’ 
They agreed that to protect decisions against bias, the following tests should be passed (Campbell and 
Whitehead 2010). 
• The familiarity test: Have we frequently experienced identical or similar situations? 
• The feedback test: Did we get quick and reliable feedback on the outcomes of past 
decisions/judgments? 
• The measured-emotions test: Is our thinking clouded by emotions we have experienced in 




• The independence test: Are we likely to be influenced by any inappropriate personal motivations 
or biased thinking? (No = pass.) 
If a situation fails even one of these tests, then we need to regard the expert’s intuition as potentially 
unreliable and to strengthen the remainder of the decision process to reduce the risk of a poor 
outcome. 
These findings are similar to those of Shanteau (1992), who found that task characteristics associated 
with poor performance in experts included: less predictable problems; those where feedback was not 
available; and, for tasks which are unique, rather than repetitive. 
Reviewing each of the tests for a typical oil and gas project: 
• The familiarity test: There are some projects where the situations may be similar; for example, 
a single well tie-back to an existing subsea manifold. Generally, however, there will be unique 
features to each project. There are errors if intuition learned in one environment is applied 
within another. 
• The feedback test: Quick and reliable feedback is not generally received for oil and gas projects. 
It is often several years between the FID and ready for start up (RFSU), and then a further six 
months to a year before steady production is achieved and feedback is received on outcomes. 
• The measured-emotions test: This tends to be more on a personal level, depending upon 
experiences on previous projects. 
• The independence test: It is hard to be dispassionate when you have invested a lot of time and 
effort into an oil and gas project. The four key heuristics and biases mentioned previously (i.e. 
anchoring, optimism and overconfidence, taking the inside view, and the planning fallacy) may 
well come into play here. 
Overall, therefore, oil and gas projects are unlikely to pass the above tests for using expert judgment as 
a foundation for decision making. 
Klein and the naturalistic decision making proponents have also examined the conditions necessary for 
the construction and use of an algorithm for decision making (Kahneman and Klein 2009). They 
emphasise that the conditions are stringent and include: 
• Confidence in the adequacy of the list of variables that will be used. 
• A reliable and measurable criterion. 
• A body of similar cases. 
• A cost/benefit ratio that warrants the investment in the algorithmic approach. 
• A low likelihood that changing conditions will render the algorithm obsolete. 
2.7 Why it is hard to be a good decision maker for oil and gas projects 
The above sections have provided some of the reasons why it is hard to be a good decision maker. It 
is not because we are not smart, it is because we are human. Our brains have evolved to be efficient, 
to take shortcuts and trust our intuition. Under the right circumstances, this is very useful. However, 
for complex decisions under uncertainty, it is not appropriate. We are also subject to heuristics and 
biases that affect our thinking. We have fallible memories and we think we ‘know’ we have made a 
good decision when this is not necessarily the case. 
There may also be motives and drivers that conflict with what would otherwise be a good decision. 
Decisions to proceed with projects may be driven by commercial, political or social imperatives, which 




Burcham et al. 2014). In addition, there may be misalignments between company objectives and 
personal incentives (Begg, Bratvold et al. 2003). 
It is even harder to be a good decision maker for oil and gas projects, because there are additional 
factors that apply.  As discussed previously, the requirements for relying on our experience and 
judgment include that we have frequently experienced identical or similar situations, and we have 
received quick and reliable feedback on the outcomes of past decisions/judgments. However, this is 
not the case for oil and gas projects, which take a long time, and the projects are generally dissimilar. 
So, the learning is different on each one. We do not get quick feedback, because there is a significant 
time between the final investment decision and the outcomes in terms of cost, time and production 
attained. The feedback is also not reliable, as our memories are revised by subsequent experience 
(Budson and Price 2005). The longer that time passes, the more likely it is that memories will change. 
Hence, the feedback we receive may be inaccurate, and may also be affected by the hindsight bias. 
In addition, a significant number of projects are schedule driven, which means that priority is placed 
on achieving schedule, over other objectives (Walkup and Ligon 2006). Hence, the desire to pass 
through decision gates ‘on time’ overrides the desire to ensure readiness to make a decision, which 
may lead to decisions being taken on the basis of inaccurate, irrelevant or incomplete information. 
2.8 Premortem 
A useful adjunct to DA is to perform a premortem, which provides a useful check before finalising a 
decision. Research on prospective hindsight (Mitchell, Russo et al. 1989) has found that imagining that 
an event has already occurred increases the ability to correctly identify reasons for future outcomes 
by 30%. This concept was used by Klein (2007) to create the premortem, which provides a safe 
environment for project team members to identify weaknesses that could result in project failure. The 
premortem technique has been shown to be effective in a crisis-management planning context 
(Veinott, Klein et al. 2010). 
A premortem is like a postmortem, but with one significant difference; a postmortem takes place after 
the event to determine why things went wrong; a premortem occurs during a project to prevent the 
project going wrong, or to minimise the consequences if it does go wrong. The premortem takes place 
after an important decision has been made, but before it has been formally committed. Key project 
team members are gathered together. The leader starts the exercise by informing everyone that it is 
now a time in the future, when the project has been implemented as per the decision, and the 
outcome is a spectacular disaster. During the next few minutes, everyone works independently and 
writes down all the potential reasons they can think of for the failure, especially things that would not 
normally be mentioned for fear of being impolitic. The leader then asks each team member to read one 
reason from their list; everyone states a different reason until they are all recorded. After the session 
has finished, the project manager reviews the list, looking for ways to strengthen the planned way 
forward. 
A benefit of the premortem is that it legitimises doubt, which helps overcoming groupthink (Esser 1998) 
that can affect teams once a decision has been made. Otherwise, when a team comes to a decision, 
and particularly when the leader has a strong involvement in it, doubts about the plan are gradually 
(even unconsciously) suppressed. This contributes to overconfidence in the team, because only 
support for the decision is expressed. The premortem overcomes this by letting doubts be raised, and 
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Historically, oil and gas projects have struggled to achieve 
promised outcomes. Research has demonstrated that a good 
predictor of project outcomes is the level of front end loading 
(FEL) achieved at the final investment decision (FID). Specifi-
cally, projects with high levels of FEL have more predictable 
costs, shorter schedules and better production attainment.
Anecdotally, however, the application of FEL within the 
industry is patchy, with many companies advocating its use 
but allowing projects to pass decision gates with incomplete 
levels of FEL. 
To understand why this occurs, the authors have inter-
viewed more than 30 senior personnel from a range of oil and 
gas companies, asking them a series of questions about their 
understanding and acceptance of FEL. Those interviewed had 
significant experience, averaging more than 25 years in oil 
and gas, and more than 20 years’ experience on opportunities 
and projects.
Results suggest that, while FEL is highly regarded and the 
concept is well understood, it is not always applied appropri-
ately. It is used as a final hurdle—checking the level of FEL just 
prior to the FID—rather than as a guide from the early stages 
to determine what work needs to be focused on to achieve a 
good FEL score. Furthermore, lower FEL benchmark scores 
are often overridden by expert judgment, justified by a proj-
ect’s unique characteristics, allowing it to proceed. 
This approach, focusing on the specific attributes of a proj-
ect and ignoring general effects or predictive models such as 
FEL benchmarking, is referred to as taking an inside view and 
is known to produce inferior results, such as cost and time 
overruns. The authors argue that a stricter application of FEL 
and benchmarking predictions, integrating it from the early 
stages of projects and allowing overrides only in truly excep-
tional cases, will produce superior outcomes.
KEYWORDS
Front end loading, FEL, final investment decision, FID, deci-
sion, outcome, opportunities, development, project, prediction, 
intuition, heuristics, biases, benchmarking, interview, oil and 




There is a long history of oil and gas projects not achieving 
promised outcomes. Research has demonstrated that a good 
predictor of project outcomes is the level of front end loading 





(FEL) achieved at the final investment decision (FID). Specifi-
cally, projects with high levels of FEL have more predictable 
costs, shorter schedules and better production attainment.
Anecdotally, however, the application of FEL within the in-
dustry is patchy, with many companies advocating its use but 
allowing projects to pass decision gates with incomplete levels 
of FEL. 
To understand why this occurs, the authors interviewed 
more than 30 senior personnel from a range of oil and gas 
companies. The authors asked them a series of questions about 
their understanding of the concept of FEL and how it is being 
applied. 
It is acknowledged that FID decisions are entrepreneurial 
decisions based on a deliverable project, delivering a product 
to a specific market at a point in time. By the nature of the se-
niority of the people who make them, they may rely on their 
expertise and experience as much as facts and analysis. This 
paper looks at the impact of doing this and when it is appropri-
ate to rely on expert judgement. 
This is part of a larger research project, aimed at improv-
ing project outcomes by making more effective use of FEL and 
decision analysis, and so the interviews included questions on 
decision analysis. This paper, however, is focused on FEL, and 
the only aspect of decision analysis that is investigated here 
is the impact of using expert judgement for decision making. 
Decision analysis and its integration with FEL will be the focus 
of future work and publications.
Front end loading
FEL means investing significant effort in the phases that 
lead up to the FID. It involves developing sufficient strategic 
information to address uncertainty and help make decisions to 
commit resources to maximise the potential for success. Note 
that success means different things for different phases. In the 
early phases the focus is on creating value, through selecting 
the concept that will maximise value. During front end engi-
neering design (FEED) the focus is on ensuring that there is 
sufficient definition, so that the predicted outcomes at FID will 
be accurate, and value will not be lost during execution due to 
changes required. Put simply, success in the early phases is 
about maximising value; for the later phases it is about achiev-
ing predicted outcomes.
For a typical oil and gas development, this means that suf-
ficient work is carried out to confirm that the selected develop-
ment concept is consistent with the realistic1 range of potential 
subsurface outcomes. It means that well design does not com-
mence until there is sufficient subsurface definition to finalise 
well targets, and facilities design does not commence until 
there is sufficient certainty on the predicted ranges of volumes, 
throughputs and fluid properties.
The FEL benchmark scoring is based on assessing whether 
activities have been completed in the right sequence and dur-
ing the right phase, and on whether the organisation is inte-
grated sufficiently to allow the appropriate information flow 
to facilitate this. 
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If sufficient FEL is not undertaken, there are two main drivers 
of lost value: selecting and executing the wrong project (even if 
it is executed well); and, changes required due to an incomplete 
level of definition, necessitating rework.
Independent Projects Analysis (IPA), a benchmarking and 
research organisation, have been measuring FEL and analys-
ing projects for more than 20 years (Merrow and Croker, 1995). 
They have shown that the level of FEL is a good indicator of how 
likely a project is to achieve the promises made at the FID (Nan-
durdikar and Kirkham, 2012; Merrow, 2011b; Nandurdikar and 
Wallace, 2011; Griffith, 2006). They have shown that FEL drives 
cost predictability and schedule predictability, and reduces oper-
ability problems (Merrow, 2011a). 
Of particular interest is Nandurdikar and Wallace’s (2011) 
paper on the impact of schedule aggressiveness on project out-
comes. This shows that when people plan to achieve speed by 
compromising on front end development time, this typically re-
sults in poorer outcomes; that is, a later start up and lower pro-
duction attained. Counterintuitively, it seems that one needs 
to go slow to go fast. That is, the way to achieve an earlier start 
up time is to “slow down”2 the project in the front end phase to 
gather all the necessary appraisal data so that an optimal level of 
definition can be achieved. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Of course, there are circumstances where holding a project 
until a pre-determined level of definition is achieved could be 
considered to be counter-productive (Lowes and van Driel, 
2004). Examples of this could include:
• Missing a market opportunity that might be critical to the 
project’s business success, especially for gas projects.
• Missing a commercial opportunity, for example, a heavy lift 
vessel or a drill rig at favourable rates.
• Contractual obligations with onerous penalties if schedule 
commitments are not met, for example, a licence expires.
In such cases, it is suggested that an assessment is made based 
on value: will the value lost by not completing project definition 
be more than compensated by the value gained from the oppor-
tunity; for example, hiring a heavy lift vessel at favourable rates.
It is important to be realistic in the assessment of the impact 
of an earlier FID. As per Figure 1, there can be unintended conse-
quences of chasing schedules. This could result in missing the op-
portunity and ending up with the double-whammy of losing value 
by not completing FEL, and missing the value of the opportunity.
NOTES
1. Realistic means that the predicted outcome is consistent 
with the information and is unbiased. It is neither over-
confident (i.e. the range of uncertainty is too narrow) nor 
optimistic (i.e. the likelihood of desirable outcomes has 
been overweighted, and the whole range has shifted in the 
direction of a favourable outcome).
2. “Slow down” has been written in inverted commas as, 
although one should be working as fast as possible during 
this phase, it means that one should not take key deci-
sions—like moving into FEED and FID—until one has the 
necessary information.
Statistical predictions versus expert judgment
Research has examined the relationship between expert 
judgement and statistical prediction (Meehl, 1954). In his book, 
Paul Meehl reviewed the results of 20 studies that had analysed 
whether clinical predications by experts were more accurate 
than mechanical methods of predictions. The experts were 
trained professional clinical psychologists relying on their ex-
pert judgement to diagnose patients with various disorders. The 
statistical predictions, by contrast, were made by combining a 
few scores or ratings according to a rule. The results showed 
that, even when using a small amount of information and a 
simple rule, the statistical predictions were significantly more 
accurate than expert judgement. 
Since then, around 200 studies—for example Grove et al, 
(2000) and Kuncel et al (2013)—have been carried out on a 
wide range of subjects including the longevity of cancer pa-
tients, football game results, and future wine prices. About 60% 
of studies have shown significantly better accuracy for the al-
gorithms compared with the experts. The other comparisons 
generally score a draw, with almost none showing expert judge-
ment to be superior (Kahneman, 2011).
Robyn Dawes developed Meehl’s work further (Dawes, 
1979), showing that even a non-statistically based model is 
good enough to outperform expert judgment. The research 
leads to a counterintuitive conclusion: to maximise the like-
lihood of achieving predicted outcomes, decisions should be 
based on formulae rather than by using expert judgment.
This has interesting implications for the FEL scores calculat-
ed by IPA. IPA has shown—across thousands of projects—that 
the FEL score is a good indicator of the likelihood of a success-
ful project outcome. Meehl’s and Dawes’ research show that 
even simple models are better at predicting outcomes than 
expert judgment. The IPA model is much more than a simple 
model, and has statistical validity, suggesting that its predic-
tions are likely to be significantly superior to those of experts. 
Heuristics and biases
Behavioural economist Richard Thaler coined the terms 
Econs and Humans to distinguish between two types of deci-
sion makers (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Econs comes from the 
assumption made by economists that people are logical when 
they make their decisions, and thus choose options that are in 
their own best interests. 
Behavioural economists, by contrast, draw on psychologi-
cal research, which has repeatedly demonstrated that is not 
the case and that, as humans, people make illogical choices 
that may not be in their best interests due to being subject to 
a number of heuristics and biases, as described in the seminal 
work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; see, for example, 
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995), Kahneman (2011), Kahneman 
and Tversky (1977), and Tversky and Kahneman (1981; 1974). 
Heuristics, in this context, are simple processes that help to 
find easy—though often imperfect—answers to difficult ques-
tions. Heuristic methods are used to speed-up the process of 
finding a satisfactory solution by mental shortcuts to ease the 
cognitive load of making a decision. Problems occur, however, 
 
Fig.1 : Impact of Schedule Aggressiveness 
 Figure 1. Impact of schedule aggressiveness.
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when they cause biases and lead to systematic deviations from 
a standard of rationality or good judgment.
Heuristics can be useful for situations where the potential 
consequences of an incorrect decision would not be serious. 
This is, however, not generally the case for major decisions on 
oil and gas projects.
Some key heuristics and biases are discussed in the follow-
ing sections.
ANCHORING
Anchoring occurs when people consider a particular value 
for an unknown quantity before estimating that quantity. An ex-
ample of this for an oil and gas project could be where executives 
have given target dates for FID or first oil to the project team. 
Decades of research has demonstrated that people are anchored 
by values they see prior to making their estimate, such that their 
estimates tend to be closer to the anchoring value than they 
should be—even if the anchoring value is irrelevant (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974).
OPTIMISM AND OVERCONFIDENCE
People are prone to overestimate how much they understand 
about the world, and to underestimate the role of chance in 
events. Overconfidence is fed by the illusory certainty of hind-
sight whereby the causes of events, so uncertain prior to the 
event’s occurrence, seem inevitable (and thus easily predict-
able) once they have occurred (Kahneman, 2011).
The optimism bias focuses on success while underestimat-
ing the potential for mistakes and miscalculations (Lovallo and 
Kahneman, 2003).
INSIDE VIEW VERSUS OUTSIDE VIEW, 
AND PLANNING FALLACY 
An example from Kahneman will be used to illustrate these 
biases (Kahneman, 2011). Despite being an expert on biases, 
Kahneman found that he was not immune to biases in his own 
work. He and his colleagues had a project to design a curricu-
lum and write a textbook on decision making and judgment. 
They felt they had made a good start, which included construct-
ing a detailed outline of the syllabus, writing a couple of chap-
ters, and running a few sample lessons. With this in hand, they 
estimated the time to complete the project.
• Their estimate (inside view): two years to complete the proj-
ect. 
Kahneman asked one of the team, a curriculum expert, on 
how long similar teams had taken on this task.
• His reply (outside view): 40% gave up, the others took 
7–10 years.
Although the team knew that seven years and a 40% failure 
rate was a plausible forecast, they did not acknowledge what 
they knew. They ignored the base-rate information and carried 
on. The book was eventually completed eight years later.
Kahneman says he learned two lessons from this. The first is 
the distinction between two profoundly different approaches to 
forecasting: the inside view and the outside view (Kahneman 
and Lovallo, 1993). The second is that their forecasts exhibited 
a planning fallacy whereby their estimate represented a best-
case scenario rather than a realistic assessment of the schedule 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1977).
Interestingly, one of the authors of this paper had a similar 
experience when writing a decision analysis book (Bratvold and 
Begg, 2010). The estimate was one year, and the book ended up 
taking six years to write.
When to trust expert judgment
The research into prediction and the biases cited in the pre-
vious sections portrays expertise in a poor light. This, however, 
is not the case for all research into expertise. Gary Klein is a 
research psychologist who pioneered the field of naturalistic 
decision making (Klein, 2008)  and whose recognition primed 
decision (RPD) model has provoked changes in the ways the 
Marines and Army train their officers to make decisions. Klein 
studied how decisions are made in the field under typical con-
ditions, using experienced people such as fireground com-
manders. Note that the decisions that he studied were in very 
different situations from those on an oil and gas project. Klein 
was generally looking at situations where the decision maker 
was under intense time pressure, and there was not the option 
of taking time out to do some considered decision analysis.
Klein rejected the focus on biases in the heuristics and bi-
ases approach, criticising this mode as overly concerned with 
failure and driven by artificial experiments rather than by the 
study of real people doing things that matter. Given this, Kah-
neman and Klein started poles apart, but agreed to collaborate 
to answer the question: When can you trust an experienced 
professional who claims to have an intuition?
In Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree 
(Kahneman and Klein, 2009) and in the interview When can 
you trust your gut? (Kahneman and Klein, 2010), they debated 
when you can trust intuition or gut-instinct.
They agreed on the definition of intuition, which is the one 
developed by Herbert Simon; ‘The situation has provided a cue; 
this cue has given the expert access to information stored in 
memory, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is 
nothing more and nothing less than recognition,’ (Simon, 1992).
They agreed that to protect decisions against bias, the fol-
lowing tests should be passed (Campbell and Whitehead, 2010).
• The familiarity test: Have we frequently experienced identi-
cal or similar situations?
• The feedback test: Did we get quick and reliable feedback 
on the outcomes of past decisions/judgments?
• The measured-emotions test: Is our thinking clouded by 
emotions we have experienced in similar or related situa-
tions? (No = pass.)
• The independence test: Are we likely to be influenced by 
any inappropriate personal motivations or biased thinking? 
(No = pass.)
If a situation fails even one of these tests, then we need to 
regard the expert’s intuition as potentially unreliable and to 
strengthen the remainder of the decision process to reduce the 
risk of a poor outcome. 
These findings are similar to those of James Shanteau, who 
found that task characteristics associated with poor perfor-
mance in experts included: less predictable problems; those 
where feedback was not available; and, for tasks which are 
unique, rather than repetitive (Shanteau, 1992).
Reviewing each of the tests for a typical oil and gas project:
• The familiarity test: There are some projects where the situa-
tions may be similar; for example, a single well tie-back to an 
existing subsea manifold. Generally, however, there will be 
unique features to each project. There are errors if intuition 
learned in one environment is applied within another.
• The feedback test: Quick and reliable feedback is not gener-
ally received for oil and gas projects. It is often several years 
between the FID and ready for start up (RFSU), and then 
a further six months to a year before steady production is 
achieved and feedback is received on outcomes.
• The measured-emotions test: This tends to be more on a 
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• The independence test: It is hard to be dispassionate when 
you have invested a lot of time and effort into an oil and gas 
project. The four key heuristics and biases mentioned previ-
ously (i.e. anchoring, optimism and overconfidence, taking 
the inside view, and the planning fallacy) may well come into 
play here.
Overall, therefore, oil and gas projects are unlikely to pass the 
above tests for using expert judgment as a foundation for decision 
making.
Klein and the naturalistic decision making proponents have also 
examined the conditions necessary for the construction and use 
of an algorithm for decision making (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). 
They emphasise that the conditions are stringent and include:
• Confidence in the adequacy of the list of variables that will be 
used. 
• A reliable and measurable criterion. 
• A body of similar cases. 
• A cost/benefit ratio that warrants the investment in the algo-
rithmic approach.
• A low likelihood that changing conditions will render the algo-
rithm obsolete.
The following is an assessment of whether the FEL benchmark 
score satisfies the conditions necessary to make it suitable as an 
algorithm for use in decision making. 
• Confidence in the adequacy of the list of variables used
— IPA have shown, based on benchmarking many thou-
sands of projects, that the variables that they use, and 
the algorithms that they have constructed based on 
these variables, can be used to develop FEL bench-
mark scores that correlate with predicted outcomes.
• A reliable and measurable criterion
— IPA have demonstrated that the FEL benchmark score 
is a reliable and measurable criterion.
• A body of similar cases
— There are large numbers of cases for a wide range of 
project types. Although projects tend to be bespoke, 
there are generally sufficient similarities for bench-
marking to be appropriate. For step out projects, 
such as those employing new technology or novel 
approaches, this may not be the case.
• Cost/benefit ratio
— Generally, for oil and gas projects the cost of under-
taking FEL benchmarking is low compared to the 
potential benefits.
• Changing conditions
— It is possible that a new approach may come along that 
would mean that the algorithms and the resultant FEL 
benchmark scores need to be adjusted, but there is a 
low likelihood they would be rendered obsolete.
Overall, the conditions for using of FEL benchmark scores to 
drive decision making on oil and gas projects have been met, and 
are supported by extensive research. There, however, are grounds 
for being more cautious when applying these to step out projects, 
such as those using new technology or novel approaches.
METHOD
The first phase of this research was by interview, using mainly 
open questions to elicit from the participants their understanding 
of the concept of FEL, their experience of using it, and to find out 
how it is being applied in their company. This is part of a larger 
research project, aimed at improving project outcomes by making 
more effective use of FEL and decision analysis, and so questions 
were also asked on decision analysis. This paper, however, is solely 
focused on FEL. A second phase of research is planned to be car-
ried out. This will be in the form of a structured survey, and will 
be designed for quantitative analysis.
The participants were targeted to be oil and gas personnel who 
were involved in developments and projects in a variety of roles 
(e.g. decision makers, development managers, analysts, subject 
matter experts). They were initially targeted for their areas of 
expertise, using connections known to the researchers. After be-
ing interviewed, they were asked to suggest others who might be 
suitable, with a focus on obtaining participants from a diversity of 
companies, organisation levels and role types. In addition, a You-
Tube video (Newman, 2015) was created to provide an overview of 
the research, and to encourage oil and gas personnel to participate 
in the interviews. Unfortunately, there were no additional respon-
dents from the YouTube video.
The length of the interviews ranged from 30 minutes to just 
over an hour, with a typical length of around 45 minutes. The 
interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed, or inter-
view notes taken when companies requested these not be audio-
recorded. The interview questions were about the processes and 
tools used to make decisions on projects, and not about the details 
of the projects themselves. Hence this research can be completed 
without using any commercially confidential information. The 
following measures were taken to further protect companies and 
ensure anonymity:
• The interview notes were reviewed by the researchers, who 
removed any information that they considered could lead to 
an individual or company being identified, or could be com-
mercially confidential or sensitive.
• The draft interview notes were then sent to the participant to 
edit as they considered necessary.
In practice, the participants generally agreed with the interview 
notes, and there was very little editing by them.
Interviews were carried out with 34 senior personnel from the 
oil and gas industry. These were all highly experienced personnel, 
having an average of 29 years of industry experience (standard 
deviation, σ = 8.8 years) and 24 years of experience in opportuni-
ties and project (standard deviation, σ = 7.5 years). 
The participants were all Australian based, except for two based 
in the UK. The interviewees were from six companies, two of which 
are global majors, three are mid-sized, and one is a smaller oil and 
gas company. Around two-thirds (23 of 34) of participants came 
from two of these companies, so this is not a representative sample. 
The participants were from a range of organisational levels, and 
have been categorised into three groups: professionals, managers 
and executives (n = 4, 19 and 11, respectively). The professionals 
were generally experts in a technical discipline. The executives 
were personnel at the vice president—or equivalent—level. 
All the interviews conducted have been included in the analy-
sis; none were rejected.
The interview questions were in a semi-structured format to 
allow for follow-up questions to be used to clarify answers, and 
for further exploration of areas of interest. The standard questions 
asked on FEL were as follows. 
• Are you familiar with the concept of FEL?
• What does FEL mean to you?
• How useful and important do you think FEL is?
• Are you familiar with FEL benchmarking?
• Have you used FEL benchmarking on your projects?
• How are FEL benchmarking scores used?
• How important do you think the FEL is compared with achiev-
ing cost and schedule milestone targets?
• What has been your experience with FEL—positive, negative, 
and perceived problems?
At the end of the interview, people were asked to do an assess-
ment of their level of knowledge and understanding of FEL using 
the template shown in Figure 2. They selected from five options: 
low, basic, fair, good and excellent. The descriptors to define the 
options are shown in the next sections. In addition, they were 
asked to assess the level of knowledge and understanding of a 
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typical decision maker in their organisation. A significant num-
ber (9 out of 11) of executives interviewed said they were decision 
makers themselves. Each of these were asked to assess a more 
senior decision maker, such as the CEO. 
RESULTS
Figures 3–6 were drawn up based on the responses to the 
questions:
• how useful and important do you think FEL is?
• how are FEL benchmarking scores used?
and on subsequent questions to clarify these. 
How useful and important do you think FEL is?
For the first question on how important and useful FEL is, four 
categories were drawn up. That is, these categories were not pre-
conceived choices given to the participants to select from; rather, 
they were created in response to the data.
• Very (useful and important)
• Important
• Balanced (i.e. it is important, but other criteria must also be 
considered)
• Unimportant
An example for each category is given below. A larger selection 
of typical answers is given in Appendix 1.
• Very
— I think it is extremely important. The worst projects I’ve 
been involved with have been those where scope uncer-
tainty has progressed way beyond where it should have.
• Important
— It’s a good check to see how mature you are. Front end 
loading means that you have your ducks in a row. 
• Balanced
— I think there’s a balance to be had. Clearly getting the 
basics right is fundamental to project success, so it is 
really important. 
— But it can become a cottage industry. And the less expe-
rienced a team are, the more likely they are to over-egg 
the front end loading.
Unimportant
— There were no responses in this category.
How are FEL benchmarking scores used?
For the second question, about how the FEL benchmarking 
scores are used, there were five categories drawn up. Again, 
these categories were not choices given to the participants to 





• Do not know
The hard criteria category means that there is a set require-
ment upfront for what the FEL score needs to be, otherwise 
the project will not proceed through the gate. There were no 
responses in this category. 
 The soft criteria category means that there is a target score 
or grouping to be achieved; for example, best practical, good, 
or fair before proceeding through the gate. Where the target is 
not reached, however, the project may still be allowed through 
the decision gate if there is considered to be sufficient justi-
fication.
The third category, contributing, is for when there is no 
target for the FEL score, but it is used as a contributory factor 
in making the decisions.
The not used category is self-explanatory.
The do not know category is included as a number of peo-
ple were too far removed from the decision makers to have an 
understanding of how the FEL scores are used as part of the 
decision making.
An example for each category is given below. A larger selec-
tion of typical answers is given in Appendix 1.
• Soft criteria
— In my mind, as long as we’re meeting ‘fair’, I didn’t 
get too concerned. I may still put more effort into 
something to get a better result, but in this balance 
between costs, effort, speed and trying to optimise 
what you’re trying to do, if I would have ‘fair’ in one 
particular category, I’d assess what that would mean 
to me. It wouldn’t worry me too much, but it would 
mean in the next phase, or prior to the decision, I 
still would be looking at what I’d need to do in that 
area.
• Contributing
— With my current company, just as an indicator. In my 
previous again it was more a qualitative assessment. 
There was not, say ‘Unless you have a score under xx 
you wouldn’t progress through the gate’. We never 
had any criteria like that.
• Not used
— Scoring information itself is not used, it is mainly the 
findings that are used.
 
Fig. 2 Template for Assessment of Knowledge of FEL 
 
Figure 2. Template for assessment of knowledge of FEL.
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How important do you think the FEL is 
compared with achieving cost and 
schedule milestone targets?
These are a short selection of answers to the question on 
how important FEL is compared with achieving cost and sched-
ule milestone targets. A larger selection of typical answers is 
given in Appendix 1.
• To my mind, FEL is critical. From a company perspective, 
sometimes others have a different motivational bias. In 
practice schedule often takes precedence over FEL.
• It depends on the circumstances that the company finds itself 
in. It’s a risk reward. There are times where certain things need 
to happen within a certain time frame because there are very 
material penalties, or you have no choice because your permit 
expires or whatever that may be. Sometimes going fast can pay 
off, but you need to do it on an informed basis. 
• I think, in our current organisation, that’s taken very seri-
ously. It’s not just a question of satisfying a cost and schedule 
hurdle. The solution that sits behind that, and the execution 
plan that sits behind that, has to be pretty robust. If it’s not 
robust, then you would argue that perhaps the cost and 
schedule are not as acceptable as you think they are.
Why the FEL benchmark score is not used more
These are some of the reasons given for why the FEL bench-
mark score is not used more.
• The scores are just an indicator
— Achieving the targets of cost and schedule and oper-
ability are the only important thing. The index is just 
a signpost along the road to give you confidence that 
you’re going in the right direction. It isn’t the road and 
it isn’t the journey.
• Lack of project management experience
— I don’t think enough of them really understand the 
projects that well.
• Lack of in-depth knowledge of the project
— You’ve got people who are working an opportunity 
day in day out over years, and you’ve got a bunch of 
external people flying in for a week, two weeks—they 
only see so much.
• Benchmark model not flexible enough
— What they do is a cookie cutting approach, so it doesn’t 
always fit specific circumstances. So it’s just another 
view that’s taken into consideration.
• Consultants can be influenced
— I think they can be manipulated. I think they can be 
pressured. I think the report is only as good as the 
consultant who’s reviewing it, and his experience.
• It works best for tried and tested approaches
— I have a niggling fear that they don’t provide insight 
into breakthrough technology or breakthrough ap-
proach. So they tend to anchor you to practices of 
the past. Their measures of success are based upon 
models of the past that are not necessarily valid.
• Not convinced that better FEL leads to earlier RFSU
— If I take an extra six months to get to FID and achieve 
the higher quality front end loading, I’m not entirely 
convinced that I will always get that six months back 
in execute. As you go from ‘fair’ to ‘good’ you get to a 
point where, in my opinion, to get that last little bit 
the creaming curve starts. You have to put a lot of 
incremental effort and I’m not convinced that you 
necessarily get the incremental reward. So I see it as a 
sort of law of diminishing returns.
 
Fig 3: How useful and important is FEL (no. participants) Figure 3. How useful and important is FEL? (Number of participants.)
 
Fig 4: How useful and important is FEL (%) igure 4. ow useful and important is FEL? (%)
 
Fig 5: How is the FEL score used (no. participants) Figure 5. How is the FEL score used? (Number of participants.)
Figure 6. How is the FEL score used? (%)
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• Drivers for moving ahead quickly
— One of the reasons might be, we need the oil of gas, 
we’ve already committed the contract. A second rea-
son might be that the project is so advanced, and on a 
rate return of 100%, you don’t have to do more work to 
fine tune the cost or the schedule, just go ahead. The 
third reason, is that the CEO might have made com-
mitments to the Government, we will provide these 
jobs, we will do this work etc. 
Assessment of understanding of FEL
Figure 7 shows, for each of the categories of interviewees, 
their assessment of their own understanding of FEL, and their 
assessment of that of a typical decision maker in their organisa-
tion. The mean estimate and the range of estimates are shown 
for each group.
DISCUSSION
The results showed that there is a good understanding in 
the concept of FEL, and a strong belief in its importance within 
the authors’ sample. More than 80% said that FEL was either 
very important or used stronger expressions, such as extremely 
important, essential, critical or paramount; no one indicated 
that FEL was unimportant.
Although there is strong support for the concept of 
FEL, less account seems to be taken of the FEL benchmark 
scores. Nobody interviewed used the FEL benchmark score 
as a hard criteria, requiring that a certain score must be 
achieved before passing through a decision gate. 
Figure 8 is a simplified version of Figure 6, where the don’t 
know column has been removed, and the percentage figures 
adjusted accordingly. This shows that, overall, only 29% of re-
spondents consider that the FEL score is used as a soft criteria; 
for 50% it is a contributing factor to decision making, and 21% 
say that it is not used at all.
A key point is the difference in views between the executives 
and the managers. 38% of the managers say that the FEL score 
is used as a soft criteria. Only 18% of the executives, however, 
agree that it is used in this way—and they are in a much better 
position to know.
A chi-squared test carried out on the scores, however, 
showed that there was no statistically significant differ-
ence between the views of executives and the managers—
χ2 (2) = 1.66, p = 0.43—due to the small sample size.
Time value of money
One of the objections given to completing FEL was because 
of the time value of money; however, as argued earlier in this 
paper (illustrated in Fig 1.), if one plans to achieve speed by 
compromising on front end development time, it typically re-
sults in a longer overall time to start up. That is, if you do the 
FEL, this generally helps with the time value of money. 
Impact of timing of the FEL benchmark 
assessments
In some companies the FEL benchmarking is first done just 
prior to FID. Even if it is done a month or two before the FID, 
however, it is often too late to take effective corrective actions. 
Instead, it is helpful to have an assessment carried out at an 
earlier phase to identify the key things that need to be focused 
on to improve FEL. This was pointed out by a few of the par-
ticipants who placed more value on FEL benchmarking carried 
out prior to the start of FEED.
That is to say, a key use of FEL benchmarking should be to 
identify areas for improvement—to find out where one would 
gain the most bang for your buck—rather than using it simply 
as a final check prior to FID. 
Applying the FEL benchmark score more effectively
The FEL benchmark score is just one indicator of how well 
the project is likely to do; that is, how likely the outcomes are 
to be in accordance with those predicted at FID. While only an 
indicator, however, it is likely to be the best one available in most 
circumstances. The research by Meehl and others on statistical 
predictions versus expert judgement, for example Meehl (1954), 
and the work on when to trust expert judgment (Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009) certainly suggests that the FEL benchmark score is 
likely to be a better predictor of outcomes than expert judgement. 
Figure 7. Assessment of understanding of FEL.
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There has been a great deal of benchmarking carried out, 
which has shown there to be a correlation between the out-
comes (in terms of cost, schedule and production attainment) 
predicted at FID, the outcomes achieved in practice, and the 
FEL benchmarking score. Of course, a good FEL benchmark 
score does not guarantee a good outcome for a project, as there 
is a range of uncertainty on the outcomes. A project with a good 
or best practical FEL benchmark score, however, is more likely 
to have a good outcome than one with a poor or fair score. 
In light of this, it seems sensible to suggest that use be made 
of this known relationship, and the FEL benchmarking score 
used to predict the likely range of project outcomes in terms of 
cost, schedule and production attainment. With this informa-
tion in hand, the outcomes predicted at FID could be adjusted 
using factors derived from FEL benchmarking. 
An example of adjustment factors to use is shown in Figure 9. 
Please note that these are included to illustrate the concept 
only. The actual factors to be used would need to be derived 
from FEL benchmarking. The closer the benchmarking infor-
mation is to the particular type of project and the particular 
region, and the larger the benchmarking sample size is, then 
the more accurate the prediction is likely to be. Even a more 
broad-brush approach, however, will provide some indication, 
and some insight on a range of potential outcomes.
As an example of how this would be used, assume that FEL 
benchmarking has been carried out for an exploration and pro-
duction mega-project prior to FID, and the FEL benchmarking 
score is rated as fair. Figure 9 shows that the likely outcome 
in terms of cost would be a mean value of 1.25 times the pre-
dicted value at FID, with a P10–P90 range of 1.05–1.45 times 
the predicted value at FID. Similarly for schedule, the mean 
likely value would be 1.3 times the predicted value at FID, with 
a P10–P90 range of 1.05–1.45 times the predicted value at FID. 
The likely production attained would be a mean of 0.8 times the 
predicted value at FID, with a P10–P90 range of 0.6–0.95 times 
the predicted value at FID.
The decision makers would then be provided with informa-
tion based on the adjusted forecast outcomes calculated using 
the level of FEL and the corresponding predicted impacts on 
the project economic factors, such as net present value (NPV).
As mentioned in the introduction, there may be circum-
stances where the value lost by not doing FEL is more than 
made up by the value of time saved. Possible examples include 
commercial opportunities such as a heavy lift vessel available at 
reduced rates, and market opportunities in a tight timeframe.
To check whether it would be worth taking advantage of the 
opportunity, this becomes a decision based on value (Lowes 
and van Driel, 2004). The added value of the opportunity is 
determined from, for example, the costs saved by hiring a heavy 
lift vessel at reduced rates. The loss of value due to incomplete 
FEL can also be calculated using the benchmarked adjustments 
for project outcomes. Then it is a simple matter of comparing 
whether the expected added value of the opportunity is greater 
than the predicted loss due to incomplete FEL. 
Note that, if these opportunities are to be taken up, it may 
be necessary to adopt a different approach to ensure that time 
really will be saved. This could mean proceeding with a so-
lution that meets all of the key hurdles, rather than spending 
additional time looking for a solution that creates more value.
Assessment of understanding of FEL
Figure 7 shows the mean and the range for each of the cat-
egories of interviewees. This shows their assessment of their 
own understanding of FEL, and their assessment of that of a 
typical decision maker in their organisation.
Although the numbers in the samples are too small to be 
statistically significant, it is interesting to look at the trends in 
these samples. 
• The more senior they are, the better they rate themselves. 
• Each group rate themselves equal to, or better than, the 
decision makers.
As the executives are typically decision makers, it is inter-
esting to compare the ratings the executives gave themselves, 
with the view of the decision makers by the professionals. The 
two ratings of interest are shown in the top and bottom lines of 
Figure 7; that is, compare the blue tick of the executives with the 
red tick of the professionals. There is a large difference between 
the two, with the executives rating their understanding of FEL 
much higher than the professionals.
This could be due to the professionals not understanding 
how well informed the executives are. The literature on heuris-
tics and biases, however, suggests that this could, just as easily, 
be an overconfidence bias on the part of the executives.
Countering common heuristics and biases
There are a number of biases that may affect decision mak-
ing on an oil and gas project, including anchoring, overcon-
fidence, taking the inside view, and the planning fallacy. To 
help overcome those biases, it is proposed that the following 
actions are taken:
• A sensitivity check based on the FEL benchmark score.
• A premortem.
SENSITIVITY CHECK BASED ON THE FEL BENCHMARK SCORE
The FEL benchmark score can be used, in conjunction with 
the table of benchmarked adjustments for project outcomes, 
to provide an outside view of the likely cost, schedule and pro-
duction to be attained. This would provide a form of sensitivity 
check to review whether the consequences would be acceptable, 
should the outside view of likely outcomes come to fruition.
PREMORTEM
A premortem (Klein, 2007) is a specialised form of risk as-
sessment developed by Klein, based on research carried out 
on prospective hindsight (Mitchell et al, 1989), which found 
that imagining that an event has already occurred increases 
the ability to correctly identify reasons for future outcomes by 
30%. Klein used prospective hindsight to create the premortem, 
which helps project teams to identify risks prior to key decisions 
being committed.
In contrast to a postmortem, which is carried out after the 
event to find out why things went wrong, a premortem occurs 
during a project to prevent the project going wrong, or to mi-
nimise the consequences if it does go wrong. The premortem 
 
Fig 8: Opinions on FEL scores – ‘Don’t Know’ removed and % adjusted 
 
Figure 8. Opinions on FEL scores—don’t know column removed and % adjusted.
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takes place after an important decision has been made, but be-
fore it has been formally committed. A group of key members 
of the project team is gathered. The leader starts the exercise by 
informing everyone that it is now a year or two in the future, the 
project was implemented as per the decision, and the outcome 
is a spectacular disaster. During the next few minutes each in-
dividual writes down all the potential reasons they can think 
of for the failure—especially things that would not normally be 
mentioned for fear of being impolitic. The leader then asks each 
team member to read one reason from their list; everyone states 
a different reason until they are all recorded. After the session 
has finished the project manager reviews the list, looking for 
ways to strengthen the planned way forward.
One of the benefits of the premortem is that it legitimises 
doubt, thereby overcoming the groupthink (Esser, 1998) that 
can affect teams once a decision has been made. Otherwise, 
when a team comes to a decision—and particularly when the 
leader has a strong hand in it—public doubts about the planned 
way ahead are gradually (even unconsciously) suppressed. This 
contributes to overconfidence in the team, as only support for 
the decision is expressed. The premortem overcomes this by 
allowing doubts to be raised, and encourages even supporters 
of the decision to look for potential threats that they had not 
considered before.
A premortem could also be used to look for reasons why 
the outcomes predicted from the FEL benchmarking (i.e. lon-
ger schedule, higher costs, and lower production attainment) 
might occur.
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of FEL is well understood and is considered to 
be very important by the respondents. FEL benchmark scores, 
however, are neither well understood nor considered to be im-
portant. Specifically, the predictive power of FEL benchmark 
scores seems not to be fully appreciated. 
The research carried out by Meehl and others, for example 
Grove et al (2000) and Kuncel et al (2013), shows that statistical 
methods generally give better predictions of likely outcomes 
than expert judgment. The work carried out by Kahneman and 
Klein provides criteria for when expert judgment should be 
trusted, and when the use of algorithms is appropriate. Apply-
ing these criteria to oil and gas projects shows that, in general, 
the FEL benchmark scores are likely to be a better predictor of 
project outcomes than expert judgment.
Therefore, while the FEL benchmark score is only one in-
dicator of how likely the outcomes are to align with those pre-
dicted at FID, it is likely to be the best one available. 
There are a number of biases that may affect the prediction 
of outcomes on an oil and gas project. To help overcome those 
biases, it is proposed that a premortem is carried out, and the 
FEL benchmark score is used—in conjunction with the table of 
benchmarked adjustments for project outcomes—to provide 
an outside view of the likely cost, schedule and production to 
be attained.
A table of benchmarked adjustments for project outcomes, 
as proposed here, could also be used to help determine whether 
it is worthwhile cutting short FEL to take up an opportunity, 
such as using a heavy lift vessel available at reduced rates. The 
predicted value lost by not completing FEL can be compared 
to the expected value gained from the opportunity.
There is also evidence from the authors’ results that FEL is 
sometimes used primarily as a hurdle, whereas research points 
to FEL being used most effectively when it is integrated into the 
project at an early stage and used to highlight activities to be 
focused on, rather than just being used as a final check.
Thus, the overall conclusion from this research is that the con-
cept of FEL is understood, but the FEL benchmark scores are 
not generally being applied very effectively. Acting on the above 
suggestions may help to rectify this situation.
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APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLES OF ANSWERS TO 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
How useful and important do you think FEL is?
These are some typical answers to the first question: How 
useful and important do you think front end loading is? 
• Very
— To my mind, FEL is critical.
— Very useful and important.
— Essential.
— It’s hugely important: deliberate slowly, execute 
quickly.
— Doing thorough work before you proceed is essential. 
It is paramount.
— I think it is extremely important. The worst projects 
I’ve been involved with have been those where scope 
uncertainty has progressed way beyond where it 
should have.
— Incredibly important.
— I think it’s extremely useful and very important.
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Front end loading: misunderstood or misapplied? 
• Important
— It is important, though don’t want to overdo it, need 
to be pragmatic. 
— For routine, repeatable and predictable projects it’s not 
so important. Much more important for a new project.
— It’s a good check to see how mature you are. Front end 
loading means that you have your ducks in a row. 
• Balanced
— I think there’s a balance to be had. Clearly getting the 
basics right is fundamental to project success, so it is 
really important. 
— But it can become a cottage industry. And the less 
experienced a team are, the more likely they are to 
over-egg the front end loading.
— It depends on what’s done. In subsurface if you have 
only sparse information and instead of six months you 
spend one year of grinding out models, it’s not worth 
much extra. 
— But if you acquire appraisal information, i.e. not just 
taking extra time but getting the right information and 
the right people to analyse the data, then you have 
better information and it’s worthwhile.
How are FEL benchmarking scores used?
These are some typical answers to the second question: How 
are front end loading benchmarking scores used? 
• Soft criteria
— In my mind, as long as we’re meeting ‘fair’, I didn’t get 
too concerned. I may still put more effort into some-
thing to get a better result, but in this balance between 
costs, effort, speed and trying to optimise what you’re 
trying to do, if I would have ‘fair’ in one particular 
category, I’d assess what that would mean to me. It 
wouldn’t worry me too much, but it would mean in 
the next phase, or prior to the decision, I still would 
be looking at what I’d need to do in that area.
— I think the majority of places, and what I’ve seen here, 
but also I saw at my previous company, is that there 
is a very clear push not to be ‘best practical’. There is 
a feeling that that is overdoing things. And so on the 
bottom end of ‘good’ is seen as an excellent result. I 
think that’s the sort of area that people would target. 
— I believe we would seriously consider not going 
through a gate if we didn’t reach an acceptable score. 
My experience to date is that as a company, we would 
be looking for a ‘good’ score and if it was just a ‘fair’ 
score, we might be saying what more do we need to do 
here? Bearing in mind it is only one piece of informa-
tion in our decision-making process. It’s not the whole.
• Contributing
— With my current company, just as an indicator. In my 
previous again it was more a qualitative assessment. 
There was not, say ‘Unless you have a score under xx 
you wouldn’t progress through the gate’. We never had 
any criteria like that.
— The good/fair type rating is discussed when the review 
is done. It is often discussed at the pre-gate assurance 
review, but I’ve not seen it be a significant factor in the 
decision as to whether we are ready to proceed or not.
— It wasn’t the only thing that we used, but it was one of 
the inputs that we used to understand how well de-
fined our project was. And for some of the joint venture 
partners, it was mandatory within their decision gate 
process to get an IPA front end loading score. 
— As a sense check. I mean, at the end of the day of 
course, we make up our own mind how well we’re pre-
pared. It’s just another opinion and, I guess if you get 
a number, which is outside of the range, that’s always 
a cause then to investigate further. 
• Not used
— Scoring information itself is not used, it is mainly the 
findings that are used.
— I do not think it is really used.
— It’s not. There’s not a lot of weight put behind front end 
loading scores. It just doesn’t attract a lot of attention.
How important do you think the FEL is 
compared with achieving cost and 
schedule milestone targets?
These are some typical answers to the question: How impor-
tant do you think the FEL is compared with achieving cost and 
schedule milestone targets?
• FEL is very important. However, from a company perspec-
tive, sometimes schedule is used as a driver and, in order to 
move ahead and achieve the targets given for completing 
the phase, FEL is not always fully completed. 
• To my mind, FEL is critical. From a company perspective, 
sometimes others have a different motivational bias. In 
practice schedule often takes precedence over FEL.
• The decision makers say FEL is important, but their actions 
are not consistent with how important they say it is.
• There is tension between front end loading and commercial 
aspects of starting production. This can be good tension, 
but often we get dragged along without sufficient front end 
loading. We often think we know more than we do. 
• FEL is more important. Compromising FEL leads to compro-
mises in achieving cost and schedule and quality. However, 
this is not a general view—typically in the oil and gas indus-
try schedule is prioritised over FEL. The view is that we are 
different, we have confidence we can meet our targets.
• It’s the time value of money: the longer you take to do things, 
the lower your NPV and therefore the lower your sharehold-
er value. So it’s a matter of finding that balance. Sometimes 
going fast can pay off, but you need to do it on an informed 
basis.
• I think it’s a balance. Because you could quite easily add 
another 12 months to your FEED program to improve your 
front end loading score but conversely, you’re trying to sell 
a product to the market and you’re trying to deliver that 
product as quickly as possible to the market. So, there’s a 
trade-off between doing the right amount of front end load-
ing and being able to deliver the product to the market in the 
shortest possible time.
• Clearly projects are littered with jobs that have been crashed 
at the front end. You do have to push back against that if 
you’re being asked as a project team to keep to milestones 
where the quality of the input’s not really good enough. You 
have to be careful about that. 
• It depends on the circumstances that the company finds it-
self in. It’s a risk reward. There are times where certain things 
need to happen within a certain time frame because there 
are very material penalties, or you have no choice because 
your permit expires or whatever that may be. Sometimes 
going fast can pay off, but you need to do it on an informed 
basis. 
• I think, in our current organisation, that’s taken very seri-
ously. It’s not just a question of satisfying a cost and schedule 
hurdle. The solution that sits behind that, and the execution 
plan that sits behind that, has to be pretty robust. If it’s not 
robust, then you would argue that perhaps the cost and 
schedule are not as acceptable as you think they are.
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Abstract. The outcomes of many business decisions do not live up to expectations or possibilities. A literature review of
neuroscience and psychological factors that affect decisionmaking has been undertaken, highlightingmany reasonswhy it is
hard for people to be good decision makers, particularly in complex and uncertain situations such as oil and gas projects.
One way to diminish the impact of these human factors is to use the structured methodology and tools of Decision
Analysis, which have been developed and used over 50 years, for making good decisions. Interviews with senior personnel
from oil and gas operating companies, followed up by a larger-scale survey, were conducted to determine whether or how
Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are used and why they are used in particular ways.
The results showed that Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are not used as often as the participants think they
should be; some 90% of respondents believed that they should be used for key project decisions, but only ~50% said that
they are used.
Six propositions were tested for why Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are not used more, and the following
three were deemed to be supported:
* Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are not well understood.
* There is reliance on experience and judgment for decision-making.
* Projects are schedule-driven.
Further research is proposed to determine the underlying causes, and tackle those, with the aim being to improve business
outcomes by determining how to influence decisionmakers to useDecisionAnalysis andDecisionQualitymore effectively.
Keywords: biases, decision analysis, decisiongate, decision-gated framework, decisionmaking, decisionquality, emotional
tagging, experience, heuristics, interview, intuition, judgment, neuroscience, outcome, pattern recognition, prediction,
premortem, psychology, rational, survey.
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Introduction
This paper aims to obtain an understanding of how Decision
Analysis (DA) and Decision Quality (DQ) are used for key
decisions on oil and gas projects, and to determine why they
are not used more effectively. This is further to a previous study
(Newman et al. 2016) examining how Front End Loading is used
when making key decisions on oil and gas projects.
Oil and gas projects have often failed to live up to
expectations, with higher costs, longer schedules and, most
importantly, lower production than forecast (Nandurdikar and
Wallace 2011; Preis et al. 2014; Whitfield 2014). There are
also projects where value has been lost, owing to the concept
selected (i.e. the development plan chosen) not being the best
match for the subsurface structure (Crager 2011). So, why
do key decisions for oil and gas projects often miss out on
value, or produce outcomes that are systemically worse than
predicted?
Before addressing this question, it is important to distinguish
between decisions and outcomes. This is explained in the
following extract from Making Good Decisions (Bratvold and
Begg 2010, p. 6):
Agoodoutcome is ‘a future state of theworld thatwe
prize relative to other possibilities.’A good decision
is ‘an action we take that is logically consistent with
our objectives, the alternatives we perceive, the
information we have and the preferences we feel.’
In an uncertain world, good decisions can lead to
bad outcomes and vice versa.
Unfortunately, the distinction between decisions and outcomes is
rarely recognised in everyday language, or in decision reviews
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and look-backs by oil and gas companies. If a decision results
in a bad outcome, the decision is regarded as bad; if a decision
leads to a good outcome, the decision is considered to have
been good. Hence, it is important to make a distinction between
the action (i.e. making the decision) and the role of chance in the
resulting outcome, because it allows us to focus on what we can
control, namely, the decision.
In the present paper, we conduct a review of decision making,
to provide a background view on the latest thinking on why
decisions are not made the way they ‘should’ be. This looks at
how people naturally tend to make decisions, and at some
practical tools to improve the way decisions are made. Arising
from this review, we postulate reasons why more effective use is
not made of DA and DQ. These are examined in the light of the
outcomes of two studies conducted with senior personnel from
oil and gas companies, with the first being a series of interviews,
and the second an online survey. Discussion of these results,
and determination of which of the propositions are supported
by the outcomes of the studies, is then followed by proposals
for future research and general conclusions.
Review of decision making
This section examines the human side of decision making and
the reasons, from both a psychological and neuroscience
perspective, why decisions may not always be made in an
optimum way. It then outlines Decision Analysis and Decision
Quality as methods for making better decisions and describes
the decision-gated framework, and the theory of how it should
be applied.
The human side of decision making
What is decision making? A definition of decision making
that applies to oil and gas projects is as follows: the conscious,
irrevocable allocation of resources to achieve desired objectives
(Bratvold and Begg 2010, p. 5). More generally and informally,
making decisions is what you do when you do not know what
to do (Howard 1980, p. 4).
This is succinctly put as follows: if you knowwhat to do, then
there is no decision to be made. Interestingly, this was stated
when Klein interviewed firefighters (Klein et al. 1986) as part
of his research on decision making. Klein asked a fireground
commander to tell him about some difficult decisions he had
made, with the reply being as follows:
I don’t make decisions, I don’t remember when I’ve
ever made a decision.
The fireground commander insisted that fireground commanders
never make decisions, as it is usually obvious what to do in any
given situation (Klein 1998, chapter 2, p. 11).
However, this is a special case. A fireground commander is
someone who has frequently experienced similar situations, and
who has received quick and reliable feedback on the outcomes
of decisions made in those situations. Hence, the ‘decision’ has
moved from one that requires conscious thought and effort, to
one that has become intuitive and automatic.
However, this approach is not suitable for all decisions.
Kahneman and Klein (2009, 2010) spent a long time discussing
and debating when it is appropriate to use your intuition and trust
your gut feelings. Kahneman andKlein agreed that, to increase the
likelihoodof a good outcome, the following tests should bepassed,
if intuition is to be used (Campbell and Whitehead 2010):
* The familiarity test: have we frequently experienced identical
or similar situations?
* The feedback test: didweget quick and reliable feedback on the
outcomes of past decisions/judgments?
* The measured-emotions test: is our thinking clouded by
emotions we have experienced in similar or related
situations? (No = pass.)
* The independence test: are we likely to be influenced by any
inappropriate personal motivations or biased thinking?
(No = pass.)
If a situation fails even one of these tests, then we need to
regard intuition as potentially unreliable and to strengthen the
remainder of the decision process to reduce the risk of a poor
outcome.
Oil and gas project decisions, and investment decisions in
particular, are very unlikely to pass the above tests. Generally,
there are unique features to each project; it is often several years
between final investment decision (FID) and ready for start-up
(RFSU) and even longer before steady production is achieved
and feedback is received on outcomes; and when a team has
invested significant time and effort on a project, it is hard to be
dispassionate, and pass the independence test. Hence, an intuitive
approach is highly unlikely to be appropriate for major decisions
on oil and gas projects.
Two ways we make decisions
Kahneman (2011), describes the following two different
processes that our brains use to make decisions:
* System 1: intuitive and automatic: effortless – thinking fast.
* System 2: reflective and logical: effortful – thinking slow.
Stanovich (2011) originally proposed the terms System 1 and
System 2, but now prefers Type 1 process and Type 2 process.
He explains the differences and why each is useful, as follows:
System 1/Type 1 process
* Low on computational power but quick.
* Does not allow high accuracy (except in certain, constrained
conditions).
* Does not interfere with other ongoing cognition.
System 2/Type 2 process
* Great computational power.
* Enables high accuracy.
* Slow and interferes with other thoughts and actions.
However, humans are cognitive misers and, therefore, default
to Type 1. Evolution has developed our brains to be effective and
efficient organs for certain tasks. It enables as many processes as
possible to be set to automatic, and keeps its computational power
available for ‘important’ actions. However, in a decision-making
context such as oil and gas, our brain may need a nudge to remind
it which actions are ‘important’, and, hence, to deliberately
engage Type 2.
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Heuristics and biases
We are subject to many heuristics and biases that affect our
decision making. Heuristics are simple procedures, ‘rules of
thumb’, that provide quick answers to questions. For example,
it may be difficult to judge how good a wine is by looking at the
bottle, so we may use the heuristic of price, i.e. cheap = poor
quality, expensive = good.Heuristicmethods are used to speedup
the process of finding a solution via mental shortcuts to ease
the cognitive load of deciding. Sometimes heuristics provide
a satisfactory answer, and sometimes not (e.g. not all expensive
wine might be ‘good’ for the decision maker, and vice versa).
Problems occur when heuristics cause biases that are systematic
deviations from a standard of rationality or good judgment.
Heuristics and biases result from our tendency to rely on
Type 1 processes; our use of heuristics leads to predictable,
systematic biases, as demonstrated by the research of Tversky
andKahneman; see, for example, Tversky andKahneman (1973,
1974, 1981; Tversky et al. (1990).
Examples of biases that may affect decisionmaking on oil and
gas projects include the following:
* Availability – prompts us to overestimate the probability of
occurrence of recent or most vivid events, i.e. those which are
most easily recalled.
* Taking the inside view – an inside view is based on the specific
circumstances of the task by using information that is close at
hand, and makes predictions on the basis of that narrow and
unique set of inputs. The inside view tends to be optimistic. By
contrast, the outside view consults the statistics of similar cases
to obtain a comparative forecast, which tends to provide amore
realistic prediction.
* Hindsight bias – the effect whereby people think that past
events were predictable, or at least more predictable than they
really were and, specifically, that they themselves made better
predictions than they really had.
Suggestions for helping overcome these biases include the
following:
(1) Education: forewarned is forearmed. Although we cannot
stop being affected by biases, the more we understand the
wayourmindswork andare aware of thepossibility of biases,
then the better placed we are to avoid these psychological
traps.
(2) Checklists: using checklists designed to highlight biases, and
help avoid them, can improve decision making, particularly
for important decisions such as key project decisions.
Examples of checklists to use are the 12-question checklist
from ‘Before you make that big decision. . .’ (Kahneman
et al. 2011), and the identifying redflags checklist from ‘Why
Good Leaders Make Bad Decisions’ (Campbell et al. 2009).
Neuroscience
This section discusses decision making from a neuroscience
perspective. First, it will explain the two neural pathways for
decision making. Second, it shows us how the two processes
of pattern recognition and emotional tagging work together to
enable us to make intuitive decisions on the basis of our past
experiences. Third, it cautions us about trusting our memories
and what we believe that we ‘know’ when making decisions.
Two neural pathways for making decisions
The twoways wemake decisions (i.e. Type 1 and Type 2) can
be looked at from a neuroscience perspective. LeDoux (2003)
showed that there are two neural pathways in mammals.
* One goes direct from the thalamus (the part of the brain
responsible for relaying sensory and motor signals) to the
amygdala (the part of the brain that has primary role in the
processing of memory, and emotional reactions). It is very
quick and has minimal processing. It is an early warning
system. For example, if you see a coiled snake-like object
ahead of you on the path, it causes you to jump back and stop.
This happens before you recognise the object.
* The other pathway goes from the thalamus to the cortex
(responsible for processing and thinking) then to the
amygdala. It is slower, but with more detailed analysis of
information. It causes you to realise that the snake-like
object is a coiled rope.
Hence, these twopathways are both very useful, andhave their
place. This parallels the Type 1–Type 2 thinking. Intuition and
heuristics (aligned with Type 1) have their place, but not for key
decisions on oil and gas projects, where there is uncertainty and
complexity, and Type 1 processing is known to produce errors.
Pattern recognition and emotional tagging
Wedepend primarily on two hardwired processes for decision
making. Our brains assess what is going on by using pattern
recognition. We react to that information, or ignore it, because of
emotional tags that are attached to our memories. Both processes
help us make excellent decisions most of the time. They have
survived evolutionary selection because they give us advantages
over other animals in the food chain (Mattson 2014; Brusman
2017). But under certain circumstances, both can mislead us,
resulting in poor judgments and bad decisions.
Pattern recognition is a complex process that integrates
information from as many as 30 different parts of the brain
(Campbell et al. 2009). When faced with a new situation, we
make assumptions on the basis of prior experiences and
judgments. For example, a chess master can assess a chess
game and choose a high-quality move in as little as 6 seconds
by drawing on patterns he or she has seen before (Bilalic et al.
2010). But pattern recognition can also mislead us. When we are
dealingwith seemingly familiar situations, our brains cancauseus
to think that we understand themwhenwe do not. For example, if
you catch a glimpse of someone walking by, you may instantly
‘recognise’ them as a friend. But when you look again more
closely, you realise that it is someone else.
Emotional tagging occurs when the brain stores a memory of
an event or action, and it also stores an associated emotionwith it.
Actions we have previously taken, whether they were driven by
rational decision-making or not, are filed in our brains with
emotional tags that serve as markers that can affect subsequent
thinking. When we make a decision, our brain will recall past
situations that seem similar to the current one and access the
emotions that are tagged to them. (Finkelstein et al. 2009)
At the psychological level, there is a long-accepted view that
emotionally charged events are likely to be remembered better
(Bergado et al. 2011). Emotions, such as fear, anger, pleasure and
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love, are elevated states of arousal that enhance memory and
recall of the events occurring during those emotional states. The
translation of this into neuroscience has led to the proposal of the
‘emotional tag’ concept, whereby the amygdala is activated by
emotionality, resulting in changes to the brain regions involved
in forming the memory of the emotional event (Richter-Levin
and Akirav 2003). This is an explanation for the availability bias;
emotional tagging causes greater ‘availability’ for such events,
which leads to overestimating the likelihood of them occurring.
Under the right circumstances, pattern recognition and
emotional tagging are very helpful. For example, this is the
case with the fireground commanders interviewed by Klein
(Klein et al. 1986), as mentioned earlier. They had attended
many fires, and going into a fire situation gives you an elevated
state of arousal. The experience and feedback they received led
to pattern recognition and associated emotional tags. Hence, as
far as they were concerned, they just ‘knew’ what to do.
Compounding the problem of high levels of unconscious
thinking is the lack of checks and balances in our decision
making (Campbell et al. 2009). Our brains do not naturally
follow the optimal model, i.e. to define the objectives, determine
the alternatives, and assess each alternative against each
objective. Instead, we use pattern recognition, which takes
cues from the environment to recognise the situation, and
arrive at a decision to act or not, guided by emotional tags.
The two processes happen almost instantaneously. Indeed, as
Klein (1998) shows, our brains leap to conclusions and are
reluctant to consider alternatives, and we are particularly bad
at revisiting our initial assessment of a situation, i.e. our
initial frame.
Other lessons from neuroscience
Burton (2008) described several reasons why we should be
cautious about trusting our memories and our ‘knowledge’when
making decisions. These include the following:
* We have defective memories (Loftus and Loftus 1980). The
study conducted by Neisser on the Space Shuttle Challenger
disaster (Neisser and Harsch 1992) demonstrated this. Neisser
asked 106 students to write down their memories of what
happened, where they were and how they felt about the
event and details of the event. They did this 1 day after the
disaster and 2 1/2 years later. Of the two accounts, 25%
were strikingly different, 50% had lesser errors, less than
10% had all details correct. Prior to being handed their
original scripts, most students presumed their memory was
correct. This is a related effect to the hindsight bias described
above, which results because our ‘memory’ of an event is
updated over time as we gain new information, which we did
not have at the time.
* We are fooled by the ‘feeling of knowing’, i.e. we feel we
know things that are objectively false (Koriat 2000). The
feelings of knowing, correctness, conviction and certainty
are not deliberate conclusions and conscious choices. This
feeling of knowing can be spontaneously activated by direct
stimulation of an area of the brain or by electrical
manipulation, but it cannot be triggered by conscious
thought. (Maril et al. 2005).
Wilson showed that each human mind operates largely out of
view of its owner (Wilson 2002; Wilson and Bar-Anan 2008).
This may be because that was the way it evolved initially, and
because that is the way it works best, under many circumstances.
Without such a quick and effective way of understanding and
acting on the world, it would be difficult to survive.We would be
stuck mulling over every little decision, such as whether to put
our left or right foot forward, as the world sped by. However, as
a result we are strangers to ourselves, unable to observe the
workings of our own minds.
This means that we believe that we know ourselves; we
believe falsehoods to be facts, we believe that we are making
good judgments and we ‘know’ when we have made a good
decision, when none of this is, necessarily, the case (Kida 2009).
This reinforces the importance of taking an ‘outside view’, to
avoid bias in our decision making.
Why it is hard to be a good decision maker
The above sections have provided some of the reasons why it is
hard to be a good decision maker. It is not because we are not
smart, it is because we are human. Our brains have evolved to
be efficient, to take shortcuts and trust our intuition. Under the
right circumstances, this is very useful. However, for complex
decisions under uncertainty, it is not appropriate.
There may also be motives and drivers that conflict with
what would otherwise be a good decision. Decisions to proceed
with projects may be driven by commercial, political or social
imperatives, which may be given inappropriate weighting,
inconsistent with the principal decision maker’s goals.
(Preis et al. 2014). In addition, there may be misalignments
between company objectives and personal incentives (Begg
et al. 2003).
It is even harder to be a good decision maker for oil and
gas projects, because there are additional factors that apply.
As discussed previously, the requirements for relying on our
experience and judgment include that we have frequently
experienced identical or similar situations, and we have
received quick and reliable feedback on the outcomes of past
decisions/judgments. However, this is not the case for oil and gas
projects, which take a long time, and the projects are generally
dissimilar. So, the learning is different on each one.We do not get
quick feedback, because there is a significant time between
the final investment decision and the outcomes in terms of
cost, time and production attained. The feedback is also not
reliable, as our memories are revised by subsequent experience
(Budson and Price 2005). The longer that time passes, the more
likely it is that memories will change. Hence, the feedback we
receive may be inaccurate, and may also be affected by the
hindsight bias.
In addition, a significant number of projects are schedule
driven, which means that priority is placed on achieving
schedule, over other objectives (Walkup and Ligon 2006).
Hence, the desire to pass through decision gates ‘on time’
overrides the desire to ensure readiness to make a decision,
which may lead to decisions being taken on the basis of
inaccurate, irrelevant or incomplete information.
One way of diminishing the impact of these factors is to take
a structured approach, as discussed in the next section.
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Decision Analysis
The term Decision Analysis (DA) was coined in 1966 by
Howard (1966) and, since then, a plethora of books (such as
Goodwin 2004; McNamee and Celona 2005) and research
papers (such as Brown 1970; Keeney 1982; Thomas 1984;
Howard 1988; Davidson 2001; Lev and Murphy 2007) have
been written on it.
DA is the discipline of making good decisions, and
describes how people should logically make decisions. It is
a structured approach for creating and evaluating choices, by
using a pragmatic application of tools and processes tailored to
the needs of the decision. It is a methodology that provides the
means for a dialogue between the decision maker and the project
team so that uncertainties, concerns, expectations, assumptions
and meaning can brought into the open and clarified, leading to
a compelling course of action.
The fundamental aspects of DA can be represented using
the image of theman on the three-legged stool (Fig. 1), as adapted
from Howard (2007). Where the stool is placed represents the
frame, namely, what is the correct background, setting and
context for the decision? Indeed, what is the decision to be
made? The frame is an important choice. If your car breaks
down and is beyond repair, then framing the decision as
buying a replacement car is different from framing it as
looking at alternative modes of transport. This affects all three
legs, namely, what you want, what you know and what you
can do. If the frame is buying a replacement car, you will be
considering, for example, what features you want from a car,
whether you want to buy new or second hand, what types of car
you wish to consider and howmuch you are willing to pay. If the
frame is looking at alternative modes of transport, you will be
considering where you might want to travel to, how quickly you
want to get there, what types of transport you wish to consider
(e.g. bus, train, bike, car, walking, taxi), howmuchflexibility you
want, what would the cost be, in terms of time and money.
The legs of the stool represent the three elements of any
decision.
* Objectives:what youwant, i.e.what is valuable toyou, andhow
you would trade-off between conflicting values.
* Information: what you know, how well you ‘know’ it (and
clarity on what you don’t know).
* Alternatives: what you can do. Are there creative, doable
alternatives? If there are no alternatives, then there is no
decision to be made.
These are held together by the seat, which is the sound
reasoning to determine which alternative best meets the
objectives of the decision maker.
Then commitment is required to move the decision to action;
the best decision is useless if it is not implemented.
Although it has been around for 50 years, the uptake ofDAhas
not been good. Keeney (2004), one of the pioneers of DA with
over 40 years of experience, estimated that of 10 000 decisions
* 9000 are no brainers or of small consequence (e.g. what shall
I have for lunch, what shoes shall I wear?).
* 1000 are worthy of careful thinking.
* Only 40 get systematic thought.
Of the 40 that get systematic thought,
* 30 are resolved using qualitative concepts of decisions analysis
to guide clear thinking about the problem, objectives and
alternatives.
* 10 are resolved using quantitative analysis.
By contrast,Keeney (2004) indicatedhowhe thought the 1000
decisions requiring careful thought should be made.
Namely, of the 1000 that are worthy of careful thinking,
* 750 should be resolved by clear thinking consistent with DA.
* 200 should be resolved using partial DA (i.e. explicitly
addressing specific complexities of the decision. This may
involve writing out a clear list of objectives, determining
relevant probabilities, or specifying a value trade-off).
* 50 should be resolved using complete DA (i.e. all 6 elements
of DA should be rigorously addressed, to ensure that the best
decision is made and will be acted on).
Keeney is not saying that partial or complete DA should be
used for all decisions. He estimated that 90% of decisions are
either no-brainers or have small consequences. The principles of
DA should be used for the rest, but only 20% of these should use
partial DA and 5% complete DA. However, this is still a much
larger percentage than the current use of DA, according to the
estimates of Keeney (2004).
All major oil and gas project decisions have high levels of
uncertainty; the decisions are generally complex with multiple,
often competing, objectives; and they have high-consequence
outcomes. Therefore, according to Keeney’s advice, they should
use complete DA. Other oil and gas project decisions, with lower
levels of uncertainty andcomplexity,wouldbebest handledusing







What you know What you want
Logic
Fig. 1. The six elements of Decision Analysis.
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Dialogue Decision Process
The Dialogue Decision Process (Fig. 2) was developed to
bring the power of DA to situations where the decision maker is
not the same person who is doing the analysis. It has been named
the Dialogue Decision Process because of its emphasis on
systematic dialogue between the two groups, namely, the
decision maker(s), and the team that develops the basis for the
decision (McNamee and Celona 2005).
Although the decision makers and the project personnel all
work together as one team, there are distinct roles for each of
these, which are as follows:
* Decision makers: ‘declare’ decisions, approve frame, provide
objectives and trade-offs, and make decisions.
* Project team: develop frame and alternatives, assess
information, evaluate alternatives, plan implementation.
Unfortunately, theDecisionDialogueProcess doesnot always
occur. Instead, project teams sometimes adopt an advocacy
position, and promote their selected alternative to the decision
maker, as shown in Fig. 3.
Walkup andLigon (2006) cited the advocacy process as one of
the key failure modes for oil and gas projects, with advocacy
occurring both internally within the operator and externally with
partners and other stakeholders.
Assessing Decision Quality
If we want to know how to make good decisions, a first step is
to define what ‘good’means. This is where we use DQ. The DQ
chain (Fig. 4) has the same six elements as those of DA (Fig. 1).
The DQ chain was developed in the 1980s (Spetzler 1991), and
expandedon in the bookbySpetzler et al. (2016). Itwasoriginally
presented in the form of a chain, because this signifies that all six
elements are important, and that the quality of a decision is only as
good as its weakest link. However, many companies now present
DQ in the form of a DQ wheel.
The six elements of DQ are as follows:
(1) Appropriate frame: what is the issue being addressed,
including what is the purpose in making the decision,
what is the scope, and how will the decision be approached?
(2) Creative, doable alternatives: is there a range of creative and
compelling alternatives?
(3) Meaningful, reliable information: is all relevant information
available for the decision? Is it trustworthy and unbiased?
(4) Clear values and trade-offs: is there clarity on the values that
the decision will be assessed against? Is there clarity on the
trade-offs between values?
(5) Logically correct reasoning: is sound reasoning being
applied, i.e. which alternative gives you the most of what
you want, based on the information that you have?
(6) Commitment to action: is there commitment to action the
decision?
The quality of a decision is assessed by reviewing the six
elements in turn, to seewhether they each achieve the 100%rating
required for a quality decision. Note that 100% is not perfection.
As explained in Spetzler et al. (2016):
100% is the point at which the cost of further
improvement – in terms of effort and delay – isn’t
worth it. At 100%, the value from improving the
requirement is outweighed by the cost. So, 100% is
not perfection; it is a judgment that the incremental
cost of improvement is greater than the additional
value that would result.
Hence, DQ should be assessed at the start of a phase to determine
what work needs to be completed to achieve 100% for each
element. The work should then be completed, and another
assessment of DQ should be made before the decision, to











Fig. 2. The dialogue decision process.
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Fig. 4. The Decision Quality chain.
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In summary, DQ is a simplifiedway of applying the principles
ofDA, and awayof assessing the readiness formaking a decision.
DQ is a pragmatic tool; it directs you to do only the work that has
the potential to change the decision.
Barriers for wider adoption of Decision Analysis
Karakaya (2012) reviewed the literature on DA tools, and
stated that it suggested the following three broad categories of
barriers to a wider adoption of DA:
* Theoretical foundation: complex theoretical foundation,
varying solution techniques, lack of understanding of underlying
assumptions and applicability.
* Practical applicability: computational challenges, absence of
available tools to produce required inputs, organisational
difficulties.
* Perceived lack of value: unfavourable cost–benefit posture,
unproven in practical domain, absence of industry acceptance.
Decision-gated framework
Whereas uptake of DA in oil and gas has been limited, most
oil and gas companies use a structured process for creating
value from opportunities and projects, known as a decision-
gated framework. These processes typically have five phases
(Fig. 5), focussed as follows:
* Appraise: determine whether this an opportunity worth
pursuing, and whether there is a real understanding of what
is being initiated and the commitment required.
* Select: ensure that an adequate rangeof alternative concepts has
been identified, and that the best alternative has been selected.
* Define: define the scope in sufficient detail to enable anaccurate
estimate of cost and schedule to be made, and uncertainties
and risks to be understood to enable a FID to bemade.Note that
FID is also known as authorisation for expenditure (AFE) or
sanction.
* Execute: implement the project-execution plan to develop an
operating asset consistent with scope, cost and schedule.
* Operate: operate the asset and realise and optimise the project
value.
Each phase is separated by a decision gate. In addition to the
questions specific toeachphase, there are twogeneric questions to
be answered by the company (or the investors) at each decision
gate. These are as follows:
(1) Are we ready to proceed to the next phase? Technical focus:
has all the work been completed to provide the information
necessary to make a quality decision?
(2) Do we want to proceed? Business focus: is there value
in proceeding, taking account of uncertainties, risks and
opportunities?
These are sequential steps. Step 2, ‘Do we want to proceed?’,
should not be addressed until readiness to proceed has been
confirmed at Step 1.
For Step 2, ‘Do we want to proceed?’, there are four options:
proceed to the next phase, stop the project, put it on hold, or
recycle and conduct further work before coming back to the
decision.
The concept behind the decision-gated framework is that each
gate is firmly closed until the decision has beenmade. Nowork is
to be started on the next phase, unless a decision to proceed has
been made at the decision gate. Approval to proceed at a decision
gate is approval to go to the end of the next phase only, not to
continue the project through to the end. During the next phase,
further information is gathered, which will inform the decision
at the end of the phase as to whether there is still value in
proceeding further.
For the present paper, the key decisions referred to are those at
the end of the first three phases in the decision-gated framework,
i.e. the decision at the end of the appraise phase, the concept select
decision and the FID. Collectively, the work undertaken during
these first three phases is known as front-end loading (FEL).
There is a different focus for each of these decisions. At
the end of the appraise phase, the key question being asked is:
‘Is there a business justification to progress the opportunity?’.
Typically, this will be about the expected value that the
opportunity would provide, although there may be other,
strategic factors. One of the purposes of the decision-gated
framework is the early cancellation of opportunities and projects
that donot addvalue. It is obviously better to stop an opportunity at
the appraise stage, rather than using further time and resources
during later phases before stopping it. However, circumstances
change; opportunities that look promising at the appraise stage
may turn out not to add value when they have been developed
further in the select or define phases.
The focus for the concept select decision is ‘Have all feasible
concepts been identified and has the best concept been selected?’.
This is the phase that has most impact on value creation or
destruction. Value can be destroyed in two ways. First, value
can be destroyed by not looking at a wide enough range of
alternatives. If range of alternatives is too narrow, and a better
concept is missed out, then value will be lost. Second, value can
be destroyed by making the selection early, before sufficiently
accurate information is available to inform the decision. This
is the phase where complete DA is particularly beneficial for
developing value-creating opportunities.
The focus for the FID is ‘Is there value in proceeding with
this project?’. Ideally, this would be a two-stage decision. First,
are we ready to proceed to the execute phase? That is, whether
sufficient FEL has been performed to inform the decision, and
whether the appropriate uncertainties, risks and opportunities
Fig. 5. A typical decision-gated framework.
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have been taken into consideration, so as to provide confidence
that the predicted project outcomes are likely to be achieved.
Second, whether there is value in proceeding to the execute phase
on the basis of the predicted project outcomes.
HowDQ and DA fit within the decision-gated framework
One of the principles of the decision-gated framework is that
all theworkandactivities in aphase shouldbedecisiondriven, not
activity driven. This means that the only work conducted during
the phase should be that required to provide the information
necessary for making a good decision, which should be
determined by making an assessment of DQ at the beginning
of the phase. There should not be a ‘standard’ list of activities that
are completed during the phase. A ‘standard’ list of activitiesmay
help as a checklist for consideration; but whether an activity is
necessary, and what level of detail required, is dependent on
whether it has the potential to influence the decision
DQ is used for assessing the work required to be conducted
during each phase of the decision-gated framework, and then for
checking whether it has been completed satisfactorily before
making the decision. At the beginning of a phase, there needs
to be clarity on the context of the decision to be made. On what
basis will the decision maker make the decision? What is the
frame, the context for the decision? What measures will be used
by the decision maker to determine whether to proceed or not?
What level of risk and uncertainty are acceptable to the decision
maker? Once there is clarity on these, then the activities to be
completed during the phase, and the level of detail required for
these, can be determined.
At the end of the phase, the readiness to proceed is determined
by assessing the six elements of decision quality to see whether
theyhavebeen completed to the level of detail required.Only then
should the Step 2, i.e. ‘Do we want to proceed?’, be addressed.
Reasons for decision-gated framework failures
Unfortunately, there are often gaps between the theory of the
decision-gated framework and how it is applied in practice. The
2006 paper on the good, the bad and the ugly of the stage-gate
project management process (Walkup and Ligon 2006) provided
several reasonswhy the decision-gate framework fails in practice.
These include the following:
* The Decision Review Board (DRB) not owning DQ, i.e. the
DRB does not ensure that all stakeholders align with DQ, and
do not motivate and inspire project teams to stay focussed on
DQ through each phase of the decision-gated framework.
(Note: there may not be a DRB and DQ may not even be
a consideration for the decision maker.)
* Focus more on schedule than value creation. It is not
uncommon for over 50% of projects to be fast-tracked.
* Project teams overplaying their role and develop an advocacy
position, believing they should make a recommendation to
be approved by the DRB, rather than providing information
for the DRB to assess and draw their own conclusions.
* Most stage gate process implementations have become activity
driven rather than decision driven.
* Value is lost because there is a strong motivational bias
for teams to focus on project approval, as opposed to value
maximisation. Teams are rewarded for completion, that is,
usually, the faster the better.
Propositions
Arising from our review of decision making, we have developed
propositions for the reasonswhyDAandDQarenot usedmore, or
are not used more effectively:
(1) DA and DQ are not well understood.
(2) DA and DQ are perceived to be complicated.
(3) People rely mainly on experience and judgment for decision
making.
(4) Projects are schedule driven.
(5) There is a lack of clarity on the requirements of the decision
maker.
(6) DQ is not assessed at the start of the phase to inform the work
to be undertaken.
To determine which, if any, of the above propositions are
valid, we have conducted two studies with senior personnel from
oil and gas companies; the first was a series of interviews, and
the second was an on-line survey. These studies are discussed
in the following sections.
Method: interviews
The first phase of the present research was by interview, using
mainly open-ended questions to elicit from the participants
their understanding of DA and DQ, their experience of
using them, and to find out how they are being applied in their
company.
This was, primarily, an exploratory phase, to help determine
questions to be asked for the survey in the second phase.
Participants
The participants targeted were oil and gas personnel who were
involved in developments and projects in a variety of roles (e.g.
decision makers, development managers, analysts, subject-
matter experts). They were initially targeted for their areas
of expertise, using connections known to the researchers. After
being interviewed, they were asked to suggest others who
might be suitable, with a focus on obtaining participants from
a diversity of companies, organisation levels and role types.
Interviews were conducted with 34 senior personnel from
the oil and gas industry. These were all highly experienced
personnel, having an average of 29 years of industry experience
(s= 8.8 years) and 24 years of experience in opportunities and
project (s= 7.5 years).
The participants were mostly Australian based, with just two
based in the UK. The interviewees were from six companies,
two of which are global majors, three are mid-sized, and one
a smaller oil and gas company. About two-thirds (23 of 34)
of participants came from two of these companies. The
participants were from a range of organisational levels, and
have been categorised into three groups, namely, professionals,
managers and executives (n= 4, 19 and 11 respectively). The
professionals were generally experts in a technical discipline.
The executives were personnel at the vice president, or
equivalent, level.
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Materials
The interviewquestionswere in a semi-structured format to allow
for follow-up questions to be used to clarify answers, and for
further exploration of areas of interest. There were five questions
on the interviewee’s experience in the oil and gas industry, five
questions on how projects and decision making are dealt with in
their company, 10 questions to probe their understanding and use
of DA, and six questions to probe their understanding of DQ.
The full structure of the interview and list of questions are
given in Appendix 1.
Procedure
The length of the interviews ranged from 30min to just over an
hour,with a typical length of ~45min.The interviewswere audio-
recordedand then transcribed, or interviewnoteswere takenwhen
companies requested that these were not to be audio-recorded,
which was the case for 10 interviews. The interview questions
were about the processes and tools used to make decisions on
projects, and not about the details of the projects themselves. The
following measures were taken to further protect companies and
ensure anonymity:
* The interview notes were reviewed by the researchers, who
removed any information that they considered could lead to an
individual or company being identified, or could be
commercially confidential or sensitive.
* Thedraft interviewnoteswere then sent to the participant to edit
as they considered necessary.
In practice, the participants generally agreed with the
interview notes, and there was very little editing by them.
All the interviews conducted have been included in the
analysis; none were rejected.
At the end, interviewees were asked to do an assessment of
their level of knowledge and understanding of DA and DQ, by
using the template shown in Fig. 6.
The interviewees selected from five options, i.e. low, basic,
fair, good and excellent. The descriptors to define the options
are shown inFig. 6. In addition, theywere asked to assess the level
of knowledge and understanding of a typical decision maker in
their organisation. A significant number (9 of 11) of executives
interviewed said that they were decision makers themselves.
Each of these were asked to assess a more senior decision
maker, such as the CEO.
The researchers conducted their own assessment of the level
of knowledge and understanding of the interviewees. Scoring
rubrics were developed to make this as objective as possible. The
rubrics used for assessment of knowledge and understanding
of DA and DQ are shown in Appendix 2.
Interview results
The interviews were aimed primarily at obtaining an
understanding of the knowledge and use of DA within
participants’ companies and to help determine questions to be
asked to a larger audience in the second-phase survey for
quantitative evaluation.
However, the interview answers also provided information
that permitted some limited quantification and simple statistical
analysis, so as to help assess two of the propositions for why DA
and DQ are not used more. This is shown below.
Proposition 1: DA and DQ are not well understood
This proposition was addressed in several ways, including the
following:
* The answers by the interviewees to the question on whether
they have conducted any DA.
* The descriptions given to the question of what DA means
to them.
* The answers given to the questions on familiarity with the DQ
chain or wheel.
Fig. 6. Template for interviewees to assess their understanding of Decision Analysis (DA) and Decision Quality (DQ).
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* The comparisons between the self-assessments and the
researchers’ assessments on their understanding of DA andDQ.
The results are presented below.
Have you performed any DA?
The interviewees’ answers to the questiononwhether theyhave
performed any DA have been reviewed and assigned into three
categories, namely, ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘partly’. This is presented in
bar chart form inFig. 7. Itwas generally evidentwhich category the
individual responses should be assigned to. Some examples of
responses in the three categories are given below.
Yes
* Yes, lots of them.
* Yes, and I have helped people frame decisions. I’ve used the
SDG (Strategic Decisions Group) framework for decision
analysis.
Partly
* In the past, I’ve done things like event trees, which look at all
possible scenarios. I think that’s an example of decision
analysis.
* I have (for) very small components. I haven’t, in a major
decision. I’ve looked at them and I’ve sometimes challenged
the decision analyses that have been done. But, I haven’t gone
into thedetail, I haven’t had the responsibilitywhere I’vehad to
drive the decision analysis.
No
* I haven’t done it myself directly. I’ve provided input into the
process but I have not done it myself.
* Not formally; I have not used any formal structures.
Figure 7 shows that just over a half of the interviewees had
performed DA, 10% had contributed towards a DA, and a third
had not performed DA.
Note that 5 of the 34 intervieweeswere not asked this question,
mainly because of time constraints; hence, the above analysis is
based on 29 responses.
What does Decision Analysis means to you?
Therewas awide range of answers to the question: ‘What does
Decision Analysis mean to you?’. Some focussed on the purpose
of DA, such as:
* It means a rigorous disciplined process of working out what
options are going to meet your objectives.
Others gave more of a high-level description, such as:
* The science and process of how you make a decision, both the
psychology and the process.
Some described the components of DA (i.e. the 6 elements of
the man on the stool or the DQ chain), such as:
* There are five or six different dimensions to making a good
decision and, to me, the Decision Analysis is around assessing
those dimensions and determining whether you’ve considered
all the aspects. So, whether you have framed it correctly,
whether you’ve got the relevant information, whether you
are committed to action, whether the work is complete to
enable you to make a decision.
Others focussed on the tools and techniques, such as:
* Itmeans the techniques andmethodology formakingdecisions,
generally under uncertainty, and understanding the quality of
these. It’s about the tools and the statistical methods you have.
Some were not familiar with DA, such as:
* I’m not sure what Decision Analysis is. I know what decision
making is – when you actually make a decision. But I do not
know what Decision Analysis is.
The full range of answers is given in Appendix 3.
Familiarity with the DQ chain or wheel
Nineteen of the interviewees said they were familiar with the
DQ chain or wheel, 15 were not. Those who said they were
familiar where asked to name the six elements of the DQ chain.
Three of these nineteen people were unable to identify any
elements. Nobody identified all six elements. The average
number of elements identified (by those familiar with the DQ
chain) was 2.4 of 6, i.e. 40%. Further details are shown in Fig. 8.
Understanding of DA and DQ: self-assessments
and researchers’ assessments
Figures 9 and 10 show the comparisons between the self-
assessments and the researchers’ assessments of the interviewees’
understanding of DA and DQ. The S for self-assessment and
Fig. 7. Interviewees answers on performing Decision Analysis. Fig. 8. Number of elements of the Decision Quality chain identified.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of understanding of Decision Analysis.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of understanding of Decision Quality.
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the R for researcher assessment are positioned at the mean
values. The ranges from minimum to maximum are indicated
by the horizontal lines. The 25th and 75th percentiles are shown
as vertical lines.
The self-assessments were higher than the researchers’
assessments by about half a category for DA, and almost a full
category for DQ.
The assessments by the researchers show that only 25% of
participants had a good understanding of DA, and less that 25%
had a good understanding of DQ. Hence, this is evidence to
support the proposition that DA and DQ are not well understood.
Proposition 5: there is a lack of clarity on the requirements
of the decision maker
Figure 11 shows analysis of answers given to the following
questions:
* Is time spent upfront in framing the decision, e.g. providing
clarity on the boundaries, the objectives and the criteria, to be
used by the decision makers?
* Is much time spent with the decision maker(s) to clarify their
requirements, both upfront and during each phase?
Looking at Fig. 11, most of the participants considered that
time is spent framing the decisions and clarifying requirements
with the decision makers. If this is the case, there should be
clarity between the project team and the decision maker on the
requirements for the decision. Hence, the proposition is not
supported.
Method: survey
The second phase of research was an on-line survey, designed to
enable quantitative analysis. The survey results, in conjunction
with the first-stage interview outputs, were used to gain an
understanding of why DA is not better utilised for major
decisions on oil and gas projects.
Participants
Theparticipantswere, again, oil andgas personnel fromoperating
companies involved in developments and projects in a variety of
roles (e.g. decision makers, development managers, analysts,
subject-matter experts). These were selected by convenience
and snowball sampling (i.e. specific people were targeted for
their areas of expertise, connections to the researchers and
amenability for participation. They then suggested others in
similar areas).
The invitation to take part in the survey was sent out by the
researchers to 123 people in 10 oil and gas companies, including
the 34 people who took part in the interviews. Several people
emailed stating that they had forwarded the survey invitation
to others.
Seventy-eight people participated in the survey, 49 of whom
gave their email addresses. Of those 49, 11 were positively
identified as having been interviewees. Pro-rating (i.e. 78 11/
49) suggested that ~50%of the interviewees are likely tohave also
completed the survey.
The participants were, again, mainly based in Australia, with
only 4 of the 49 who gave their email addresses being based
overseas, including three in the UK and one in Canada.
Materials
The questions were in the form of response-scale ratings
regarding the participant’s knowledge, opinion about, and use
of specific aspects of FEL andDA.The surveywas designed to be
quick to complete, so as to encourage participation. It asked four
demographic questions and 20 questions on decision making,
including six on FEL, five on DA, five on DQ and four general
decision-making questions. A list of the survey questions is given
in Appendix 4.
The questions on decisionmakingwerewritten as a statement,
and the participants had to state whether they agreed or disagreed
with the statement, with a range of options from strongly agree to
strongly disagree. Figure 12 is an example of how the questions
were set out in the survey.
Procedure
A link to the survey was sent out to potential participants as part
of an email of introduction, along with an information sheet on
the research. Phone calls were alsomade to potential participants,
so as to increase the likelihood of their participating.
The survey participants were offered a copy of any resulting
published papers.
Survey results
To assist with analysis of the survey results for the decision-
making questions (i.e. for everything except the demographic
questions), the strongly agree (StA), agree (A) and slightly agree
(SlA) figures have, in some cases, been aggregated into one
Fig. 11. Interviewees answers on clarity of decision makers’ requirements.
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‘broadly agree’ figure, and the strongly disagree (StD), disagree
(D) and slightly disagree (SlD) figures have been aggregated into
one ‘broadly disagree’ figure.
Demographic questions
The survey results for the demographic questions are shown in
Fig. 13.
Dem1 shows that almost two-thirds of participants were at a
managerial level, with the remainder being equally split between
the executive and professional levels.
Dem2 shows that over half of the participantswere involved in
development or project management. Almost one-fifth were
subject-matter experts, and others whose main roles were in
support services or as a decision maker. No decision analysts
participated in the survey.
The participants were generally highly experienced. Dem3
shows that nearly three-quarters had over 25 years of experience
in the oil and gas industry. Dem4 shows that there was
less experience on opportunities and projects, although nearly
two-fifths had over 25 years of experience, and over four-fifths
had more than 15 years of experience on opportunities
and projects.
Decision Analysis questions
The survey results for the DA questions are shown in bar chart
form in Fig. 14.
The DA1 subplot of Fig. 14 shows that most considered that
they were familiar with DA. Only 4% broadly agreed that they
were unfamiliar with DA, and 90% broadly disagreed.
DA2 indicates that, on balance, DA was not considered to
be complicated. In all, 32% broadly agreed that DA was
complicated, versus 51% who broadly disagreed.
DA3 shows that nearly everyone considered that DA should
be used for major project decisions. In total, 94% broadly agreed
Fig. 12. Example of how the questions were set out in the survey.
Fig. 13. Survey results – demographic questions.
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that DA should be used for major project decisions, and only 1%
broadly disagreed.
DA4 indicates that most people considered that DA is
necessary for making good decisions. In total, 15% broadly
agreed that DA is not necessary for making good decisions,
and 68% broadly disagreed.
DA5 shows that over a third of participants considered that
DA is not used for major project decisions. In total, 50% broadly
agreed that DA is used for major project decisions and 36%
broadly disagreed.
Decision Quality questions
The survey results for the DQ questions are shown in Fig. 15.
The DQ1 subplot of Fig. 15 shows that most people









































Fig. 14. Survey results – Decision Analysis questions.
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broadly agreed that they regularly check DQ before making
decisions versus 11% who broadly disagreed.
DQ2 indicates that there was a split view on whether
formal assessments of DQ were conducted before all key
decisions. In total, 45% broadly agreed that formal assessments
of DQ were conducted before all key decisions, and 42% broadly
disagreed.
DQ3 shows that about twice as many people considered
that DQ is measured early on in a phase to identify activities
to be completed before the decision is taken, compared with
those who did not. In total, 57% broadly agreed that DQ is
measured early on in a phase to identify activities to be
completed before the decision is taken, and 30% broadly
disagree.
DQ4 shows that there was a slight majority who considered
that assessing DQ is not quick and easy to do. In total, 36%










































Fig. 15. Survey results – Decision Quality questions.
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DQ5 shows that experience is not considered to be a substitute
for checking DQ. Only 1% broadly agreed that experienced
people do not need to check on DQ before making a decision,
whereas 96% broadly disagreed.
General decision-making questions
The survey results for the general decision-making questions
are shown in Fig. 16.
The Gen1 subplot of Fig. 16 shows that the majority agreed
that they rely mainly on their experience and judgment for
decision making. In total, 55% broadly agreed that they rely
mainly on their experience and judgment for decision making,
whereas 31% broadly disagreed.
Gen2 shows that nearly all agreed that time is spent with the
decision makers to clarify their requirements. In all, 92% broadly
agreed that time is spent with the decision makers to clarify their
requirements, both upfront and during each phase, whereas 8%
broadly disagreed.
There was a strong view that projects are schedule driven.
Gen3 shows that 97% broadly agreed that projects are often
schedule driven, whereas 2% broadly disagreed.
Gen4 shows that most considered that time is spent upfront on
framing the decision. In all, 90% broadly agreed that time is spent
upfront on framing the decision, including providing clarity on
the boundaries, objectives and criteria to be used by decision
makers, whereas 6% broadly disagreed.
Testing the propositions
Null-hypothesis significance testing
In the following sections, the propositions have been tested
usingnull-hypothesis significance testing.This approach requires
that we assess the likelihood of our proposition (known as the
alternate hypothesis for null-hypothesis significance testing)
being wrong, i.e. the null hypothesis being right. Only if that
is unlikely, can we reject the idea that there is no relationship
and conclude that our proposition is likely to be correct. For this
null-hypothesis significance testing we have set an a-value
of 0.05. Hence, if P (the probability of the null hypothesis
being correct) is less than or equal to 0.05, then the null
hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis
(i.e. our proposition). If P is greater than 0.05, then the null
hypothesis is not rejected.
For testing the null hypothesis, a binomial test has been used
with the expected rate set at three of seven, i.e. 0.4286. This is
based on there being seven categories to select from, three of
which will agree with the alternative hypothesis (strongly agree,
agree and slightly agree) and four will disagree with the alternate

































Fig. 16. Survey results – general decision-making questions.
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neither agreenor disagree).Hence, if categories are being selected
at random, it would be expected that three of seven would agree
with the alternate hypothesis, and four of seven would agree with
the null hypothesis.
Alternative analyses were conducted in which the neither
agree nor disagree responses were either excluded entirely or
split between the agree and disagree groups. Neither of these
changes, nor the use of single-sample Student’s t-tests, changed
the results. As a result, the described 3 : 4 split was retained.
Proposition 2: DA and DQ are perceived
to be complicated
This proposition was tested separately for DA and DQ, using
DA2 and DQ4.
On balance, it seems that DA was not considered to be
complicated. DA2 shows that 32% broadly agreed that DA is
complicated, versus 51%who broadly disagreed. This observation
was confirmed by a binomial test (HO: DA is not perceived to be
complicated, HA: DA is perceived to be complicated, P=0.98),
showing that the proposition is not supported.
The question of whether assessing DQ is quick and easy to
perform is more in the balance. DQ4 shows that 36% broadly
agreed that assessing DQ is quick and easy to do, whereas 43%
broadly disagreed. However, a binomial test (HO: DQ is not
perceived to be complicated, HA: DQ is perceived to be
complicated, P= 0.49) showed that the proposition is not
supported.
Proposition 3: people rely mainly on experience
and judgment for decision making
Gen1 shows that 55% broadly agreed that they rely mainly on
their experience and judgment for decisionmaking,whereas 31%
broadly disagreed. This observationwas confirmed by a binomial
test (HO: people do not rely mainly on experience and judgment,
HA: people relymainly on experience and judgment,P = 0.0195),
which showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
Proposition 4: projects are schedule driven
There is a strong view that projects are schedule driven. Gen3
shows that 97% broadly agreed that projects are often schedule
driven, whereas 2% broadly disagreed. This observation was
confirmed by a binomial test (HO: projects are not schedule
driven, HA: projects are schedule driven, P < 0.001), which
showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
Proposition 5: there is a lack of clarity on the requirements
of the decision maker
There seems to be no lack of clarity between the project
team and the decision maker on the requirements for the
decision. Gen2 shows that 92% broadly agreed that time is
spent with the decision makers to clarify their requirements,
both upfront and during each phase, whereas 8% broadly
disagreed. This observation was confirmed by a binomial test
(HO: there is clarity on the requirements of the decision maker,
HA: there is a lack of clarity on the requirements of the decision
maker, P > 0.99), which showed that the proposition was not
supported.
In addition, Gen4 shows that 90% broadly agreed that time
is spent upfront on framing the decision, including providing
clarity on the boundaries, objectives and criteria to be used by
decision makers, compared with 6% who broadly disagreed.
This observation was confirmed by a binomial test (HO: there
is clarity on the requirements of the decision maker, HA: there is
a lack of clarity on the requirements of the decision maker,
P > 0.99), which showed that the proposition was not supported.
Proposition 6: DQ is not assessed at the start
of the phase to inform the work to be done
On the basis of the answer to DQ3, 57% broadly agreed that
DQ is measured early on in a phase to identify activities to be
completed before the decision is taken, and 30% broadly
disagreed. This observation was confirmed by a binomial test
(HO: DQ is assessed at the start of the phase to inform the work to
be done, HA: DQ is not assessed at the start of the phase to inform
the work to be done, P = 0.995), which showed that the
proposition was not supported.
Discussion
General
This section discusses some general issues that may have
influenced the results.
How representative are the samples?
The sample is predominantly Australian, although many
participants have overseas experience. The initial participants
for both the interviews and survey were oil and gas personnel
known to the researchers, who were targeted for their knowledge
and experience in opportunities and projects. The interviewees
were from six companies, and about two-thirds of these came
from two companies. Hence, it is likely that there was some
inherent biaswith the participants, and the resultsmay not be truly
representative of all companies.
This is similar for the survey. The survey request was sent out
to people currently working in 10 oil and gas companies.
However, about two-thirds of completed surveys came from
people working for two companies. A balancing factor is that
there is a great deal of varied experience, as many participants
had previously worked for several different companies.
Format of survey questions
The survey questionnaire was deliberately set up to have
a balance of positive and negative questions. This was based
on research, e.g. Choi and Pak (2005), which suggested that
some respondents may be either ‘yes-saying’ or ‘no-saying’, that
is, tend to answer yes (or agree) to all questions or to answer no
(or disagree) to all questions. Having a balance of positive or
negative questions is suggested as a solution.
However, this may have had unintended consequences.
Some questions can be made negative by changing one word,
such as, DA2: ‘decision analysis is complicated to use’ is the
negative of ‘decision analysis is simple to use’. However, for
three questions (DA1, DA4, DQ5), we have made the question
negative by including the word ‘not’. This may have led to errors
in answering the survey, as respondents may not have noticed the
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‘not’, or may have become confused when answering with a
double negative, i.e. disagreeing with the not.
Decision Analysis versus decision analysis
For the present paper, we have used Decision Analysis with
capital letters to mean, specifically, Decision Analysis as
described in the Review of decision making section. Similarly,
we have used Decision Quality to refer to the process described
in that section. However, for the interviews and surveys we were
not explicit about this, and we did not use capital letters in the
survey for either decision analysis or decision quality. Hence,
understanding of decision analysis or decision quality could be
limited to English language use of the words or restricted to just
one part of it, such as, decision trees.
Being familiar with DA or DQ
What do people mean when they say they are ‘familiar’ with
something? There are different levels of understanding, which
can be described in the following way:
* On paper.
* On the lips.
* In the head.
* In the heart.
‘On paper’ means that ‘Yes, I’ve seen that. It’s written down
somewhere. If I can find the piece of paper, I will be able to show
you’. ‘On the lips’means that I can talk about it, and explain some
bits of it. ‘In the head’ means that I have a good intellectual
understanding of it, including the principles and concepts behind
it. ‘In the heart’ means that I live and breathe this, I fully
understand this, and I am committed to doing it.
Hence, there are different possible interpretations of what
‘being familiar with’ means. Some people might only consider
that they are familiar with DA or DQ if it is ‘in the head’ or ‘in the
heart’; othersmight consider that they are familiar withDAorDQ
if it is ‘on paper’ or ‘on the lips’.
Are DA and DQ used as much as they ‘should’ be?
The present research was predicated on the assumption that DA
and DQ are not used as much, or as effectively, as would be
required to achieve a high decision quality, and, hence, increase
the likelihood of a good outcome. To check whether this
assumption is correct, we reviewed the relevant survey results.
When comparing the answers for DA3 and DA5, it is evident
that DA is not used as much as the industry personnel believe it
shouldbe.DA3shows that 94%broadly agreed thatDAshouldbe
used for major project decisions, whereas DA5 shows that only
50% broadly agreed that DA is used for major project decisions.
This is similar for DQ, because DQ2 shows that only 45%
broadly agreed that formal assessments of DQ are performed
before all key decisions. Interestingly, DQ1 shows that 84%
broadly agreed that they regularly check DQ before making
decisions, indicating a mismatch between the respondents’
views of what they and their companies are doing. Experience
is not considered to be a valid reason for not checkingDQ, asDQ5
shows that only1%broadly agreed that experiencedpeopledonot
need to check on DQ before making a decision.
Hence, the results suggest that neither DA nor DQ are used as
much as respondents think they should be. Nearly all personnel
say that they should always be used for major project decisions,
whereas, in practice, they are used only for about half of these.
Reviewing the propositions
Proposition 1: DA and DQ are not well understood
The surveys and the interviews contain conflicting
information on how well DA and DQ are understood.
In general, the survey outcomes implied a reasonable
understanding of DA and DQ, whereas the interviews casted
doubt on this.One possible explanation for this is the difference in
the demographics of interviewees and the survey respondents,
and how representative theywere of the overall oil and gas project
population. However, Fig. 17 shows that the demographics of
both groups, in terms of years of experience in oil and gas,
and years of experience in opportunities and projects, were
very similar.
DA1 shows that most of participants considered that they are
familiarwithDA.This seems tobeanendorsement thatDAiswell
understood.However, only 55%of the interviewees said that they
hadperformedDA, another 10%said theyhadperformedpart of a
DAand34%hadnot performed anyDA.Hence, there is a contrast
here between 90% from the survey that said that they were
familiar with DA, compared with 55% of interviewees who
had conducted DA. This implies that some people considered
themselves ‘familiar with’ DA, even though they had not
performed DA themselves.
In DQ1 of the survey, 84% broadly agreed that they regularly
check DQ before making decisions. If you ‘regularly check DQ’,
then the expectation is that you are familiar with the DQ chain or
wheel, andwould be able to name all, ormost of, the six elements.
However, in the interviews only 19 of 34 (i.e. 56%) said theywere
familiar with the DQ chain or wheel. And for the 19 people who
said that they were familiar with the DQ chain or wheel, the
average number of elements identified was only 2.4 of 6. No-one
correctly identified all six elements, and three people could not
identify any elements. So, what does ‘being familiar with’mean?
It seems anomalous that 84% of the people surveyed stated that
they regularly check DQ before making decisions, when only 12
of 34 interviewees (35%) could identify three ormore elements of
the DQ chain.
The assessments of understanding of DA and DQ (Figs 9, 10)
showed that theaverage level ofunderstandingofDAandDQwas
approximately the ‘Fair’ range. These also showed that the
researchers considered that DA and DQ were not understood
as well as the interviewees thought they are, and the difference
was greater for DQ.
When asked ‘What does Decision Analysis mean to you?’,
the interviewees gave a variety of answers (see earlier section
on interview results and Appendix 3). Does this mean that DA is
not fully understood, or that DA means different things to
different people? A potential reason for this is a lack of clarity
and understanding on what DA is. Part of this may be the
difference between DA and decision analysis, as discussed
previously.
This is not helped by the many different definitions available
for DA. Some definitions of DA are accurate, but use specialised
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language that is not readily accessible to the layman and/or are of
high level and not sufficient to explain what it is. For example,
* Specialised language: Decision Analysis is a philosophy,
articulated by a set of logical axioms, and a methodology
and collection of systematic procedures, based upon those
axioms, for responsibly analysing the complexities inherent in
decision problems (Keeney 1982, p. 806).
* High level: Decision Analysis is a systematic procedure for
transforming opaque decision problems into transparent
decision problems by a sequence of transparent steps
(Howard 1988, p. 680).
* Specialised language and high level: The application of
decision science to real-world problems through the use of
systems analysis and operations research (McNamee and
Celona 2005, p. 1).
On balance, considering all the above, it is judged that DA and
DQ are not well understood. It is considered that a car analogy
might be helpful for explaining DA and the different ways in
which it is understood. This is shown in Fig. 18.
This also provides a good analogy of when to use different
types of DA. For example, if you are driving in a Formula 1
race, everything in the car would need to be perfectly
set up, with meticulous care taken over each of the
components; if you are going four-wheel driving, you need
a suitable type of car that is set up for four-wheel driving and
to ensure that you have the appropriate tools with you,
including an air compressor; if you are going only to the
local shops, you can just hop in your car and drive. What you
need to do is dependent on the levels of complexity and
uncertainty, and the potential consequences if things go
wrong. This is the same for DA. Major oil and gas project
decisions have high levels of uncertainty, are generally
complex and have high-consequence outcomes. Therefore,
they should use complete DA. Other oil and gas project
decisions, with less uncertainty and complexity, and lower-
consequence outcomes, may be made using partial DA, or
clear thinking consistent with DA principles.
An interesting aspect of the analogy is education. If you
want to drive a car, it is important to have some driving
instruction. It helps to have both the theoretical knowledge
of how a car works and how to drive, and to have had a
significant amount of practical experience at driving. However,
it seems that people may be happy to make decisions without
having had the necessary training in DA, that is, without either
the theoretical knowledge or practical experience.
Fig. 17. Comparison of demographics for interviewees versus survey respondents.
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Proposition 2: DA and DQ are perceived to be
complicated
It was a surprise that null-hypothesis testing showed that
this proposition, namely that DA and DQ are perceived to be
complicated, was not supported. Prior to the survey results, it had
seemed to be a likely reason why DA is not used more.
However, it is interesting to compare the answers to DA2 and
DQ4. One could be the corollary of the other, i.e. if something
is quick and easy, then it could be deemed to be not complicated,
and vice versa.
Hence, if we substitute ‘quick and easy’ for ‘not complicated’,
then, when we compare DA2 and DQ4, we get the following:
DA2: 32% broadly agreed that DA is complicated, 51%
broadly disagreed.
DQ4: 43% broadly agreed that DQ is complicated, 36%
broadly disagreed.
A t-test performed to compare the answers to DA2 and DQ4
gave the following results: t(77) = 2.73; P = 0.008, two-tailed;
meanDQ4 = 3.88,meanDA2= 4.36 (basedona scale of1–7 from
‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). This shows that there is
a statistically significant difference between the outcomes.
This implies that DQ is considered to be more complicated
than DA. This is surprising, as DQ is a part of DA and,
hence, if anything, would be expected to be is simpler than
DA. Maybe this is simply semantics, and ‘quick and easy’
does not equate to ‘not complicated’. Or, perhaps, DA is better
understood than DQ and, because it is better understood, it is
considered to be less complicated. There is possibly some
evidence of this by comparing Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. Although
the interviewees assessed their own understanding of DA to be
very similar to that of DQ, the researchers assessed the
interviewees’ understanding of DA to be better than their
understanding of DQ.
Proposition 3: people rely mainly on experience and
judgment for decision making
Although the survey respondents confirmed that this
proposition, that people rely mainly on experience and
judgment for decision making, is supported, this was
confounded by the outcomes of two other survey questions.
DA4 shows that only 15% broadly agreed that DA is not
necessary for making good decisions, and 68% broadly
disagreed, i.e. they considered that DA is necessary for
making good decisions. Similarly, DQ5 shows that experience
is not considered to be a substitute for checking DQ; 96%
considered that experienced people do need to check on DQ
before making a decision.
Hence, according to the survey outcomes, although DA and
DQ are considered necessary for making good decisions, most
people still rely mainly on their experience and judgment.
Perhaps this means that they still rely on experience and
judgment, despite considering that DA and DQ are
necessary for making good decisions. Or it could mean that
they rely on their experience and judgment in conjunction with
using DA and DQ.
Proposition 4: projects are schedule driven
The survey outcome showed that there is strong support
for the proposition that projects are schedule driven. This
implies that the desire to pass through decision gates ‘on time’
over-rides the desire to create value and ensure readiness to make
Fig. 18. Car analogy for Decision Analysis.
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a decision; that is, confirmation that the information on which
the decision will be based is sufficiently complete and accurate,
and that there is a good understanding of the uncertainties and
risks, and how these will be managed.
This is in line with the findings of Walkup and Ligon (2006)
who stated that ‘... most DRBs are concerned more with project
schedules and rarely encourage the creativity to achieve quality
alternatives.’
Proposition 5: there is a lack of clarity on the requirements
of the decision maker
The analysis of the interviews and the analysis of the survey
results showed that both the interviewees and survey respondents
considered that there is clarity on the requirements of the decision
maker.
However, how well is this tested in practice? Perhaps
assumptions are sometimes made, and there is a belief by the
project team that they have clarity on the decision-maker
requirements, but they have not checked that there understanding
is correct. Also, decisions makers may not always state their true
reasons, or some things are kept back from the project team, for
reasons of commercial confidentiality.
Proposition 6: DQ is not assessed at the start of the phase
to inform the work to be undertaken
The analysis of the survey outcomes in the survey results
section showed that the proposition that DQ is not assessed at the
start of the phase to inform the work to be undertaken, is not
supported. However, considering DQ2, which shows that only
45%broadly agreed that formal assessments ofDQare performed
before all key decisions, it was decided to perform some further
analysis to see how many broadly agree that formal assessments
are performed before all key decisions AND broadly agree that
DQ is measured early in the phase to identify activities to be
completed before the decision is taken. The result was as follows:
Broadly agree to both DQ2 and DQ3: 31 (40%).
Mix of broadly agree, neither and broadly disagree: 30 (38%).
Broadly disagree to both DQ2 and DQ3: 17 (22%).
This suggests that ~40% of respondents are using DQ
effectively by using it before all key decisions AND
measuring it early in the phase to identify activities to be
completed before the decision is taken.
What could be done to encourage better use
of DA and DQ?
To encourage better use of DA and DQ, steps need to be taken
to mitigate the impact of the three propositions that are deemed
to be valid, namely
* DA and DQ are not well understood.
* People rely mainly on experience and judgment for decision
making.
* Projects are schedule driven.
Suggestions are given below on mitigating the impact of
these through education and determining underlying causes.
Education
Education would help mitigate the impact of all three of the
above propositions. However, it is appreciated that decision
makers are busy people at a senior level, and, so, focussed,
just-in-time training is proposed before key decisions. The
initial training could be conducted in 1–2 h, and retraining (for
subsequent decisions) could be conducted in 30min to 1 h.
It is proposed that training emphasises the ease of performing
DA and DQ, and provides practice at applying them. Ideally,
this would be followed by further practice, which is frequently
repeated so that using DA and DQ becomes a habit. Applying
them, for even simple decisions, helps provide a good
understanding of the principles and concepts, which reinforces
their use. The aim of training is for DA and DQ to go beyond
a good intellectual understanding of DA and DQ (i.e.: ‘in the
head’) and it becomes compelling and the natural thing to do
for all decisions (i.e.: ‘in the heart’). To assist with this, it is
proposed that a habit is made of reviewing each of the six
elements of theDQ chain or wheel for all, even simple, decisions.
To address the tendency to rely on experience and judgment
for decision making, the training should include explanations
ofwhy this is from theneuroscience andpsychologyperspectives,
as covered in Review of decision making. It should also include
an explanation of decision situationswhere relying on experience
and judgment might be appropriate (Kahneman and Klein 2009;
Kahneman and Klein 2010), with a strong endorsement that it
is not appropriate for key decisions on oil and gas projects
involving complexity and uncertainty, whereDA should be used.
To address the issue of projects being schedule driven rather
than value driven, the training should raise awareness of the
impact that this has on decision making and consequent project
outcomes.Research has shown that schedule-driven projects tend
to have a longer schedule, higher costs and lower production
attainment (Nandurdikar and Kirkham 2012). If projects are
schedule driven, there may not be enough time to complete the
work necessary to provide sufficiently complete and accurate
information to enable a good decision to be made. Decisions are
likely to be taken on the basis of information that does not provide
a true picture of the full range of outcomes, and the associated
uncertainties and risks.
Determining underlying causes
Although education and regular practice are likely to help
encourage the use of DA and DQ, this will be insufficient if
there are strong drivers and motivations opposing the use of
DA and DQ.
Although further research is required to investigate this, one
avenue may be to adopt the causal reasoning approach used by
Stockholm (2011) for investigating incidents. This had an impact
in improving both safety and operational performance in the
petrochemical industry, and it could be used for improving the
performance on projects. This would be achieved by determining
the underlying causes for reliance on experience and judgment
for decision making, and for why projects are schedule driven.
This would look for the motivation behind the above reasons to
determine what needs to change, and how people might be
influenced to change.
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Premortem
Auseful adjunct toDA is to performapremortem,which provides
a final check on the decision. Research on prospective hindsight
(Mitchell Russo et al. 1989) has found that imagining that
an event has already occurred increases the ability to correctly
identify reasons for future outcomes by 30%. This concept was
used by Klein (2007) to create the premortem, which provides
a safe environment for project team members to identify
weaknesses that could result in project failure. The premortem
technique has been shown to be effective in a crisis-management
planning context (Veinott Klein et al. 2010).
A premortem is like a postmortem, but with one significant
difference; a postmortem takes place after the event to determine
why things went wrong; a premortem occurs during a project to
prevent the project goingwrong, or tominimise the consequences
if it does go wrong. The premortem takes place after an
important decision has been made, but before it has been
formally committed. Key project team members are gathered
together. The leader starts the exercise by informing everyone
that it is now a time in the future, when the project has
been implemented as per the decision, and the outcome is
a spectacular disaster. During the next few minutes, everyone
works independently and writes down all the potential reasons
they can think of for the failure, especially things that would
not normally be mentioned for fear of being impolitic. The leader
then asks each team member to read one reason from their list;
everyone states a different reason until they are all recorded.
After the session has finished, the project manager reviews the
list, looking for ways to strengthen the planned way forward.
A benefit of the premortem is that it legitimises doubt, which
helps overcoming groupthink (Esser 1998) that can affect teams
once a decision has been made. Otherwise, when a team comes
to a decision, and particularly when the leader has a strong
involvement in it, doubts about the plan are gradually (even
unconsciously) suppressed. This contributes to overconfidence
in the team, because only support for the decision is expressed.
The premortem overcomes this by letting doubts be raised, and
encourages even supporters of the decision to look for potential
threats that they had not considered before.
The six elements of DA and DQ could be used as a prompt
to help find reasons for failure, e.g. did it go wrong because of
incomplete or inaccurate information, did we look at sufficient
alternatives, has sound reasoning been used when selecting the
preferred alternative?
Further Research
Further research is proposed as follows:
(1) Investigate the effectiveness of just-in-time (re)training in the
principles of DA and DQ before decisions are made.
(2) Conduct work to provide convincing evidence that high-
quality decisions (i.e. decisions that score highly on the DQ
chain or wheel) lead to a higher likelihood of project success.
(3) Investigate the effectiveness of premortems for improving
project outcomes.
(4) Use a causal reasoning approach to determine the underlying
drivers and motivations behind why DA and DQ are not
used more, why projects are schedule driven and why there
is a preference to rely on experience and judgment for
decisions on projects.
Conclusions
Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are not used as much
as they should be. The survey showed that ~90% think they
should be used for major project decisions, but only ~50% say
that they are used for major project decisions.
Six propositions were tested for why DA and DQ are not
used more, or are not used more effectively. On the basis of
the outcomes of the interviews and survey, the following three
of these were not supported:
* Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are perceived to be
complicated.
* There is a lack of clarity on the requirements of the decision
maker.
* Decision Quality is not assessed at the start of the phase to
inform the work to be done.
The three propositions that were deemed to be valid are:
* Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are not well
understood.
* People rely mainly on experience and judgment for decision
making.
* Projects are schedule driven.
Just-in-time training is proposed as a first step to mitigate the
effect of these three propositions. This should emphasise the ease
of performingDA, and the use ofDQ to guidewhat work needs to
be done to achieve a high-quality decision. It should also raise
awareness on the impact that relying on experience and judgment
and being schedule driven has on decision making, and the
adverse consequences for expected outcomes.
However, training alone is unlikely to be sufficient to
encourage use of DA and DQ if there are other strong
motivations opposing this, such as schedule drivers. Further
research is proposed, to dig down to a deeper level to
determine the underlying causes of the underuse of these tools,
and tackle those, and, specifically, to determine how to
influence decision makers to change their behaviours so that
DA and DQ are used more effectively.
A premortem is proposed as a final check on decision
making. This could use the six elements of DA and DQ to
help identify potential reasons for the project to fail, leading to
corrective actions before finalising the decision.
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Appendix 1. Full structure of interview
Individual information/demographics
* What is your current role?
* How many years of experience do you have in oil and gas?
* How many years do you have on opportunities and projects?
* What previous roles have you held on opportunities and projects?
* Which of the following best defines your current role for projects:
o Decision maker (i.e. authorised to commit resources for major development decisions).





General questions on projects and decision making
* Do you use a gated decision-making framework for your projects?
* Are there any requirements to be met before for moving from one phase to the next?
o Typically, what are these?
o Are these requirements generally adhered to?
* What are (typically) the drivers for proceeding through decision gates?
* How are key decisions on oil and gas projects made in your company?
* Are any tools used to assist with decision making?
Questions on Decision Analysis
* What does Decision Analysis mean to you?
* What do you consider the key aspects of Decision Analysis are?
* Have you carried out any Decision Analyses?
* What processes and tools are used (in your company) to help you in making decisions?
* Are you familiar with any other processes and tools used for Decision Analysis?
* How can Decision Analysis be tailored for different decisions?
* Is time spent upfront in framing the decision, e.g. providing clarity on the boundaries, the objectives and the criteria to be used by the
decision makers?
* Is much time spent with the decision maker(s) to clarify their requirements, both upfront and during each phase?
* Is probabilistic analysis used for any off your decisions?
Decision making for oil and gas projects The APPEA Journal 153
66
o When is it used and why?
* Are completed analyses adjusted to take account of any new information?
Questions on Decision Quality
* How would you judge the quality of a decision?
* How would you know if it was a good decision?
* How are good decisions related to good outcomes?
* Does your company carry out any formal assessments of the quality of decisions made?
* Are you familiar with the Decision Quality chain or Decision Quality wheel?
o Can you name and describe any of the 6 components the Decision Quality?
* Are checks made of Decision Quality before key decisions?
o How are they made (all 6 aspects Decision Quality wheel?)
o What action is taken if Decision Quality is not good?
Self-assessment of knowledge and understanding of Decision Analysis and Decision Quality
See separate template.
* What is your level of understanding on a scale of 1–5?
* What is your assessment of the level of understanding of a typical decision maker in your organisation?
Fig. A1. Rubric for assessing understanding of Decision Analysis.
Appendix 2. Rubrics for assessing understanding of Decision Analysis (DA) and Decision Quality (DQ)
The researchers performed their own assessment of the level of knowledge and understanding of the interviewees. Scoring rubrics were developed tomake this as
objective as possible. The rubrics used for assessment of knowledge and understanding of DA and DQ are shown in Figs A1 and A2.
Scores were on a scale of 0–5, with 0.5 indicating themidpoint of each category. The researchers’ score for assessing understanding ofDA for each individual
was calculated by taking the average score for the four criteria (i.e. understanding of DA; has performed DA; aware of processes and tools used for DA; provides
judgment and comment on DA). The same approach was used by the researchers for assessing understanding of DQ.
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Appendix 3. What does Decision Analysis mean to you?
The following are the answers given to the question: ‘What does Decision Analysis mean to you?’:
* It means a rigorous disciplined process of working out what options are going to meet your objectives.
* The science and process of how you make a decision, both the psychology and the process.
* There are five or six different dimensions to making a good decision and, to me, the Decision Analysis is around assessing those
dimensions and determining whether you’ve considered all the aspects. So, whether you have framed it correctly, whether you’ve got
the relevant information, whether you are committed to action, whether the work is complete to enable you to make a decision.
* It means the techniques and methodology for making decisions, generally under uncertainty, and understanding the quality of these.
It’s about the tools and the statistical methods you have.
* I’m not sure what Decision Analysis is. I know what decision-making is –when you actually make a decision. But I do not knowwhat
Decision Analysis is.
* Satisfying yourself that you have made the right decision. Weighing the risks and rewards to see how/whether to proceed.
* It’s the breaking down of a decision into component parts that enable you to assess whether you are making a good, well informed
decision against certain criteria.
* I’ve been through the Stanford school and use their approach to Decision Analysis. The aim is to understand the problem and
determine whether we can make a decision.
* I’m not sure what you mean by it.
* Not much Decision Analysis is done. Lookbacks are done on projects, both for good and bad outcomes. But they don’t do a formal
assessment of decision making after the fact.
* Wehave a rigorous decision-making list of criteria. It measures projects in an economic sense versus variousmetrics. It analyses risk
and uncertainty in decisions, it looks at what drives the value proposition on projects.
* Every decision youmake carries a risk. Andevery decision youmakewill bemadewith the analysis of the data at that time. Inhindsight
people may ask why that decision was made, but it was the right decision at that time.
Fig. A2. Rubric for assessing understanding of Decision Quality.
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You may make the decision that the project was going to be economic, given the price of the product at that time. But the price
may change, and the market is not going to treat you well and say: ‘You didn’t make the right decision’ and ‘You are not making
any money with my money’.
* In essence, it’s a structured approach to informing and making an investment decision. It is addressing the risks, the uncertainty
and the value potential of a particular investment, or series of investments.
* Decision Analysis is:
(a) Working out what is the problem you are trying to solve, be it commercial, schedule, regulatory, and what are the criteria and
bandwidths around that particular problem.
(b) Putting in processes and procedures to take you through those various gates.
* Taking all the information, looking at risk and uncertainty and making the right decision.
* Basically, what I think it means is that if you are making a decision, what do you need to analyse to make that decision robust in the
present time frame, and robust for the future use of those outcomes.
* For me, Decision Analysis would be the assessment of risks and ranges, for a series of different outcomes in a particular area, and
then comparing them to reach a good decision. It’s never whether it is black or white, it is shades of grey. And it’s a matter of
understanding the shades of grey – how sensitive they are to change.
To my mind, Decision Analysis is about testing the outcome, e.g. the value outcomes. You are trying to make the best decision for
what your business objectives are. So, it’s testing risk and range for scenarios to meet your business objectives.
* The mathematics of making a decision.
* Good Decision Analysis means that you are not biased and not using heuristics. You capture the full range of uncertainty, and find
the right balance with what you are trying to achieve, making clear what the alternatives are.
* It means the techniques and methodology for making decisions, generally under uncertainty, and understanding the quality of these.
It’s about the tools and the statistical methods you have.
* I suppose the economics of the investment decision come right up tomind.We haveDA teams, and they typically look at the economics
of an investment, the risks, sensitivities, NPV’s – all those sorts of measures fall into the big bucket, in my mind, called DA.
* I guess to me it’s looking at the quality of the decision that you’re trying to make.
* Decision Analysis I’m presuming means, for instance, the decision tree. So, it’s the process of making a decision and, in making that
decision, what factors, elements get taken into account.
* Decision Analysis is looking at the quality and should be looking at the capability of the people who are actually making the decision.
Then, ona technical component, be it onadirectionoradecision tomove forward:Has the adequateamount of engineeringbeendone
so that you can get the class of the cost estimate? Is the contractor capable of actually producing the class of the cost estimate that
you’re wanting? So it’s really saying, what are the key decisions that are critical in the phase, and has the work been done, have the
people that should be involved been involved, and are the decision-makers the right decision-makers?
* A structured or repeatable way of approaching decisions.
* There are five or six different dimensions to making a good decision and, to me, the Decision Analysis is around assessing those
dimensions and determining whether you’ve considered all the aspects. So, whether you have framed it correctly, whether you’ve got
the relevant information, whether you are committed to action, whether the work is complete to enable you to make a decision.
* It means, for me, there’s three ‘going in’ components. The going in components are, first of all, the information: Were the studies
appropriately framed? Did we really map out what was needed to make this decision? And by map out it can be, were the executives
that need tomake the decision engaged early enough? So, is it that their concernswere addressed in thatmapping framing session? It
can be that the subject matter experts involved to identify the necessary studies that are needed and it can be that there are sort of wild
card approaches,wherewe just get people inwho have not done it beforewho ask oddball questions and say yes, but what about?And
what if? So, it’s good framing.
The secondpart is goodprocess that defineswhat youneed to study tobe able to bound the information that underpins the decision. So,
letme explain. If the decision doesn’t change fromA toB independent of the range of outcomes of a particular variable, don’t study it.
The third part is that there are reviews by subject matter experts during the course of the work. There’s no value in information that is
reviewed just before a decision to see whether it was good information, because the only thing that that can produce is a yes or no
answer, and if it’s a no answer, then you can’t make the decisions. So, good decisions come from work that was reviewed during the
course of the work, not just before a gate review.
* It means either a structured or a formal process to review a decision. To review the inputs and aspects of a decision from risk to
consequences to outcomes to costs – all sorts of parameters that might to around that decision, depending on what the decision is.
* I don’t know, I’ve not used it.
* Understanding risk reward. That’s what it all comes down to.
* It’s having sufficient information to be able to commit to the next financial commitment or stage of the work program.
* That’s a really good question. We quite often find that engineers, in particular, are the worst at this, where they will home in on a
particular solution based on a past experience way to soon. And, in order to fully undertake a robust Decision Analysis before you
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come to the point of making a final decision, there perhaps aremultiple more solutions that have just been ignored and perhaps could
offer a robust and cost-effective solution.
So, formeDecisionAnalysis comes back to front-end loading, in terms ofmaking sure at the outset that you spend the right amount of
time framing including brainstorming, researching past lessons learnt, and understanding options that are out there before you start
diving in and evaluating too soon. And if you can get that level of front-end framing in place, then through the different stages of the
development, you can get a healthy Decision Analysis before you come to make key decisions.
* In my view, it is around taking a holistic approach towards taking a decision. It can be around looking at different metrics, different
drivers, including uncertainty. So, doingprobabilistic analysis, if you have the luxury of being able to do that, and understanding your
low probability, high impact outcomes and taking all of that into account in your decision-making process.
* Decision Analysis. I would say, how informed were the decision-makers? Did they have any bias?Were they presented with the right
frame? Was the right decision made and was it an informed decision? Was there any bias? What were the inputs? What were the
outputs? For me, it would be assessing the quality of the decision and did it lead to a good outcome?
* To me it really means understanding the frame first, getting the right inputs, having clarity around what the decision criteria are and
obviously understanding people and who the decision-maker is. So, getting that clarity on those. That’s what it means to me.
Appendix 4. List of survey questions
This is a list of the survey questions relating to decision making. For ease of reference, they are presented here in separate sections of demographic
questions, Decisions Analysis questions, Decision Quality questions and general decision-making questions.
For the survey, the demographic questions were first, and then the questions on Decisions Analysis, Decision Quality and general decision-making were
mixed together.
Demographic questions
Dem1. Which of the following best describes your organisational level?
* Professional
* Manager
* Executive (e.g. VP, director, country manager)
Dem2. Which of the following best describes your role on opportunities and projects?
* Decision maker
















Questions on Decision Analysis
DA1. I am not familiar with decision analysis.
DA2. Decision analysis is complicated to use.
DA3. Decision analysis should be used for major project decisions.
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DA4. Decision analysis is not necessary for making good decisions.
DA5. Decision analysis is used for all our major project decisions.
Questions on Decision Quality
DQ1. I regularly check decision quality before making decisions.
DQ2. Formal assessments of decision quality are carried out before all key decisions.
DQ3. Decision quality is measured early on in a phase to identify activities needing to be completed before the decision is taken.
DQ4. Assessing decision quality is quick and easy to do.
DQ5. Experienced people do not need to check on Decision Quality before making a decision.
Questions on general decision-making
Gen1. I rely mainly on my experience and judgment for decision making.
Gen2. Time is spent with the decision makers to clarify their requirements, both upfront and during each phase.
Gen3. Projects are often schedule driven.
Gen4. Time is spent upfront on framing the decision, including providing clarity on the boundaries, the objectives and the criteria to be
used by decision makers.
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Abstract
Outcomes for oil and gas projects often fall short of the expectations predicted at project sanction.
Appropriate use of Front End Loading (FEL) and Decision Analysis (DA) to achieve high Decision Quality
(DQ) should increase the likelihood of achieving better outcomes. However, despite being successful
methodologies, research has shown that they are not always applied. The focus of this paper is on how to
encourage people to make better use of FEL and DA.
Previous results from this research program have shown two key reasons why FEL and DA are not used
more: an over-reliance on ‘experience’ and judgment for decision-making, rather than the use of structured
processes; and projects being ‘schedule-driven’, i.e. meeting target dates being the primary objective. This
paper focuses on insights from a survey conducted both to answer questions raised by this previous research
and test the likely uptake of methods designed to encourage more effective use of FEL and DA/DQ. It shows
that there is strong agreement that good FEL leads to better project outcomes, and that the FEL benchmark
score is a good indicator of readiness for project sanction. However, perhaps competing with the desire to
complete FEL, is the view (of around 2/3 of respondents) that it is important to drive the schedule in order to
prevent ‘overworking’ – continued activity that adds little value. All respondents agreed that it is essential:
that the decision maker clarifies the frame, scope and criteria for the decision; and to have regular discussions
between the decision maker and the project team to bring alignment. However, responses indicated that
these only occur in practice around half of the time. Similarly, formal assessments of DQ are made in less
than half of key project decisions.
Several novel solutions are proposed for increasing the likelihood of better project outcomes by
improving the uptake and use of FEL and DA/DQ. These include: just-in-time training on FEL and DA/DQ;
basing performance incentives on achieving high DQ and good FEL; and, developing a simple pragmatic
assessment of FEL that can be used in-house. These suggestions were all supported by a majority of survey
respondents.
Introduction
This paper is part of a research program aimed at improving outcomes for oil and gas projects by encouraging
better use to be made of Front End Loading (FEL), Decision Analysis (DA) and Decision Quality (DQ).
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Detailed descriptions of FEL, DA and DQ are given in Appendix 1 but, in brief, each can be understood
as follows.
FEL is the process of developing sufficient strategic information to address uncertainty and help make
decisions to commit resources to maximise the potential for a successful project. In practice, this means
investing significant effort in the project phases up to the Final Investment Decision (FID) [also known as
Project Sanction or Approval for Expenditure (AFE)].
DA is the discipline of making good decisions and describes how people should logically make decisions.
It is a structured approach for creating and evaluating choices, by using a pragmatic application of tools and
processes tailored to the needs of the decision.
Finally, DQ is used to judge the quality of a decision by assessing the six elements that make up a good
decision: (1) appropriate frame, (2) clear values, (3) creative alternatives, (4) useful information, (5) sound
reasoning, and (6) commitment to action. DQ can also be used as a simplified way of applying the principles
of DA. As such, hereafter, we use the term DA/DQ.
This paper builds upon work carried out in two previous studies. The first study was a series of interviews
with 34 senior personnel from a range of oil and gas operating companies and the second was a survey of
78 senior personnel. Both studies were aimed at gaining a better understanding of how FEL and DA/DQ
are currently being used with respect to decision making on oil and gas projects, and why they are being
used in this way. These studies were reported in two papers.
The first paper (Newman, Begg, & Welsh, 2016) focused on FEL. It showed that while FEL is highly
regarded and the concept is well understood, it is not always applied appropriately – with many companies
advocating its use but allowing projects to pass through decision gates with incomplete levels of FEL. Key
findings were that, although the concept of FEL is highly regarded, FEL benchmark scores are neither well
understood, nor considered to be important. In particular, the predictive power of FEL benchmark scores
does not appear to be fully appreciated.
The second paper (Newman, Begg, & Welsh, 2018) focused on DA/DQ. It included a literature review of
neuroscience and psychological factors that affect decision makers, and highlighted reasons why it is hard
for people to be good decision makers – as formally defined. Instead, we are subject to many biases - such
as overconfidence, anchoring and availability - which affect our ability to make good decisions. As a result
of our brains having evolved to be quick and efficient, we tend to rely on our intuition, rather than to take the
time to think through and analyse decisions. Intuitive decision making depends heavily on two hardwired
processes. Firstly, our brains interpret situations and information using ‘pattern recognition’ and thus, when
faced with a new situation, we make assumptions based on prior experiences and judgments (Campbell,
Whitehead, & Finkelstein, 2009). How we respond to particular information, or ignore it, however is affected
by emotional tags that are attached to our memories (Finkelstein, Whitehead, & Campbell, 2009). When
we need to make a decision, our brain will recall past situations that seem similar to the current one,
preferentially accessing those with strong emotions tagged to them. This happens almost instantaneously,
and so we leap to conclusions.
Intuitive decision making can work well, as evidenced by the work on naturalistic decision making
pioneered by Klein (2008). However, it is not suitable for complex decisions under uncertainty, such as many
decisions for oil and gas projects. We do not have a natural ability to make good choices under complexity
and uncertainty, due to the way our brains are wired; our brains have not developed to instinctively think
rationally and make the best decisions. Hence the need for DA/DQ to diminish the impact of these human
factors. Nevertheless, the interviews and survey showed that DA/DQ are not used as often as participants
think they should be; some 90% of respondents believed that DA/DQ should be used for key project
decisions, but only around 50% say that they are used in practice.
The studies showed that two key reasons why FEL and DA are not used more is that experience and
judgment is relied upon for decision-making, rather than using structured processes, and that many projects
are schedule-driven, meaning that meeting target dates is a primary objective for these projects.
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The present paper focuses on how to encourage people to make better use of FEL and DA/DQ. It describes
a second survey that has been carried out with senior personnel from oil and gas companies. This has an
initial section of demographic questions, and then each question is in the form of a proposition to be tested.
There are propositions on how FEL and DA/DQ are used, and why they are used that way, followed by
propositions on ways to encourage better use to be made of FEL, DA/DQ. This is described more fully in
the Survey section below, which also contains the results of the survey. This is followed by discussion of
the results, proposals for further research and general conclusions.
Method
This was a structured on-line survey, designed to enable quantitative analysis. The survey was aimed at:
gaining a better understanding of how FEL and DA/DQ are perceived; to assess potential reasons for them
not being used more; and to assess the likely uptake of possible methods for encouraging people to make
better use of FEL and DA/DQ.
Participants
The participants were oil and gas personnel from operating companies involved in developments and
projects in a variety of roles (e.g. decision makers, development managers, analysts, subject matter experts).
The invitation to take part in the survey was sent out to 129 people in eleven oil and gas companies, with
a request to forward it to others. Around half of the invitations were sent out to people in one oil and gas
company.
There were 76 participants for the second survey, of whom 44 supplied their email address − 24 of whom
had also supplied their email address for the first survey. This suggests that just over half the participants of
the first survey also took part in the second survey. Of the 44 participants who supplied their email address, 9
had not been sent the original invitation implying around 20% of participants (i.e. 9/44) had been forwarded
the survey by others.
The participants were mainly based in Australia. Only 3 out of the 44 who gave their email addresses were
based overseas, and all three were in the UK. Other demographic details are described in the sections below.
Materials
The questions were in the form of response-scale ratings on the participant's opinion and use of FEL, DA/
DQ and of proposals to encourage better use of these. The survey was designed to be quick to complete,
to encourage participation. It asked 6 demographic questions, 6 questions on FEL, 7 questions on DA/ DQ
and 6 questions on proposals to increase their use. A list of the survey questions is given in Appendix 2.
All the survey questions, except for the demographic questions, have been written in the form of a
proposition to be tested. These can be summarised as follows:
Front End Loading.   FEL1,2: Propositions on why FEL adds value
FEL3-6: Propositions that explain why FEL may not always be completed
Decision Analysis and Decision Quality.   DADQ1,4: Propositions on how DA and DQ add value
DADQ2,3,5: Propositions on how much DA and DQ are used in practice
DADQ6,7: Propositions that explain why DA and DQ may not always be carried out.
Improvements.   Imp1-6: Propositions on ways to improve the uptake of FEL, DA and DQ
These propositions were written as a statement, and the participants had to state whether they agreed or
disagreed with the statement, with a range of options from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. Fig. 1 is
an example of how these were set out in the survey.
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Figure 1—Example of how the questions were set out in the survey
Procedure
A link to the survey was sent out to potential participants as part of an email of introduction, along with an
information sheet on the research. The survey participants were offered a copy of any resulting published
papers.
Results
To assist with analysis of the survey results for the decision-making questions (i.e. for everything except the
demographic questions) the strongly agree (StA), agree (A) and slightly agree (SlA) figures have, in some
cases, been aggregated into one ‘broadly agree’ figure, and the strongly disagree (StD), disagree (D) and
slightly disagree (SlD) figures have been aggregated into one ‘broadly disagree’ figure.
Null Hypothesis Significance testing
The propositions, i.e. all the survey questions except for the demographic questions, have been tested using
classical null hypothesis significance testing. This approach requires that we assess the likelihood of our
proposition (known as the alternate hypothesis) being wrong – i.e. the null hypothesis being right. Only
if that is unlikely can we reject the idea that there is no relationship and conclude that our proposition is
likely to be correct. For this significance testing we have set an α value at the conventional level of 0.05.
Hence if p (the probability of the null hypothesis being correct) is less than or equal to 0.05, then the null
hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis (i.e. our proposition). If p is greater than 0.05,
then the null hypothesis is not rejected.
For testing the null hypothesis, a binomial test has been used with the expected rate set at 3/7, i.e. 0.4286.
This is based on there being 7 categories to select from, 3 of which will agree with the alternative hypothesis
(Strongly agree, Agree and Slightly agree) and 4 will disagree with the alternate hypothesis (Strongly
disagree, Disagree and Slightly disagree and Neither agree nor disagree). Hence, if categories are being
selected at random, it would be expected that 3 out of 7 would agree with the alternate hypothesis, and 4
out of 7 would agree with the null hypothesis.
Alternative analyses were conducted in which the neither agree nor disagree responses were either
excluded entirely or split between the agree and disagree groups. Neither of these approaches changed the
results. As a result, the described 3:4 split was retained.
Demographic questions.   The survey results for the demographic questions are shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2—Survey results – Demographic questions
Dem1 shows that almost two-thirds of participants were at managerial level, with the remainder equally
split between the executive and professional levels.
The participants were generally highly experienced. Dem2 shows that over 70% had more than 25 years’
experience in the oil and gas industry. Dem3 shows that there was less experience on opportunities and
projects, although almost a half had over 25 years’ experience, and over 80% had more than 15 years’
experience on opportunities and projects.
Almost all participants consider themselves to be knowledgeable about FEL. Dem4 shows that more than
40 % consider themselves familiar with FEL and over 50% stated that they have a good understanding of
the principles and practices of FEL, apply it regularly and take corrective actions based on bench-marking
information.
Dem5 shows that the participants consider themselves to be experienced with DA, but less so than for
FEL. Almost a half consider themselves to be familiar with DA, and a further third consider they have a
good understanding of the concept of DA, the associated tools and processes, and use it regularly.
They consider themselves to be experienced with DQ, but slightly less so than for DA. Dem6 shows that
over 40% consider themselves to be familiar with DQ, and a further 30% to have a good understanding of
the concept of DQ and how it is assessed, use it regularly and take the required actions to achieve high DQ.
Questions on Front End Loading
The survey results for the questions on FEL are shown in bar chart form in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3—Survey results – Front End Loading questions
FEL1 shows that 91% broadly agree with the proposition that better FEL leads to better outcomes in terms
of cost, schedule and production. A binomial test (HO: Better FEL is not likely to lead to better outcomes,
in terms of cost, schedule and production, HA: Better FEL is likely to lead to better outcomes, in terms of
cost, schedule and production, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
Similarly, there is high level of agreement that FEL benchmark scores (i.e. numerical values or:
‘Excellent’, ‘Good’, ‘Fair’, ‘Poor’ etc.) are a good indicator of readiness for FID. FEL2 shows that 89%
broadly agree with the proposition that FEL benchmark scores are a good indicator of readiness for FID. A
binomial test: (HO: FEL benchmark scores are not a good indicator of readiness for FID, HA: FEL benchmark
scores are a good indicator of readiness for FID, p<0.0001) which showed that the proposition is statistically
significant.
FEL3 shows that 70% broadly agree that they would rely more on the FEL benchmark score if they
understood it better, whereas 15% disagree. A binomial test (HO: The FEL benchmark score would not be
relied upon more if it was understood better, HA: The FEL benchmark score would be relied upon more if
it was understood better, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition, that people would rely more on the FEL
benchmark score if they understood it better, is statistically significant.
The participants are evenly split on whether other drivers, e.g. managing external expectations or
commercial aspects of starting production, override the requirement to complete FEL. FEL4 shows that
41% broadly agree versus 44% who broadly disagree. A binomial test (HO: Other drivers do not override
the requirement to complete FEL, HA: Other drivers override the requirement to complete FEL, p=0.60),
showed that the proposition is not supported.
FEL5 shows that it is important to compete FEL even if you have an experienced team: 84% broadly
disagree with the proposition that it is not so important to compete FEL if you have an experienced team
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– they can make up for any shortfalls after the Final Investment Decision, whereas 12% broadly agree. A
binomial test (HO: It is important to complete FEL, even if you have an experienced team, HA: It is not so
important to complete Front End Loading when you have an experienced project, p=0.9999), showed that
the proposition is not supported. Conversely, it showed strong support for the need to complete FEL, even
if you have an experienced project team.
FEL6 shows support for the proposition that that it is important to drive the schedule, otherwise scientists
and engineers will continue to do extra work which adds little value: 62% broadly agree versus 31% who
broadly disagree. A binomial test (HO: It is not important to drive the schedule, HA: It is important to drive
the schedule, otherwise work would be done which adds little value, p=0.0007) showed that the proposition
is statistically significant.
Questions on Decision Analysis and Decision Quality
The survey results for the questions on DA/ DQ are shown in bar chart form in Fig. 4.
Figure 4—Survey results – Decision Analysis and Decision Quality questions
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DADQ1 shows that 100% broadly agree with the proposition that to achieve a high-quality decision, it is
essential for the decision maker to clarify the frame for the decision (i.e. what is the issue being addressed,
what is the purpose in making the decision, what is the scope, how will the decision be approached) and
clarify the criteria that will be used to assess the decision. A binomial test (HO: To achieve a high-quality
decision, it is not essential for the decision maker to clarify the frame, the scope and the criteria for the
decision, HA: To achieve a high-quality decision, it is essential for the decision maker to clarify the frame,
the scope and the criteria for the decision, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
However, despite DADQ1 showing that clarification by the decision maker is essential, it does not always
happen in practice; DADQ2 shows that 46% broadly agree that is does happen, and 47% broadly disagree.
The proposition that, in practice, the decision maker always clarifies the frame for the decision and clarifies
the criteria that will be used to assess the decision, was subjected to a binomial test (HO: In practice, the
decision maker does not always clarify the frame and the criteria for the decision, HA: In practice, the
decision maker always clarifies the frame and the criteria for the decision, p=0.33). This showed that the
proposition is not supported.
DADQ3 shows that a formal assessment of DQ is made for key decisions (e.g. Concept Select and FID)
less than half the time. 42% broadly agree and 47% broadly disagree with the proposition that a formal
assessment is always made of the 6 elements of the DQ Wheel/Chain prior to key project decisions such as
Concept Select and FID. A binomial test (HO: A formal assessment is not always made of DQ prior to key
project decisions, HA: A formal assessment is always made of DQ prior to key project decisions, p=0.60)
showed that the proposition is not supported
There is a strong support for the proposition that, for effective decision making, it is essential to have
regular discussions between the decision maker(s) and the project team which bring alignment, clarify
requirements and are signed off on during each phase; DADQ4 shows that 100% broadly agree with this. A
binomial test (HO: For effective decision making it is not essential to have regular discussions between the
Decision Maker and project team to bring alignment and clarify requirements, HA: For effective decision
making it is essential to have regular discussions between the Decision Maker and project team to bring
alignment and clarify requirements, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
However, despite agreement that regular discussions are essential, it does not always happen in practice;
DADQ5 shows that 50% broadly agree that is does happen, and 39% broadly disagree. The proposition
that, in practice, regular discussions always take place between the decision maker(s) and the project team
which bring alignment, clarify requirements and are signed off on during each phase, was subjected to a
binomial test (HO: In practice, regular discussions do not always take place between the Decision Maker and
project team to bring alignment and clarify requirements, HA: In practice, regular discussions always take
place between the Decision Maker and project team to bring alignment and clarify requirements, p=0.13).
This showed that the proposition is not supported.
DADQ6 shows that there is little support for the proposition that for key decisions, such as Concept
Select and FID, it is often obvious what to do, what decision to make – so there is no need to carry out
any formal DA; only 12% broadly agree versus 83% who broadly disagree. A binomial test (HO: There is
a need to carry out DA for key decisions such as Concept Select and FID, as it is often unclear what to do,
what decision to make, HA: For key decisions, such as Concept Select and FID, it is often obvious what to
do, what decision to make – so there is no need to carry out any formal DA, p=0.9999) showed that the
proposition is not supported. On the contrary, it shows strong support for the null hypothesis that there is a
need to carry out DA for key decisions such as Concept Select and FID.
DADQ7 shows that only a small number agree with the proposition that they mainly doing DA and DQ
because they are required to, rather than because they believe that it adds value; 11% broadly agree and
73% broadly disagree. A binomial test (HO: DA & DQ are mainly carried out because they are considered
to add value, rather than because it is a requirement, HA: I am mainly doing work on DA and/or DQ because
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I am required to, rather than because I believe that it adds value, p=0.9999) showed that the proposition is
not supported. Conversely, it shows strong support for doing DA & DQ because they are considered to add
value, rather than because it is a requirement.
Questions on proposals to improve the use of FEL, DA and DQ
The survey results for the questions on proposals to improve the use of FEL, DA and DQ are shown in Fig. 5.
Figure 5—Survey results – Questions on proposals to improve the use of FEL, DA and DQ
There is a high level of agreement with the proposition that participants would like to have an in-house
tool for pragmatic assessment of FEL; Imp1 shows that 92% broadly agreed with this, and only 4% broadly
disagreed. A binomial test (HO: I would not like to have an in-house tool that gives a pragmatic assessment
of the level of FEL, HA: I would like to have an in-house tool that gives a pragmatic assessment of the level
of FEL, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
Imp2 shows that there is a high level of agreement with the proposition that participants want feedback
on key areas to focus on to achieve good FEL and high DQ, with 93% broadly agreeing and 5% broadly
disagreeing. A binomial test (HO: I do not want feedback on key areas to focus on to achieve good FEL and
high DQ, HA: I would like to receive feedback on the key areas to focus on to achieve good FEL and high
DQ, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
There is unanimous agreement with the proposition that that decision makers should be informed of
the potential impact (in terms of higher costs, longer schedule and less production attainment) of taking
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FID with incomplete FEL, Imp3 shows that 100% broadly agree. A binomial test (HO: Decision makers do
not need to be informed of the potential impact of taking FID with incomplete FEL, HA: Decision makers
should be informed of the potential impact of taking FID with incomplete FEL, p<0.0001) showed that the
proposition is statistically significant.
Imp4 shows that there is a high level of agreement with the proposition that project outcomes would
be likely to improve if performance incentives were based on attaining high DQ and good FEL, with 79%
broadly agreeing and 7% broadly disagreeing. A binomial test (HO: Project outcomes would not be likely
to improve if performance incentives were based on attaining high DQ and good FEL, HA: If performance
incentives were based on attaining high DQ and achieving good FEL, then project outcomes would be likely
to improve, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
Most participants agreed with the proposition that they would be likely to undertake training on how to
achieve good FEL, if given convincing evidence that it leads to better project outcomes; Imp5 shows that
72% broadly agreed with this 11% broadly disagreed. A binomial test (HO: I am not likely to undertake
training on how to achieve good FEL, if given convincing evidence that it leads to better project outcomes,
HA: I am likely to undertake training on how to achieve good FEL, if given convincing evidence that it leads
to better project outcomes, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
Similarly, Imp 6 shows that most participants agreed with the proposition that they are likely to undertake
training on how to achieve high DQ, if given convincing evidence that it leads to better project outcomes,
with 73% broadly agreeing and 9% broadly disagreeing. A binomial test (HO: I am not likely to undertake
training on how to attain high DQ, if given convincing evidence that it leads to better project outcomes, HA:
I am likely to undertake training on how to attain high DQ, if given convincing evidence that it leads to
better project outcomes, p<0.0001) showed that the proposition is statistically significant.
Summary of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing Results
A summary of the null hypothesis significance testing results is given in Appendix 3.
Discussion
Demographics
This was a senior group of highly experienced participants, with over 70% having more than 25 years in
the oil and gas industry. Most of the participants consider themselves to have a good understanding of, or
to be familiar with, FEL, DA and DQ. Hence this group of participants should be in a good position to
provide an informed opinion.
How representative are the samples?.   The sample is predominantly Australian, although many participants
have overseas experience. The people who were sent the initial invitation to participate in the survey were
oil and gas personnel who were targeted for their knowledge and experience in opportunities and projects.
The survey request was sent out to people working in eleven oil and gas companies. However, just over
half of the requests were sent to people in one company. Hence this may not be a fully representative sample.
A balancing factor is that there is a great deal of varied experience, as many participants have previously
worked for several different companies.
Front End Loading
The survey results (FEL1 and FEL2) show that participants have a strong belief that better FEL leads to
better outcomes and that FEL benchmark scores are a good indicator of readiness for FID. This is supported
by research showing that to achieve better outcomes it is much more important to complete FEL than to




However, although FEL is highly regarded, it is not always completed and the FEL benchmark score
is not used much as an indicator of readiness for FID. A previous study (Newman et al., 2016) showed
that none of the respondents used the FEL benchmark score as a hard criteria, i.e. a certain score had to be
achieved before taking FID; instead 29% of respondents stated that the FEL score is used as a soft criteria,
50% that it is a contributing factor for decision making, and 21% said that it is not used at all. Part of the
reason the FEL benchmark score is not used more is a lack of understanding of how it is derived and what the
key factors are that influence it. FEL3 shows that 70% broadly agree that they would rely more on the FEL
benchmark score if they understood it better. This could be feeding a belief that not all the activities to give a
good FEL benchmark score are really required. To help overcome this, there needs to be more transparency
in how the FEL benchmark score is derived, and an emphasis on all activities being decision-driven, i.e.
the only activities completed during the phase should be those required to enable an informed decision to
be made. Hence FEL does not mean that a complete set of ‘standard’ activities must be completed during
the phase – rather, the activities to be completed during the phase should be only those that are necessary
for the decision to be made.
A significant reason why FEL is not being completed is that projects are schedule driven, with research
(Newman et al., 2018) showing that 97% of survey participants broadly agree that project are often schedule
driven. One of the factors that contributes to this is that FEL6 shows that over 60% of participants consider
that it is important to drive the schedule, otherwise work will be carried out that adds little value. Hence
there is a tension between the between the need to complete FEL and the desire to drive the schedule.
However, the other two propositions to explain why FEL may not always be completed were not
supported. FEL4, the proposition that other drivers, e.g. managing external expectations or commercial
aspects of starting production, override the requirement to complete FEL not supported. FEL5, the
proposition that it is not so important for experienced teams to complete FEL prior to FID was strongly
rebutted, hence having an experienced team does not justify taking FID without completing FEL.
Decision Analysis and Decision Quality
The need for discussions to take place between the decision makers and the project team to ensure that there
is clarity and alignment on all aspects of the decision has long been recognized. A structured approach to this
was developed over 30 years ago as the Dialogue Decision Process (Fig. 6) and is described in (McNamee
& Celona, 2005). A version of this was adopted by General Motors as their decision making process, as
described in (Barabba, 1995). This process has been expanded upon for multiple decision makers in (Owen,
2015).
Figure 6—The Dialogue Decision Process
In the survey, the need for dialogue between the decision maker(s) and the project team came out as
very strong, with all participants considering that for a high quality decision it is essential for the decision
maker(s) to clarify the frame for the decision and the criteria to be used to assess the decision; and regular
discussions need to take between the decision maker(s) and the project team to bring alignment and clarify
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requirements. Unfortunately, although the necessity of discussions to bring clarity and alignment between
the decision maker(s) and the project team is acknowledged (i.e. 100% broad agreement on this for both
DADQ1 and DADQ4), in practice it only happens around half the time (see DADQ2 and DADQ5).
Similarly, DQ is underused. DADQ3 shows that a formal assessment of DQ is made for key project decisions
less than half the time.
So, why is this, why are DA and DQ underused? Two propositions were tested; however, both were
soundly rebutted. DADQ6 proposed that for key decisions, such as Concept Select and FID, it is often
obvious what to do, what decision to make – so there is no need to carry out any formal DA. This showed
strong support for the opposite conclusion, that there is a need to carry out DA for key decisions such as
Concept Select and FID, even when it seems ‘obvious’ what to do. DADQ7 focused on there being a lack
of belief in the value of doing DA and DQ and proposed that they are mainly being done because it is a
requirement, rather than because they add value. Again, the opposite was found to be true, and there is
strong support for the belief that DA and DQ add value.
So, where does this leave us? A previous study (Newman et al., 2018) tested six propostions for why DA
and DQ are not used more, and the following three were deemed to be supported:
• DA and DQ are not well understood.
• There is a reliance on experience and judgment for decision-making
• Projects are schedule-driven
Hence, we need to find ways to overturn these and so influence decision makers to make more effective
use of DA/DQ, which leads into the next section on propositions to improve the way FEL and DA/DQ
are used.
Improving the way FEL and DA/DQ are used
There was strong support for all the propositions for encouraging better use of FEL and DA/DQ. The
participants welcomed all the following:
1. Development of a simple tool to give a pragmatic assessment of FEL.
2. Feedback on key areas to focus on to achieve good FEL and high DQ
3. Information on the likely impact (in terms of cost, schedule and production) of not completing FEL.
4. Having performance incentives based on achieving good FEL and high DQ
5. Undertaking training on how to achieve good FEL
6. Undertaking training on how to achieve high DQ
There needs to be some further research to convert these into practical solutions. Some of this has already
been started, e.g. there is a proposed approach for item 3, information on the likely impact of not completing
FEL, in (Newman et al., 2016). For others, further work is required, as detailed in the next section
Although FEL and DA/DQ have been considered separately in the above discussions, there are strong
links between them. FEL should be decision-driven; you achieve good FEL when you have completed all
the activities necessary to make a good decision. In principle, the activities that need to be completed to
achieve good FEL could be determined by evaluating the DQ at the beginning of the phase, and hence
determine the activities required to achieve 100% DQ at the decision gate (Note: 100% DQ is explained in
Appendix 1). In theory, that should be sufficient – if you have achieved high DQ, you should have achieved
good FEL. As a cross-check, it might be useful to then compare this with a ‘standard’ list of activities for
that phase, which is what a lot of oil and gas companies use. However, the aim is to minimise the work
required prior to the decision, i.e. to do everything that is necessary, but no more.
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Note also that DA/DQ is not meant to be a mechanistic process; rather it is intended to provide a structure
to facilitate dialogue and discussion that enables different viewpoints and ideas to be heard, and to achieve
clarity and alignment around the decisions to be made, and the activities required to enable good decisions
to be made.
Further Research
Further research is proposed as follows:
i. Develop a tool to provide a pragmatic assessment of the level of Front End Loading
ii. Develop a practical method by which performance incentives for decision makers could be based
on attaining high Decision Quality and good Front End Loading
iii. Carry out an experiment to test the impact on decision making of undertaking just-in-time and
focused training on achieving good FEL and high DQ.
Conclusions
The survey results show that there is strong agreement that good FEL leads to better project outcomes, and
that the FEL benchmark score is a good indicator of readiness for project sanction. However, competing
with the desire to complete FEL, is the view that it is important to drive the schedule otherwise extra work
will be done that adds little value. All respondents agreed that it is essential that the decision maker clarifies
the frame, scope and criteria for the decision up front, and has regular discussions with project team to
bring alignment and clarify requirements during each phase. However, responses indicated that these only
occur in practice around half of the time. Similarly, formal assessments are made of DQ for less than half
of key project decisions.
There is strong support for all the initiatives for increasing the likelihood of better project outcomes by
improving the uptake and use of FEL and DA/DQ. These include developing a simple pragmatic assessment
of FEL, basing performance incentives on achieving high DQ and good FEL, and focused training on FEL
and DA/DQ. Further work is planned to convert these concepts into practical solutions.
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Front End Loading, Decision Analysis and Decision Quality
Front End Loading (FEL)
FEL is the process of developing sufficient strategic information to address uncertainty and help make
decisions to commit resources to maximise the potential for a successful project. In practice, this means
investing significant effort in the project phases (Fig. 7) up to the Final Investment Decision (FID) [also
known as Project Sanction or Approval for Expenditure (AFE)].
Figure 7—Front End Loading phases
Maximising the potential for a successful project means different things for different phases. For the
Select phase, the focus is on creating value, through selecting the concept that will maximize value. If
sufficient FEL has not been completed then value can be lost in two ways: if the range of alternatives is
too narrow, a better concept may be missed; or value can be lost by making the selection too early, before
sufficiently accurate information is available to inform the decision. During the Define phase, the focus
is on ensuring that there is sufficient definition, so that the predicted outcomes at FID will be realistically
achievable, and value will not be lost during execution due to changes required. So, put simply, success in
the early phases is about maximising value; for the later phases it is about achieving predicted outcomes.
Decision Analysis (DA)
DA is the discipline of making good decisions and describes how people should logically make decisions.
It is a structured approach for creating and evaluating choices, by using a pragmatic application of tools and
processes tailored to the needs of the decision. It is a methodology that provides the means for a dialogue
between the decision maker and the project team so that uncertainties, concerns, expectations, assumptions
and meaning can brought into the open and clarified, leading to a compelling course of action.
The fundamental aspects of DA can be represented using the image of the man on the three-legged stool
(Fig. 8), as adapted from Howard (2007). Where the stool is placed represents the frame, namely, what
is the correct background, setting and context for the decision? The legs of the stool represent the three
elements of any decision.
• Objectives: what you want, i.e. what is valuable to you, and how you would trade-off between
conflicting values.
• Alternatives: what you can do. Are there creative, doable alternatives? If there are no alternatives,
then there is no decision to be made.
• Information: what you know, how well you ‘know’ it (and clarity on what you don't know).
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Figure 8—The six elements of Decision Analysis
These are held together by the seat, which is the sound reasoning to determine which alternative best
meets the objectives of the decision maker. Then commitment is required to move the decision to action;
the best decision is useless if it is not implemented.
Decision Quality (DQ)
DQ is used to judge the quality of a decision by assessing the six elements that make up a good decision: (1)
appropriate frame, (2) clear values, (3) creative alternatives, (4) useful information, (5) sound reasoning,
and (6) commitment to action. These match up one to one with the six elements of DA, as depicted by the
man on the stool. Indeed, DQ can also be used as a simplified way of applying the principles of DA.
The six elements of DQ can be represented in the form of a Decision Quality wheel (Fig. 9)
Figure 9—The Decision Quality wheel
The six elements of DQ are:
1. Appropriate frame: what is the issue being addressed, including what is the purpose in making the
decision, what is the scope, and how will the decision be approached?
2. Clear values: is there clarity on the values that the decision will be assessed against? Is there clarity
on the trade-offs between values?
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3. Creative alternatives: is there a range of creative and compelling alternatives?
4. Useful information: is all relevant information available for the decision? Is it trustworthy and
unbiased?
5. Sound reasoning: is sound reasoning being applied, i.e. which alternative gives you the most of what
you want, based on the information that you have?
6. Commitment to action: is there commitment to action the decision?
The quality of a decision is assessed by reviewing the six elements in turn, to see whether they each
achieve the 100% rating required for a quality decision. Note that 100% is not perfection. As explained in
Spetzler et al. (2016):
100% is the point at which the cost of further improvement – in terms of effort and delay – isn't worth
it. At 100%, the value from improving the requirement is outweighed by the cost. So, 100% is not
perfection; it is a judgment that the incremental cost of improvement is greater than the additional




List of Survey Questions
Demographic questions
Dem1. Which of the following best describes your organisational level?
• Professional
• Manager
• Executive (e.g.: VP, Director, Country Manager)












Dem4. What has been your experience with Front End Loading?
• None
• Some familiarity with what Front End Loading is, but have not used it.
• Familiar with the concept of Front End Loading. I have used it, but it's not a significant part of
what I do.
• I have a good understanding of the principles and practice of Front End Loading, including the
use of Front End Loading bench-marking. I apply this regularly, and take corrective actions based
on bench-marking information.
Dem 5. What has been your experience with Decision Analysis?
• None
• Some familiarity with what Decision Analysis is, but have not used it.
• Familiar with the concept of Decision Analysis and some of the associated tools. I have
occasionally used these, but it's not a significant part of what I do.
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• I have a good understanding of the concepts of Decision Analysis, and the associated tools and
processes, which I use regularly.
Dem6. What has been your experience with Decision Quality?
• None
• Some familiarity with what Decision Quality is, but I have not used it
• Familiar with the concept of Decision Quality and how it is assessed. I have occasionally used it,
but it's not a significant part of what I do.
• I have a good understanding of the concept of Decision Quality, and how it is assessed. I use it
regularly and take the required actions to achieve high Decision Quality.
Questions on Front End Loading
FEL1. Better Front End Loading is likely to lead to shorter schedules, lower costs and better production
attainment for oil and gas projects.
FEL2. Front End Loading benchmark scores (i.e. numerical values or: ‘Excellent’, ‘Good’, ‘Fair’, ‘Poor’
etc.) are a good indicator of readiness for the Final Investment Decision.
FEL3. I would rely more on the Front-End Loading benchmark score if I had a better understanding of
how it was derived, and/or what the key factors are that influence it.
FEL4. Other drivers, e.g. managing external expectations or commercial aspects of starting production,
override the requirement to complete FEL.
FEL5. It is not so important to complete Front End Loading when you have an experienced project team
– they can make up for any shortfalls after the Final Investment Decision.
FEL6. It is important to drive the schedule, otherwise scientists and engineers will continue to do extra
work which adds little value.
Questions on Decision Analysis and Decision Quality
DADQ1. To achieve a high-quality decision, it is essential for the decision maker to clarify the frame for
the decision (i.e. what is the issue being addressed, what is the purpose in making the decision, what is the
scope, how will the decision be approached) and clarify the criteria that will be used to assess the decision.
DADQ2. In practice, the decision maker always clarifies the frame for the decision and clarifies the
criteria that will be used to assess the decision.
DADQ3. A formal assessment is always made of the 6 elements of the Decision Quality Wheel/Chain
prior to key project decisions such as Concept Select and the Final Investment Decision.
DADQ4. For effective decision making, it is essential to have regular discussions between the decision
maker(s) and the project team which bring alignment, clarify requirements and are signed off on during
each phase.
DADQ5. In practice, regular discussions always take place between the decision maker(s) and the project
team which bring alignment, clarify requirements and are signed off on during each phase.
DADQ6. For key decisions, such as Concept Select and the Final Investment Decision, it is often obvious
what to do, what decision to make – so there is no need to carry out any formal Decision Analysis.
DADQ7. I am mainly doing work on Decision Analysis and/or Decision Quality because I am required
to, rather than because I believe that it adds value.
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Questions on proposals to improve the use of FEL, DA and DQ
Imp1. I would like to have an in-house tool that gives a pragmatic assessment of the level of Front End
Loading.
Imp2. I would like to receive feedback on the key areas to focus on to achieve good Front End Loading
and high Decision Quality.
Imp3. Decision makers should be given information on the potential impact (in terms of higher costs,
longer schedule and less production attainment) of taking the Final Investment Decision with incomplete
Front End Loading.
Imp4. If performance incentives were based on attaining high Decision Quality and achieving good Front
End Loading, then project outcomes would be likely to improve.
Imp5. I am likely to undertake training on how to achieve good Front End Loading, if given convincing
evidence that it leads to better project outcomes.
Imp6. I am likely to undertake training on how to attain high Decision Quality, if given convincing
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Abstract An experiment was set up to determine whether some short, focused training could 
influence decision makers to take a more structured and process-based approach to project decision-
making. The experiment also investigated the impact on project decision-making of the way a 
decision is framed by an authority figure, i.e. how a decision is influenced by an authority figure 
advocating a process-driven, neutral or an opinion/schedule-driven approach. 
The experiment was set up so that half of the participants watched three 15-minute training videos 
before answering questions on decision-making scenarios for projects, and the other half just 
answered questions on the decision-making scenarios. 40% of participants (split across those who 
watched the training videos and those that only answered the decision-making scenario questions) 
had undergone some prior training on decision making. 
The results demonstrate that watching the training videos has an impact. The impact is greater when 
there has been no prior training, however there is still impact in each case, albeit small for some. 
This implies that the benefits of one hour’s training prior to project decision making is more valuable 
for those with no prior training, but still worthwhile for those with prior training. 
The results showed that framing by an authority figure has a strong influence on the participants’ 
responses, in terms of whether a process-based, neutral or opinion/intuition-based response was 
given. 
Keywords  Training · Front End Loading · Decision Analysis · Decision Quality · 
Framing 
Mathematics Subject Classification   91C99 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is part of a research program aimed at improving outcomes for oil and gas projects by 
encouraging better use to be made of Front End Loading (FEL), Decision Analysis (DA) and 
Decision Quality (DQ). Brief descriptions of FEL, DA and DQ are given below.  
FEL means investing significant effort in the phases that lead up to the Final Investment Decision, so 
that you have the information required to make decisions which maximise the potential for success 
(Weijde 2008). 
DA is the discipline of making good decisions and describes how people should logically make 
decisions to maximise the chances of desirable outcomes. It is a structured approach for creating and 
evaluating choices, by using a pragmatic application of tools and processes tailored to the needs of 
the decision. (McNamee and Celona 2005) 
DQ is used to judge the quality of a decision by assessing the six elements that make up a good 
decision: (1) appropriate frame, (2) clear values, (3) creative alternatives, (4) useful information, (5) 
sound reasoning, and (6) commitment to action. In summary, DA is the process of making good 
decisions, DQ is how you assess whether a decision is good, and can be a simplified way of applying 
the principles of DA. (Spetzler et al. 2016) 
Previous studies in this research program (Newman et al. 2016; Newman et al. 2018b) have shown 
that people know what ‘should’ be done to increase the likelihood of good project outcomes, but this 
often does not happen in practice. A survey of senior personnel from oil and gas operating 
companies (Newman et al. 2018a) showed that over 90% agreed that better FEL leads to better 
outcomes in terms of cost, schedule and production. This is backed up by Nandurdikar and Kirkham 
(2012) and Merrow (2011) who have demonstrated that better project outcomes are achieved by 
completing FEL rather than working to set schedule dates. However, it is not common practice to 
complete FEL before making a decision. Instead, aggressive targets are set, and projects are 
schedule-driven to meet those targets. Walkup and Ligon (2006) have stated that it is not uncommon 
for over 50% of projects to be fast-tracked and in a survey of senior personnel from oil and gas 
operating companies (Newman et al. 2018b) 97% of the respondents stated that projects are often 
schedule-driven. The same survey found that DA and DQ are often underutilised. It showed that 
around 90% of respondents believe that DA and DQ should be used for key project decisions, but 
only 50% agreed that this happens in practice 
There are many reasons why we do not do what we ‘should’ do – it is part of being human 
(Campbell et al. 2009; Finkelstein et al. 2009; Newman et al. 2018b). Our brains have evolved to be 
efficient, to take shortcuts and to trust our intuition (Brusman 2017; Mattson 2014). This can work 
well, as shown by Klein (2008) in his work on naturalistic decision making; for example,  fireground 
98
 
commanders who have been in similar situations hundreds of times before ‘know’ what to do based 
on their experience of what had previously led to successful outcomes  However, it is not suitable for 
complex decisions under uncertainty, such as key decisions on oil and gas projects, where a 
structured approach to decision making is required.  
In order to influence people to change and make better use FEL, DA and DQ, a number of initiatives 
have been proposed (Newman et al. 2018a). One of these initiatives is targeted training. In a survey 
of senior personnel from oil and gas operating companies (Newman et al. 2018a) over 70% stated 
that they would be likely to undertake training on achieving good FEL and high DQ, if given 
convincing evidence that this would be likely to lead to better project outcomes. Hence an 
experiment was set up with the aim of providing the evidence. However, despite the enthusiastic 
response to the survey, it was felt that, when the time came, people might have difficulty in justifying 
spending 1, 3 or more days on a decision-making course – particularly people at the top levels of the 
company who are the real project decision makers. It was decided to investigate whether some short, 
sharp, just-in-time training would be beneficial in influencing decision makers to follow a more 
structured approach to decision making aimed at achieving high DQ. The target was for the training 
to take no more than one hour.The benefits of just-in-time training in a project environment have 
been highlighted by Globerson and Korman (2001).  
To influence people to change, the training would aim to help them to understand why they tend to 
make decisions the way they do, despite ‘knowing’ that it would be better to do it differently – and to 
provide them with some tools to enable them to make better informed decisions. The goal of training 
would be to encourage realistic project targets to be set, based on benchmark information, and to 
move to the next phase only when sufficient FEL has been completed, rather than at a set schedule 
date. It would encourage the principles of DA to be used for making the decisions, with a check on 
readiness for the decision to be made by assessing DQ. 
To test the likely effectiveness of just-in-time and focused training on project decision making an 
experiment was set up. Given the likelihood of schedule drivers flowing downward through a 
company, the experiments also included a test of whether the way information is framed by an 
authority figure (i.e. whether an opinion/schedule-driven or a process-driven approach is advocated) 
influences how decisions are made.  
The rest of this paper describes how the experiment was set up, and what the outcomes were. 
Propositions are stated for what the expected outcomes of the experiment were. Then there is 
information on the method used, including the participants and details of the training and the 
decision-making scenarios. These are followed by the results, discussion and conclusions. 
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1.1 Propositions 
There are two propositions: 
1) Short, focused training just prior to decision making will lead to more process-based answers 
which take account of benchmark information. 
2) The way information is framed by an authority figure, i.e. whether a process-driven approach, 
neutral or an opinion/schedule-driven approach is advocated, will influence the decision. 
2. Method 
To test the propositions, an experiment was run whereby participants answered questions on decision 
making scenarios. There were three different versions of each scenario: one was neutral with just the 
basic information; one had the basic information plus additional information encouraging a process-
driven approach to be taken; and the other version had the basic information plus additional 
information encouraging an opinion/schedule-driven approach. 
Half of the participants were trained by watching short training videos prior to answering questions 
on the decision-making scenarios, and the other half of participants went straight into answering the 
decision-making scenarios. The questions were in the form of a structured on-line questionnaire, 
designed to enable quantitative analysis. Further details are given below. 
 
2.1 Participants 
The participants were, primarily, students and staff at the University of Adelaide, targeted via 
placement of flyers around the University. Participants were encouraged to forward the invitation to 
others. Hence, members of the general public also took part. 
Participants received a $50 gift card if they completed the training and the questionnaire, or a $25 
gift card if they completed the questionnaire only. 
153 volunteers took part in the experiment: 
• The age range was 17–68, with a median age of 25.  
• 77 were male, 73 female and 3 were non-binary or preferred not to indicate their gender. 
• 77 watched the three training videos before answering the questionnaire; 76 completed the 
questionnaire only.  
• 63 had received prior training in decision making, 90 had received no prior training. 
• Participants came from a variety of discipline backgrounds, with the largest contingents 





The materials consisted of training videos, a questionnaire and a categorisation protocol for 
assessing the answers to the questionnaire. These are explained in the following sections. 
2.2.1 Training 
The training involved watching online videos, followed by a short multiple-choice test to determine 
how well the participants had understood the key points of the training. The training covered three 
topics, with each video being around 15 minutes long: 
Training Video 1: Why we don’t always make good decisions (Newman 2018a)  
URL: https://youtu.be/wJhf586qIj0 
This video looked at the psychological side of decision making. Key points highlighted were: 
• Our brains have evolved to be efficient, to take shortcuts and trust our intuition. 
• Under the right circumstances this can be very helpful. But for complex decisions under 
uncertainty, this can lead to poor decisions and poor outcomes. 
• Perception is not always reality – information that we assume to be factual may not be 
correct and our reasoning, or manipulation of the information, is often wrong. 
• For important decisions we need the support of some tools to help us to make good 
decisions. 
Training Video 2: Making good decisions  (Newman 2018b) 
URL: https://youtu.be/MAukVnmAErg 
This video is about making good decisions. Key points highlighted were: 
• It is important to distinguish between decisions and outcomes. We can make a good decision 
and have a bad outcome; or make a bad decision and have a good outcome. However, on 
average, consistently better decisions lead to consistently better outcomes. 
• The six dimensions of a good decision are: 
1. Appropriate frame  
2. Clear values 
3. Creative alternatives 
4. Useful information 
5. Sound reasoning 
6. Commitment to action 
• This is a useful checklist to run through when making decisions. A good decision is one 
where we have done sufficient work on each of these dimensions. 
Training Video 3: Decision making for projects (Newman 2018c)  
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URL: https://youtu.be/D6FOe_wSJa8 
This video describes some important aspects of decision making for projects, including what 
typically goes wrong on projects, and some ways of overcoming this to improve the likelihood of 
good outcomes. 
Key points highlighted were: 
• The planning fallacy and projects being schedule-driven (i.e. meeting target dates is a 
primary objective) are two reasons why projects have frequently failed to live up to 
expectations. 
• To improve the likelihood of a good project outcome: 
1. Set targets based on the outside view, i.e., using the statistics of similar cases. 
2. Complete Front End Loading 
3. Carry out a premortem as a final check before committing to a decision 
For the period of the experiment, access to the training videos was only available to the participants 
selected to undertake training. Subsequently, access to these has been opened up, and they are now 
available for anyone to view on YouTube. 
2.2.2 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of Instructions, Demographic questions and 3 Decision-making 
scenarios. The questionnaire is shown in full in Appendix 1. 
Demographic questions 
There were four demographic questions on age, gender, main discipline/area of work and 
experience of formal decision-making techniques. 
Decision-making scenarios 
The participants were asked to read each decision-making scenario carefully and then answer the 
questions on it. There were three decision-making scenarios: 
1. Writing a decision-making book 
2. Building a house 
3. Wind farm project 
Each of these scenarios had three different versions. All the versions had the same basic 
information. One version was neutral and was just the basic information with no additional 
information. A second version had additional information from an authority figure, encouraging a 
process-driven approach to be taken to decision making; and the third version had additional 
information from an authority figure encouraging an opinion/schedule-driven approach to be taken. 




 Neutral Opinion /  
schedule-driven 
Process-driven 
Group A Decision-making book Building a house Wind farm project 
Group B Wind farm project Decision-making book Building a house 
Group C Building a house Wind farm project Decision-making book 
 
Table 1 Three different versions of each scenario were tested 
I.e. the people in group A answered questions on the neutral version of the Decision-making book 
scenario, the opinion/schedule-driven version of the Building a house scenario and the process-
driven version of the Wind farm project. 
Each group was then split into two sub-groups: one that had watched the training videos and one 
that had not. Hence, in total, there were 6 different sub-groups for comparing outcomes, as shown 
in Table 2: 
 
 No Training  Training videos 
Group A AN AT 
Group B BN BT 
Group C CN CT 
 
Table 2 Sub-groups for comparing outcomes 
I.e. sub-group AN are the people in group A who have not watched the training videos and sub-
group AT are the people in group A who have watched the training videos. 
Questions for the decision-making scenarios 
For each scenario there is a ‘Will do’ question asking what the participant think the group will do, 
based on the information given, and a ‘Should do’ question asking what the participants think the 
group should do, i.e. if it was the participant’s decision to make. 
For the Decision-making book scenario and the Wind farm project scenario there is a ‘Years to go’ 
question asking for the participant’s estimate of how much longer it would take to complete the 
project. 
For the Building a House scenario there is a ‘Quickest’ question asking for the participant’s 
assessment of which builder would complete the project in the shortest time. 
2.2.3 Categorisation protocol 
A categorisation protocol was developed for the decision-making scenarios such that each of the 
multiple-choice answers was allocated as being process-based (P), neutral (N) or opinion/intuition-
based (O). The process-based answers are those that align with evidence-based data, such as 
answers based on benchmark data given by an independent external party; the opinion/intuition-
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based answers are those that align with promises made which are not backed up by evidence. The 
neutral answers are the middle ground between these two. 
For several of the questions, there was a choice of ‘Other’, and the participants wrote their own 
answer in free text. For these cases, the answer to the following question: ‘Why have you given that 
answer?’ was reviewed to determine whether the answer had been process-based, neutral or 
opinion/intuition-based. 
The categorisation protocol is shown in Table 3 (and expanded on in the following explanations). 
For the ‘Will do’ questions in the Writing a Book scenario: if the answer was to continue with a 
time estimate of 3.5 years or less, this was categorised as opinion/intuition-based (O); if the answer 
was to continue with a time estimate of between 3.5 and 4.5 years, this was categorised as Neutral 
(N); if the answer was to continue with a time estimate of 4.5 or more years, or the answer was to 
Give up, this was categorised as process-based (P). For the questions in the Building a House 
scenario: if Builder A was selected, that answer was categorised as opinion/intuition-based (O); if 
Builder B was selected, that answer was categorised as neutral (N); if Builder C was selected, that 
answer was categorised as process-based (P). 
 
WRITING A BOOK BUILDING A HOUSE WIND FARM PROJECT 
































Table 3 Categorisation protocol 
 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were split into three groups, and each group was split into two sub-groups: one that 
received training, and one that did not. This was generally allocated in the order in which people 
applied to participate, i.e. one received training and the next did not. If people dropped out, others were 
allocated in their place to keep the numbers even between those who were trained and those who were 
not. 
2.3.1 Training 
Half of the participants completed the training. A copy of the email giving instructions to those 
taking part in training is shown in Appendix 2. After watching the three training videos the 
participants were required to complete a short multiple-choice test to assess their level of 
understanding. They sent an email to confirm that they had watched the training videos and had 
competed the test. 
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If they passed the test (by getting more than 50% of the answers correct) they were sent the link to 
the final part of the study, which is answering questions on decision-making scenarios. If they did 
not pass the test they were given the choice of watching the training videos again and redoing the 
multiple-choice test (to retain the option of receiving a $50 gift card) or going straight to answering 
the questions on the decision-making scenarios and receiving a $25 gift card only. In practice, only 
one person failed to pass the test, and they decided not to participate any further. 
2.3.2 Decision-making scenarios 
All of the participants answered questions on the three decision-making scenarios. They sent an 
email to confirm when they had completed this, and they received an email in reply thanking them 
for their participation and advising them where they could pick up their gift card. 




3.1 Log-linear analysis for a 3-way contingency table 
A 3-way contingency table was used to determine the probabilities of interactions between the 
training, framing condition and the response. There will first be a description of the general process of 
log-linear analysis for a 3-way contingency table (Lowry 2018), followed by an example to illustrate 
it. 
In a 3-way contingency table, the probabilities are calculated for the 3-way interaction and for the 
various 2-way interactions:  
• ABC - Represents the 3-way interaction between A, B and C. A three-way interaction means 
that there is a two-way interaction that varies across levels of a third variable. For example, 
a BC interaction differs across various levels of factor A. 
• AB, AC, BC - Represents the 2-way interactions for AB, AC and BC. 
• AB(C), AC(B), BC(A) - Represents the 2-way interactions for each pair of variables AB, 
AC and BC, when the effects of the third variable are removed. Thus, AB(C) represents the 
AB interactions when the AC and BC interactions are removed. 
Where: 
A=Training condition – i.e. whether the participants watched the training videos or not 
B=Response type – i.e. did the response indicate that the answer was process-based, neutral 
or opinion/intuition-based 
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C=Framing condition – i.e. whether the scenario was framed by an authority figure 
advocating a process-driven, a neutral or an opinion/schedule-driven approach 
Log-linear analysis is a version of chi-square analysis in which the relevant values are calculated 
by way of weighted natural logarithms. The associated probability under the null hypothesis can be 
estimated through reference to the appropriate sampling distribution of chi-square, as defined by its 
degrees of freedom.  
The format for a 3-way contingency table for log-linear analysis is shown in Table 4. The source 
column shows the 3-way interaction, ABC, and then the various 2-way interactions. G2 represents the 
chi-square value as calculated by the log-linear method, df is the number of degrees of freedom and p 
is the associated probability under the null hypothesis.  
The null hypothesis for each line of the contingency table is that there is no interaction, i.e. one 
variable does not influence the outcome of another variable. If the associated probability under the null 
hypothesis, p, is less than a set value (here we are using the conventional value of 0.05), the null 
hypothesis is rejected, and there is assumed to be a statistically significant interaction. If p is greater 
than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is not rejected.   
Source G2 df P 
ABC       
AB       
AC       
BC       
AB(C)       
AC(B)       
BC(A)       
 
Table 4 Format of 3-way contingency table for log-linear analysis  
3.1.1 Example of log-linear analysis for a 3-way contingency table 
The ‘Will do’ case for the Book scenario is used here as an example of how the log-linear analysis 
was carried out. Table 5 shows the response types for the three framing conditions, i.e. process-
driven, neutral and opinion/schedule-driven; and for the two training conditions, i.e. watched the 
training videos or did not watch the training videos. Hence, for the process-based version of the 
scenario and for the participants with no training: 6 gave process-based responses, 12 gave a neutral 











condition Process Neutral Opinion 
Process 
Driven 
No Training 6 12 8 
Training 4 14 6 
Neutral 
No Training 1 7 18 
Training 4 14 8 
Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 1 6 17 
Training 0 6 21 
 
Table 5 Responses for the ‘Will do’ case for the Book scenario for all participants 
These values have then been entered into the log-linear analysis tool on the VassarStats website 
(Lowry 2018), and the resulting contingency table is shown in Table 6.  
Hence, for the 3-way contingency, ABC: the chi-square value G2 is 36.36, there are 12 degrees of 
freedom and the associated probability under the null hypothesis, p is 0.0003. As this is below the 
set level of 0.05, the null hypothesis has been rejected and there is considered to be a statistically 
significant relationship between the three conditions.  
 
Source G
2 df P 
ABC 36.36 12 0.0003 
AB 2.2 2 0.3329 
AC 0.26 2 0.8781 
BC 25.46 4 <.0001 
AB(C) 10.64 6 0.1002 
AC(B) 8.7 6 0.1912 
BC(A) 33.9 8 <.0001 
 
Table 6 Output of 3-way log-linear analysis for the ‘Will do’ case for the Book scenario for all participants 
This has been highlighted in green in Table 6, as have the other interactions for which there are 
statistically significant relationships: BC and BC(A). These indicate that the framing by response 
type interaction is significant, and this remains true whether the effect of the problem framing is 
summed across BC or statistically controlled for BC(A). The training condition has no effect on 
responses and framing does not change this. 
 
3.2 Key to results 
The results will be be shown in a simplified form, where each cell represents the output of a 
complete 3-way log-linear analysis. The key to the results in shown in Fig.1 
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Framing  p <0.001 for all 3 results  {e.g. ABC, AB and AB(C) }  Training 
        
Framing  p <0.05 for all 3 results  {e.g. ABC, AB and AB(C) }  Training 
        
Framing  p <0.05 for 2 results  {e.g. AB and AB(C) }   Training 
        
Framing  p <0.05 for 1 result  {e.g. AB }    Training 
 
Fig.1 Key for presentation of results  
 
The responses which show a statistically significant interaction with the training condition are 
shown in blue, and the responses which show a statistically significant interaction with the framing 
condition are shown in yellow. The results with the most statistically significant interactions are shown 
in larger and bolder print, and with a darker background colour. The results which indicate no 
interaction are shown in white. 
For the example in the previous section, with the output of the 3-way log-linear analysis given in 
Table 5, the null probability, p, is less than 0.001 for the three interactions ABC, BC and BC(A). This 
indicates that the framing by response type interaction is significant at the 0.001 level, and hence this 




Fig.2 Representation of output of 3-way log-linear analysis for the ‘Will do’ case for the Book scenario  
3.3 Propositions 
The following are the expected outcomes, if the two propositions are correct 
1) The responses to the ‘Will do’ questions (i.e. what the participants think the people in the 
scenario will do, based on the information given in the scenario) would have a significant 
relationship with the framing (i.e. the additional information from an authority figure that is 
opinion/schedule-driven, neutral or process-driven). 
2) The responses to the ‘Should do’ questions (i.e. what the participants think the people in the 
scenario should do, based on the knowledge and experience of the participant) would have a 
significant relationship with their training (i.e. participants who have been trained would be 
more likely to give a process-based response). 
3) The responses to the ‘Years to go / Quickest’ questions (i.e. how long is it likely to take to 
complete the project, or who would do it in the quickest time) would also have a significant 
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relationship with the participants’ training (i.e. those who have been trained would be more 
likely to give a process-based response). 
This is shown in pictorial format in Table 7 
 
 
 Book House Wind farm 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
Should do Training Training Training 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Training Training Training 
 
 
Table 7 Expected outcomes if propositions are correct 
3.4 Results – all participants 
The results for all 153 participants are shown in Table 8. Further details of results, including p 
values and the number of participants are shown in Appendix 3, and a summary of the responses is 







  Book House Wind farm 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
Should do Training None None 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Training None Training 
 
 
Table 8 Overall results – 153 participants 
 
3.4.1 ‘Will do’ cases 
For the ‘Will do’ cases, there is a 3-way interaction between the framing condition, the training 
condition and the response type, which is statistically significant at the p<.001 level for all 3 
decision scenarios. 
There is a 2-way interaction between the framing condition and the response type. This is true for 
both the 2-way interaction between the framing condition and the response type, "BC" and when 
statistically controlled by removing the effects of the training condition, "BC(A)". These are 
statistically significant at the p<.001 level for all 3 scenarios 
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There is no statistically significant relationship between the training condition and the response type 
for the ‘Will do’ cases for any of the scenarios. 
3.4.2 ‘Should do’ cases 
Book scenario 
For the ‘Should do’ case for the Book scenario, there is a 3-way interaction between the framing 
condition, the training condition and the response type, which is statistically significant at the p<.05 
level.  
There is a 2-way interaction between the training condition and the response type. This is true for 
both the 2-way interaction between the training condition and the response type, "AB" and when 
statistically controlled by removing the effects of the framing condition, "AB(C)". These are 
statistically significant at the p<.001 level. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between the framing condition and the response 
type for the ‘Should do’ case for the Book scenario. 
House and Wind Farm scenarios 
For the ‘Should do’ cases for the House scenario and the Wind Farm scenario, there are no 
statistically significant relationships at the .05 level between any of the three conditions. 
3.4.3 ‘Years to go / Quickest’ cases 
Book scenario 
For the ‘Years to go’ case for the Book scenario, there is a 3-way interaction between the framing 
condition, the training condition and the response type, which is statistically significant at the p<.05 
level.  
There is a 2-way interaction between the training condition and the response type. This is true for 
both the 2-way interaction between the training condition and the response type, "AB" and when 
statistically controlled by removing the effects of the framing condition, "AB(C)". These are 
statistically significant at the p<.05 level. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between the framing condition and the response 
type for the ‘Years to go’ case for the Book scenario. 
House scenario 
For the ‘Quickest’ case for the House scenario, there are no statistically significant relationships at 
the .05 level between any of the three conditions. 
Wind Farm scenario 
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For the ‘Years to go’ case for Wind Farm scenario, there is not a 3-way interaction (between the 
framing condition, the training condition and the response type) which is statistically significant at 
the p<.05 level. 
There is a 2-way interaction between the training condition and the response type. This is true for 
both the 2-way interaction between the training condition and the response type, "AB" and when 
statistically controlled by removing the effects of the framing condition, "AB(C)". These are 
statistically significant at the p<.05 level. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between the framing condition and the response 
type for the ‘Years to go’ case for the Wind Farm scenario. 
3.5 Results - no prior training 
The results for those who had not received any training in decision making prior to the beginning 
of the experiment (90 participants) are shown in Table 9. Further details of the results, including p 
values and the number of participants, are given in Appendix 3. 
 Book House Wind farm 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
Should do Training None None 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Training None Training 
 
Table 9 Results for those who had no prior training – 90 participants 
The results are very similar to those for all participants, except for the ‘Years to go’ case for the 
Wind farm scenario, where there is a statistically significant 3-way interaction (between the framing 
condition, training condition and response type) at the .05 level, in addition to the 2-way interaction 
between the training condition and the response type.  
 This is a stronger interaction between the training condition and the response type, compared to 
that for all participants. 
3.6 Results - prior training 
The results for those who indicated that they had completed some sort of decision making training 
prior to the experiment are shown in Table 10. Further details of results, including p values and the 
numbers of participants are shown in Appendix 3. There were 63 participants who had received prior 
training: 38 stated they had the equivalent of 1 day’s training; 21 had received the equivalent of 3+ 
days training; and another 4 had 3+ days training and stated that they apply it regularly.  
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 Book House Wind farm 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 




Years to go/ 
Quickest 
None Framing None 
 
Table 10 Results for those who had received prior training – 63 participants 
The results are rather different from those for all participants, except for the ‘Will do’ cases for the 
House and Wind Farm scenarios, and for the ‘Should do’ case for the Wind Farm scenario. The cases 
where there are differences between the results for all participants and the results for those who had 
prior training are given below.  
3.6.1 ‘Will do’ cases 
For the ‘Will do’ case for the Book scenario, there is not a 3-way interaction (between the framing 
condition, the training condition and the response type) which is statistically significant at the p<.05 
level. 
The 2-way interaction between the framing condition and the response type is significant at the 
p<.05 level when statistically controlled by removing the effects of the training condition, "BC(A)" 
but not but not for the simple 2-way interaction "BC".  
There is no statistically significant relationship between the training condition and the response type 
for the ‘Will do’ case for the Book scenario. 
3.6.2 ‘Should do’ cases 
For the ‘Should do’ case for the Book scenario, there are no statistically significant relationships at 
the 0.05 level between any of the three conditions. This compares to the results for all participants, 
where there was a strong interaction between the training condition and response for these cases. 
For the ‘Should do’ case for the House scenario, there is not a 3-way interaction (between the 
framing condition, the training condition and the response type) which is statistically significant at 
the p<.05 level. The 2-way interactions between the framing condition and the response type, the 
training condition and the response type, and the framing condition and the framing condition are 
all significant at the p<.05 level when statistically controlled by removing the effects of the third 
variable, [i.e. "BC(A)", “AB(C)” and “AC(B)”], but not for the simple 2-way interactions "BC", 





3.6.3 ‘Years to go / Quickest’ cases 
For the ‘Years to go’ case for the Book scenario, there are no statistically significant relationships 
at the 0.05 level between any of the three conditions. This compares to the results for all participants, 
where there was a strong interaction between the training condition and response for these cases. 
For the ‘Quickest’ case for the House scenario, there is not a 3-way interaction (between the framing 
condition, the training condition and the response type) which is statistically significant at the p<.05 
level. The 2-way interaction between the framing condition and the response type is significant at 
the p<.05 level for the simple 2-way interaction "BC", but not when statistically controlled by 
removing the effects of the training condition, "BC(A)". There is no statistically significant 
relationship between the training condition and the response type for the ‘Quickest’ case for the 
House scenario. 
For the ‘Years to go’ case for the Wind Farm scenario, there are no statistically significant 
relationships at the 0.05 level between any of the three conditions.   
4. Discussion  
The comparision between the expectation and the actual results for all participants is shown in Table 
11. 
 Expectation    Actual - All participants 
         
 Book House Wind farm   Book House Wind farm 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
Should do Training Training Training 
 
Should do Training  None None 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Training Training Training 
 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Training None Training 
 
  
 Table 11 Comparision between expectation and actual results for all participants 
 
The results show that the outcomes did not all align with expectations. They aligned for all the ‘Will 
do’ cases, which showed that the way a decision is framed has a strong influence on the outcomes. 
However, the results for the ‘Should do’ and ‘Years to go/Quickest’ cases are rather more mixed: for 
the Book scenario there is a significant relationship with training; for the House scenario there are no 
significant relationships with either framing or training; and for the Wind Farm scenario, one has a 
relationship with framing and one with training, though both of these are at a reduced level. So, this 
raises two questions: 
1) Why did the results not align better with the expectations? 
2) Why are there different outcomes between the 3 decision scenarios? 
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4.1 Why did the results not align better with the expectations? 
4.1.1 Correlation between framing and training 
After some post-hoc theorising, it was realised that there may be an alternative explanation for the 
way framing and training impact the responses. There is some correlation between framing and 
training, and so it seems reasonable to suggest that they could operate at cross purposes and one 
hide the effect of the other. 
Training encourages a process-based approach to be used for decision making. Framing may 
encourage a process-driven approach, a neutral approach or an opinion/schedule-driven approach 
to be used. Hence, sometimes the framing and training will be working together and pulling in the 
same direction. At other times there will be tension between them, and they will be pulling in 
opposite directions. Hence if the impact of framing is stronger, then the effect of training may be 
hidden, or partially hidden. Conversely, if the impact of training is stronger, then the effect of 
framing may be hidden or partially hidden.  
This alternative view of how training may impact outcomes is explained further below, and shown 
pictorially in Table 12.  
           A) Training has no influence 
 
B) Training has some influence 
 
C) Training has major influence 





  Book House 
Wind 
farm 
  Book House 
Wind 
farm 
Will do Framing Framing Framing  Will do Framing Framing Framing 
 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
Should do Framing Framing Framing  Should do None None None 
 
Should do Training Training Training 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Framing Framing Framing  
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
None None None 
 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Training Training Training 
 
Table 12 Impact on outcomes as training influence becomes stronger 
If training has no influence (Table 12 A), there would be no difference between the ‘Will do’ and 
‘Should do’ results for all participants, and so the responses would relate to the framing. This would 
be the same for the ‘Years to go / Quickest’ responses. 
If training has some influence (Table 12B), it would (gradually) move the responses from Framing 
to None.  
If the training influence was strong (Table 12 C), it would shift the response all the way from 
Framing to Training.  
If this interpretation is correct, then, by inspecting the All Participants result in Table 11, it can be 
inferred that training has an influence on all the cases. For the ‘Should do’and ‘Quickest’ cases for 
the House scenario, the shift was from a strong relationship with framing to no relationship with 
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framing or training. For the ‘Years to go’ case for the Wind Farm scenario, the movement was from 
a strong relationship with framing to a weak relationship with training. The strongest influence of 
training was in the ‘Should do’ and ‘Years to go’ cases for the Book scenario, where the movement 
was from a significant relationship with framing, to a significant one with training. 
4.1.2 Impact of prior training 



























Table 13 Combinations of training 
There is likely to be some overlap between prior training and the training videos, with both 
encouraging a process-based approach. This means that the participants with prior training are likely 
to start from a more process-based approach to decision making than those with no prior training. 
Hence, prior training is likely to reduce the apparent impact of watching the training videos, 
particularly if the prior training was recent, and/or has been applied regularly. This is similar to the 
previous discussion where the impact of training is offset by framing. In this case the impact of 
watching the training videos is offset by prior training 
This can be seen by comparing of results for participants with and without prior training, shown in 
Table 14.  
 
No Prior Training  Prior Training 
         
 Book House Wind farm   Book House Wind farm 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
 
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
Should do Training None None  Should do None 
Framing 
None 
 Training  
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
Training None Training 
 
Years to go/ 
Quickest 
None Framing None 
 
Table 14 Comparision of results for participants with and without prior training 
For the ‘Should do’ and ‘Years to go’ cases for the Book scenario, and for the ‘Years to go’ case 
for the Wind Farm scenario, the effect of the prior training has been to reduce the impact of the 
training videos from a significant relationship with training, to no relationship with either framing 
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or training. Similarly, for the ‘Quickest’ case for the House scenario and for the ‘Should do’ case 
for the Wind Farm scenario, the effect of the prior training has been to reduce the impact of the 
training videos from no relationship with either framing or training to a weak relationship with 
training. 
Hence, the results demonstrate that watching the training videos has an impact. While the impact is 
greater when there has been no prior training, there is still some some impact in each case (albeit 
small in some). This implies that the benefits of one hour’s training prior to project decision making 
are particularly valuable for those with no prior training, but it is still worthwhile for those with 
prior training. 
4.1.3 Other contributing factors 
We have established so far: 
• The impact of framing on project decision making is very strong 
• The impact of framing can offset, or partially offset, the impact of training. 
• Similary, prior training can offset the impact of watching the training videos  
Other potential contributing factors are the small sample sizes and uneven splits for some of the 
cases. For the All Participants cases, care was taken to ensure that the number of people trained (by 
watching the videos) was the same or very similar to those untrained (i.e. did not watch the videos). 
Sample sizes were in the range 24-27 (see Appendix 3 for further details).  
However, when these were split into Prior Training and No Prior Training, the sample sizes were 
both smaller and uneven. For example, for Prior Training there was one group (Neutral group for 
Book scenario) where there are 16 who viewed the training videos, and only 7 who did not. The 
small numbers may mean that the sample is not truly representative, and this may have impacted 
on the statistics.  
4.2 Why are there different outcomes between the 3 decision scenarios? 
No clear reason has been identified to explain why there are different outcomes for the 3 decision 
scenarios, however the following are considered to be potential contributing factors.  
4.2.1 Differences in the way the decision scenarios are written 
There are differences in the choices for the answers. The House scenario had only 3 set choices 
(which are the same for each question), there is no ‘Other’ choice (where the participant has the 
option of supplying a different answer from the given multiple-choice answers), and there is no 
question where the participants have to supply their own answer. The Book and Wind Farm 
scenarios have more set choices, they have an ‘Other’ option for the first two questions, and the 
participants have to supply their own answers for the third question. 
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The House scenario has shorter and less strong framing statements than the other two scenarios  
4.2.2 More familiarity with some scenarios than others 
There is likely to be more familiarity with the House scenario than with the other two, which may 
encourage people to go along with their intuition more. 
The Wind Farm scenario is likely to be the least familiar, which could encourage a more 
conservative approach to be taken with the answers. The choices for the ‘Should do’ question were: 
• Proceed based on the current design [Opinion/intuition-based option] 
• Carry out further work before deciding before deciding [Neutral option] 
• Stop the project [Process-based option] 
From Appendix 4 it can be seen that 13 gave the answer to proceed, 135 to carry out further work 
and only 5 to stop the project. It would appear that there was a reluctance to say that the project 
should be stopped – which was the process-based option. Instead, a more conservative option was 
selected, of carrying out further work before making a decision on whether to proceed. 
4.2.3 Small and uneven sample sizes 
The small sample sizes and uneven splits for some of the cases may also have impacted upon the 
outcomes, as discussed previously in the above section on Other contributing factors  
5. Further Research  
It is proposed that the experiment is repeated with the following changes: 
• Aim for 240+ participants, to ensure that at least 40 in each of the 6 sub-groups – with 20 of 
these prior trained and 20 not prior trained.  
• Ask participants upfront if they have had any prior training – to enable participants to be 
allocated to ensure even numbers in the splits. Ask them how recent the training was and how 
useful they considered it to be. 
• Consider including more scenarios to rule out or identify scenario-specific effects. 
• Consider including more technically relevant scenarios. 
6. Conclusions 
The results aligned with expectations for the ‘Will do’ cases, which showed that framing by an 
authority figure has a strong influence on the participants’ responses, in terms of whether they were 
process-based, neutral or opinion/intuition-based. However, the expectation that the responses would 
have been influenced by training to be process-based for the ‘Should do’ and ‘Years to go / 
Quickest’ cases was only partially met. For the participants with no prior training, the short, focused 
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training just prior to decision making strongly influenced the outcomes for half of the cases and 
partially influenced the outcomes for the other half. The impact was much reduced for those who had 
received prior training. 
However, there is a correlation between framing and training. Training encourages a process-based 
approach to be used for decision making. Framing encourages a processed-based approach, a neutral 
approach or an opinion/intuition based approach to be used. Hence, framing and training can operate 
at cross purposes; sometimes they may be pulling in the same direction, and sometimes they may be 
working against each other. Hence, one could mask the effect of the other. In the same way that 
framing can offset the impact of watching the training videos, prior training can offset the impact of 
watching the training videos, and one hide the effect of the other 
The results demonstrate that watching the training videos has an impact. The impact is greater when 
there has been no prior training, however there is still impact in each case, albeit small for some. 
This implies that the benefits of one hour’s training prior to project decision making is more valuable 
for those with no prior training, but still worthwhile for those with prior training. 
In conclusion, and to answer the question posed in this paper’s title, one hour of training can lead to 
better project decision making by encouraging a structured, process-based approach to be taken.     
7. Conflicts of interest 




Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Introduction and Instructions 
There are descriptions of three decision making scenarios, with a few questions following each 
one. 
For each scenario there will be a question asking what you think the group will do, based on the 
information given, and another question asking what you think the group should do, i.e. if it was 
your decision to make. 
Please note the following: 
• Read each scenario carefully, before you attempt to answer any questions on it. There are no 
right or wrong answers to these questions. 
• The answers will be partly in multiple choice format, and partly free text. 
• The free text will be generally to state why an answer has been given. If you do not know, 
please give your honest opinion, e.g. I don’t know/ it was a pure guess / it felt right / I didn’t 
like the other answers etc 
Demographic Questions  
• Please enter your age in the box below. 
If you would prefer not to say, please enter: 0 




o Prefer not to say 
• What is your main discipline/faculty/area of work? 
o Sciences (e.g. Geology, Chemistry) 
o Health (e.g. Medicine, Dentistry) 
o Social Sciences (e.g. Geography, Politics) 
o Arts & Humanities (e.g. English, Philosophy) 
o Engineering incl. Maths (e.g. Petroleum Engineering, Electrical Engineering) 
o Business & Professions (e.g. Law, Commerce) 
o Other (please specify) 
• What is your level of experience of formal decision-making techniques? 
o None 
o Have received some basic training on decision making (e.g. 1-day course) 
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o Have undertaken a formal training course on decision making, decision analysis or decision 
quality. (e.g. 3+ days course) 
o Have undertaken a formal training course AND regularly apply it. 
Scenario 1: Writing a decision making textbook 
The schools’ curriculum council are interested in a proposal for decision making to be taught in 
senior schools. A team has been assembled to design the curriculum and write a textbook for it. The 
team includes two University professors who specialise in decision making, several experienced 
teachers and Simon Jones, the head of the University’s School of Education who is an expert in 
curriculum development. 
• The team has been meeting once a week for a year. They have constructed a detailed outline 
of the syllabus, have written two chapters and have run several trial lessons in the classroom. 
They all feel that they were making good progress. 
• The schools’ curriculum council advised the group that they were looking to make changes to 
the curriculum over the next few years. They needed confirmation on whether the textbook 
would be ready for the new curriculum, preferably starting in three years’ time, but no later 
than four years. 
• The group then set about estimating how much longer it would take for completion of the 
textbook. They knew, from their decision-making experience, that the right way to obtain 
information from a group is not to start with a discussion amongst the group, but for each 
group member to independently write down their estimate of the time to completion. 
• The estimates were written down and collected up. They ranged from 1½ to 2½ years, 
averaging around 2 years. 
• The group leader decided to make a further check by asking Simon, the curriculum expert, 
how long similar teams had taken to develop a curriculum from scratch and write a textbook. 
He went quiet for a while, and then said that he had not realised this before, but around half 
of the teams had failed to complete the task. 
• The group leader then asked how long it had taken for those groups that finished. Simon said 
this ranged from 7 years to 10 years. 
• The group leader then asked how the other groups skills and resources compared to theirs, i.e. 
how good are they compared to the other groups. Simon said that this group were just about 
average compared to the others. 
• This comes as a complete surprise to the group; this new information seems unreal. The 
group were confident that they had a reasonable plan to complete a book in two years, which 
conflicts with statistics which indicate that other teams had either failed or taken a very long 




Additional Information for the 3 different versions  
Neutral Version 
o No additional statements 
 
Schedule/Opinion Driven Version 
o The group leader says: 
“I am shocked by this and cannot see how it could possibly take so long to complete the 
book. We’ve made a great start: we have an outline for the whole book, we’ve completed 
two chapters and tested them with trial lessons.  
“We have an excellent team, we’re working well together and we’ve all agreed that it will 
take around 2 years to finish. We shouldn’t be comparing ourselves with others, because 
we have good information for our particular textbook.  
“I am keen to continue working on this, to keep up the momentum and maintain the 
excellent progress we’ve made to date. I am convinced that we could still complete this in 
2 years, and I am absolutely certain that we can do it within 4 years - which is the 
requirement for the Curriculum Council.  
“We have to make this work, and I know that we can.” 
 
Process Driven Version 
o The group leader says that he is surprised as anyone about the time taken for other groups 
to complete a similar task. However, he considers that it is important to take this 
information seriously, as this was not just one group, but several groups that have taken a 
long time to complete their task. He says: 
“I know from my experience that it is important to base decisions on objective 
information, and to take statistical information on past performance seriously. It appears 
that no group has previously completed a similar task in the 3-4 years that we have been 
allocated.  
“I would like us to consider what the reasons for this there might be, using a technique 
called a premortem. I would like us to imagine that it is now 4 years in the future. We 
have gone ahead to complete the textbook and it has all gone disastrously wrong – we are 
still nowhere near completing it. 
“I would like us all to write down all the possible reasons that we can think of for this 
failure. We will do this individually, then discuss it as a group to consider whether this 
changes our plans. We will then decide what we are going to do.” 
Questions 
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What do you think that the group will decide to do? 
o Continue with the curriculum and textbook, based on their mean estimate of 2 more years  
o Continue with the curriculum and textbook, based on a revised estimate of 3 more years 
o Continue with the curriculum and textbook, based on a revised estimate of 4 more years 
o Give up, and stop working on the curriculum and textbook 
o Other (please specify) 
 
Why have you given that answer? 
 
What do you think that the group should decide to do? 
o Continue with the curriculum and textbook, based on their mean estimate of 2 more years  
o Continue with the curriculum and textbook, based on a revised estimate of 3 more years 
o Continue with the curriculum and textbook, based on a revised estimate of 4 more years 
o Give up, and stop working on the curriculum and textbook 
o Other (please specify) 
 
Why have you given that answer? 
 
If the group decided to go ahead and complete the textbook, how much longer do you think that 
is it likely to take (i.e. not including the year they have already spent on this)? 
o (Fill in the blank) years  
o Fail to complete 
 
Why have you given that answer? 
 
Scenario 2: Building a house 
• A couple are married with two children, aged 9 and 13. 
• They are currently renting a house in the suburbs of a major city. 
• The wife’s father-in-law would like to give them a block of land in a suburb very close to 
where he lives, which is around 25km from where they currently live. This is on condition 
that they build a house and move there. 
• The wife is highly skilled with a secure job. 
• The couple have spoken to the bank and, in principle, the bank would be willing to give them 
a home loan. 
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• It is December. The lease on their current house expires in a month’s time. The person from 
whom they rent their current house is only willing to do so in 6 or 12 month increments 
• They want to move in 13 months’ time (i.e. 1 month existing lease + 12 month extension). 
This is so that you can move into your new home in January of the year after next, and the 
children can then go into their new schools at the start of the school year. 
• The couple need to have drawings submitted to the council to obtain planning permission and 
need the bank to confirm they will give them a home loan before they can have the house 
built. 
• They have decided to use an architect-builder to project manage this on their behalf. 
• They have approached 3 architect-builders. This is the information they have, after receiving 
their quotes: 
Builder A:  Least experienced, well presented brochures, charming salesman. 
i. Cheapest at $475,000 
ii. Has previously done similar projects in 15-23 months, average 19 months. 
iii. The salesman is very enthusiastic about this project. Although the company 
will not provide a monetary guarantee on a completion time, the salesman says 
that he is absolutely convinced that it can be completed it in 13 months, by 
prioritising efforts on this project.  
Builder B:  Average experience. Knows this council and has dealt with them before. 
iv. Middle cost at $500,000 
v. Has previously completed similar projects in 14-21 months, average 17 
months. 
vi. Is not willing to provide a monetary guarantee for a completion time. 
However, says 13 months might be possible, if a contract is awarded this week 
to prepare the drawings, so that they can be submitted to the council to meet 
the deadline for the next planning meeting. Says it would require the family to 
be available at short notice to discuss any issues and give their approval to the 
plans, before they are submitted. 
Builder C:  Highly experienced and known to be very efficient. Salesman is a bit blunt, with a 
‘take it or leave it’ attitude. 
vii. Dearest at $525,000 
viii. Has done similar projects many times in 12-20 months, averaging 15 months. 
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ix. The company will guarantee a completion time of 14 months. The guarantee 
would be a 1% reduction in price for every complete week late after 14 
months, up to a maximum of 5% reduction.  
• The couple are keen to decide this week, to avoid any further delays. 
 
Additional Information for the 3 different versions  
Neutral Version 
o No additional statements 
 
Schedule/Opinion Driven Version 
o The wife is pushing strongly to award the contract to builder A. She likes the look of the 
houses in the brochures, says they are cheapest, and their salesman is the only one that is 
certain that it can be done in 13 months – in time for the new school year, and matches 
when the current house lease ends. 
 
Process Driven Version 
o The wife’s job involves analysing information used to help decide which options her 
company will go ahead with. She knows from her experience that it important to base 
decisions on objective information, wherever possible, and consult the statistics of past 
performance to determine likely outcomes, rather than rely on promises made. She is 
strongly advocating that this approach is adopted for deciding which builder to go to. 
 
Questions 
Which builder do you think the couple will award to? 
o Builder A 
o Builder B 
o Builder C 
 
Why have you given that answer? 
 
Which builder do you think the couple should award to? 
o Builder A 
o Builder B 
o Builder C 
 




Which builder is most likely to complete the work in the shortest time? 
o Builder A 
o Builder B 
o Builder C 
 
Why have you given that answer? 
 
Scenario 3: Wind farm project  
• An electric power company are proposing to build a 70MW capacity wind farm. 
• The design work for the wind farm has been going on for several years, and it is now coming 
up to the planned time for the decision on whether the project should go ahead and move into 
construction. This decision will be made by the Chief Executive Officer of the electric power 
company. 
• The forecast for the project is that it will take 3 years to complete at a cost of $200 Million to 
provide an electricity production of 70MW. (Note: If this outcome occurred, the project 
would make a healthy profit.) 
• A consultancy company have been asked to review the project. They have technical doubts, 
as the turbines chosen are of a new design and are not fully proven, and there are concerns 
over the complexity of the overall design. They also have concerns that the wind profile will 
not allow the required electricity production to be achieved.  
• Based on analysis of data from a large number of similar projects, the consultancy predicts 
that this project is likely to cost $240M, take 4 years to complete, and production would be 
limited to around 55MW. (Note: If this happened, the project would lose a significant amount 
of money).  
• The consultant’s view is that delaying the start of construction would be beneficial. This 
would enable further work to be carried out to reduce uncertainties and manage the risks. It 
would be likely to reduce both the overall cost and schedule, and to lessen the production 
shortfall. 
• The power company manager, who is responsible for the project, dismissed the consultant’s 
claims. He said that the individuals sent by the consultant to review the project were young 
and inexperienced in project management and did not fully understand the particulars of this 
project; whereas the project team are highly experienced, they have been working on this for 
several years, and their judgment counts more than some consultants who have been 
reviewing the project for less than 2 weeks. 
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Additional Information for the 3 different versions  
Neutral Version 
• Neutral position, no views expressed by the new CEO.  
 
Schedule/Opinion Driven Version 
• A new Chief Executive Officer has recently been appointed. This is a statement he made on 
the project: 
“I am new to this company, but already I am a strong supporter of this project – it is going to 
put our company on the map. We need to get things going. The quicker we get the operation 
underway, the quicker the money will start coming in – speed is of the essence. 
“I am interested in outcomes, not process. We waste too much time filling out paperwork and 
following bureaucratic procedures, which add little or no value and waste valuable time. 
“We need to set challenging targets. We have highly talented people in the team; setting a 
tight schedule leads to creative ideas and makes things happen. Whereas, if you take your 
foot off the pedal, people will relax and take their time. Engineers will keep looking at more 
and more options, which add little value. 
“I am a supporter of Hirschman's principle of the Hiding Hand which states that ignorance 
can be good - because if decision makers knew the real costs and difficulties of projects, few 
ventures would ever get started. Whereas if you just get on and start the projects, any 
underestimates of costs and difficulties are more than offset by the benefits from the creativity 
and problem-solving abilities of the project teams.” 
 
Process Driven Version 
• A new Chief Executive Officer has recently been appointed. This is a statement he made on 
the project:  
“I am a strong believer in a structured approach. If we follow the right process we will make 
the best decision, which will increase the probability of achieving a successful outcome.  
“However, if we proceed to construction before we are ready, it often ends up costing us 
dearly, with expensive and time-consuming corrective work required once mistakes are 
discovered. Hence, I advocate a two-stage approach for this decision: 
“Firstly, are we ready to proceed? I.e. have we completed the necessary work to be able to 
make a good decision? If not, then do not proceed any further until the necessary work has 
been completed.  
“Secondly, if we are ready to proceed, then we need to seriously consider whether there is 
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value in proceeding, i.e. do the benefits outweigh the costs, taking account of uncertainties, 
risks and opportunities?  
“This needs to be a measured decision. Just because we have completed a large amount of 




Which option do you think the Chief Executive Officer will select? 
o Proceed now (i.e. go ahead with the project and start construction based on the 
current design) 
o Stop (i.e. abandon the project altogether) 
o Carry out further work before deciding (i.e. make improvements, taking account of the 
consultant’s recommendations, before deciding on whether to proceed) 
o Other (please specify) 
 
Why have you given that answer? 
 
• Which option do you think the Chief Executive Officer should select? 
o Proceed now 
o Stop 
o Carry out further work before deciding  
o Other (please specify) 
 
Why have you given that answer? 
 
If the decision was to proceed now, how long do you predict it would take to complete the 
project? 
o (Fill in the blank) years  
o Fail to complete 
 





   
Appendix 2: Email to those taking part in training.  
 




Thank you for volunteering to take part in this decision-making study. 
 
The first part of the study is for you to undertake training on decision making by watching 3 videos, 
each around 15 minutes long, followed by a short multiple-choice questionnaire to assess your level 
of understanding. 
  
Please do not answer the questionnaire until you have watched all 3 training videos. 
  
The links to the training videos are: 
1. Why we don’t always make good decisions - aaaaa  
2. Making good decisions - bbbbb 
3. Decision making for projects - ccccc 
The link to the multiple choice questionnaire is: xxxxx 
  
Please do not forward these links to anyone else. 
  
When you have watched the videos and completed the questionnaire please email me. I will then 
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 No. of Participants   
Results - All 
    
    
 
NoTV = No Training Videos 
TV = Watched Training videos 
  
 Book House Wind farm   Book House Wind farm   
 
    
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
 
Will do 
ABC   0.0003 
BC     <.0001 
BC(A) <.0001 
ABC   <.0001 
BC     <.0001 
BC(A) <.0001 
ABC   <.0001  










TV=26 Overall 153 
Should do Training None None 
 
Should do 
ABC   0.0088  
AB     0.0002  
AB(C) 0.0007 
ABC  0.7693  
AB     0.463  
AB(C) 0.4506 
ABC   0.311  

















ABC   0.0062  
AB     0.0012  
AB(C) 0.001 
ABC   0.9035  
AB     0.5066  
AB(C) 0.7782 
ABC   0.0981  












                
Results - No Prior Training                              
 Book House Wind farm   Book House Wind farm   Book House 
Wind 
farm   
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
 
Will do 
ABC   0.0002  
BC     <.0001  
BC(A) <.0001 
ABC   <.0001  
BC     <.0001  
BC(A) <.0001 
ABC   <.0001  












Should do Training None None 
 
Should do 
ABC   0.0024  
AB     0.0001  
AB(C) 0.0003 
ABC   0.264  
AB     0.1959  
AB(C) 0.2024 
ABC   0.5102  



















ABC   0.0072  
AB     0.0011  
AB(C) 0.0014 
ABC   0.913  
AB     0.7334  
AB(C) 0.8038 
ABC   0.0464  












                
Results - Prior Training Only                              
 Book House Wind farm   Book House Wind farm   Book House 
Wind 
farm   
Will do Framing Framing Framing 
 
Will do 
ABC   0.0738  
BC     0.0805  
BC(A) 0.0175 
ABC   <.0001  
BC     <.0001  
BC(A) <.0001 
ABC   <.0001  


















ABC   0.735  
AB     0.2144  
AB(C) 0.4077 
AB(C) 0.0377  
AC(B) 0.0357  
BC(A) 0.0401 
ABC   0.3561  



















ABC   0.4441  
AB     0.5945  
AB(C) 0.4742 
ABC   0.3084  
BC     0.0252  
BC(A) 0.1832 
ABC   0.7709  


















         
Framing  p <0.001 for all 3 results  {e.g. ABC, AB and AB(C) }  Training 
        
Framing  p <0.05 for all 3 results  {e.g. ABC, AB and AB(C) }  Training 
        
Framing  p <0.05 for 2 results  {e.g. AB and AB(C) }  Training 
        


























   
Appendix 4: Summary of responses – All participants 
 
BOOK  Will do     Should do     Years to go  
                 



















No Training 6 12 8  Process 
Driven 
No Training 3 13 10  Process 
Driven 
No Training 4 5 17 
Training 4 14 6  Training 10 13 1  Training 14 4 6 
Neutral 
No Training 1 7 18  Neutral 
No Training 3 14 9  Neutral 
No Training 10 1 15 
Training 4 14 8  Training 10 10 6  Training 13 4 9 
Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 1 6 17  Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 4 7 13  Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 6 0 18 
Training 0 6 21  Training 8 13 6  Training 10 4 13 
                 
HOUSE  Will do     Should do     Quickest  
                 



















No Training 17 6 1  Process 
Driven 
No Training 15 8 1  Process 
Driven 
No Training 20 2 2 
Training 16 6 5  Training 21 3 3  Training 24 1 2 
Neutral 
No Training 11 10 5  Neutral 
No Training 18 5 3  Neutral 
No Training 22 2 2 
Training 12 6 6  Training 17 6 1  Training 19 4 1 
Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 1 3 22  Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 15 7 4  Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 20 3 3 
Training 2 0 24  Training 17 5 4  Training 20 5 1 
                 
WIND FARM Will do     Should do     Years to go  
                 



















No Training 1 22 3  Process 
Driven 
No Training 2 23 1  Process 
Driven 
No Training 6 12 8 
Training 0 23 3  Training 1 25 0  Training 8 12 6 
Neutral 
No Training 1 12 11  Neutral 
No Training 0 20 4  Neutral 
No Training 3 10 11 
Training 6 8 19  Training 1 23 3  Training 8 18 1 
Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 0 1 25  Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 0 22 4  Opinion 
Driven 
No Training 3 14 9 
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A simplified, decision-based approach for assessing Front End Loading  
David Newman, Steve Begg & Matthew Welsh 
Abstract 
This paper aims to encourage Front End Loading (FEL) to be used more effectively to increase 
the likelihood of delivering better project outcomes. It introduces a simple and pragmatic 
approach to assessing FEL which can be carried out in-house. 
Previous research has shown that, despite FEL being highly regarded, companies regularly 
sanction projects with insufficient levels of FEL. This has frequently resulted in projects not 
achieving the outcomes promised at the Final Investment Decision (FID) in terms of cost, time 
and production attained. This paper reviews reasons why FEL may not be used very effectively 
at present and proposes a solution to change this. 
An alternative method of assessing FEL has been developed which is decision-based, which 
can be carried out internally and which provides clarity on the factors that drive good FEL. In 
addition to assessing the status of activities carried out in the phase, the decision-based 
approach emphasises value-creation by considering key factors that could influence an 
increase or decrease in Decision Quality and thus the value created by the final outcome.  
The FEL benchmarking approach and the decision-based approach are very different. FEL 
benchmarking is external, objective, more bottom up; whereas the decision-based approach 
is internal, subjective and more top down. The FEL benchmarking approach is more detailed, 
with a large number of individual activities assessed, and the progress on these aggregated 
to provide an overall benchmarking score. The decision-based approach is more of a big 
picture view. 
FEL benchmarking is well proven and its use is advocated. The decision-based approach is 
unproven, but it has benefits that are not available from FEL benchmarking and avoids some 
of the disadvantages. It encourages consideration to be given to activities that may result in 
value being created or destroyed; e.g. ensuring there are sufficient and appropriate 
alternatives during the Select phase, and that the benefits of flexibility are taken into account. 
A further advantage of the decision-based approach is that working through the FEL tools as 
a project team leads to a better joint understanding of the project and improves team 
integration. 
The two approaches consider FEL from different perspectives and have different benefits. 
They complement each other, and so the combination of the two approaches is more powerful 
than either on its own. It is suggested that the two approaches are worked in conjunction with 
each other to gain the benefits of both methods, provide a better understanding of FEL, and 
have a stronger basis for decision-making. 
A new way of assessing FEL has been developed which uses a decision-based approach 
aimed at increasing the value of project outcomes. Separate tools are provided for the Concept 
Select and FID phases. 
Introduction and Background 
Major investment projects are commonly managed by a stage-gate process [1] whose over-
arching purpose is intended to create value through making a decision, at each gate, as to 
whether or not the project should proceed (Fig.1). At each stage-gate there are two 
questions to ask: 
1. Are we ready to proceed? Is the necessary information available to enable a good 
decision to be made? 
2. Do we want to proceed? Is there value in proceeding to the next phase?  
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Success in the early phases is about maximizing value; for the later phases it is about 
preserving value and achieving the predicted outcomes. 
 
Fig. 1 Stage-gate process and Front End Loading phases 
Front End Loading (FEL) comprises the first three phases of the typical stage-gate process 
that lead up to the Final Investment Decision (FID) and mainly addresses the first question 
on readiness to proceed.  Two definitions of FEL are given below. The first is from 
Independent Project Analysis (IPA) and the second is from the Construction Industry 
Institute (CII) 
• FEL is the owner work process that prepares a project for FID. FEL is usually 
formatted into three stages: business case development and appraisal, scope 
development and front-end engineering design (FEED), which also includes execution 
planning. [2]  
• FEL is defined as the process of developing sufficient strategic information with which 
owners can address risk and make decisions to commit resources in order to 
maximize the potential for a successful project. [3] 
Maximizing the potential for successful project outcomes means different things for different 
phases. This paper focuses on the Concept Select decision and the Final Investment 
Decision (FID). For the Select phase, the emphasis is on creating value, by generating and 
selecting the concept that will maximize value for the owner. However, value may be lost in 
two ways if there has been insufficient FEL: a better concept may be overlooked if the range 
of alternatives is too narrow; or a wrong choice may be made if it is based upon information 
that is not sufficiently accurate. If the true range of uncertainty is not assessed, it may lead to 
under-investment in further information gathering or in developing flexible designs to mitigate 
the risks and capture the opportunities that arise from uncertainty.  During the Define phase, 
the emphasis is on developing sufficient definition so that changes would be minimal during 
project execution, and the outcomes predicted at FID would be realistically achievable.  
FEL benchmarking is the process of quantitatively assessing the level of FEL that has been 
carried out and comparing those scores against actual project outcomes.  Previous studies, 
including interviews [4] and surveys [5] have shown that FEL is highly regarded and the 
concept is well understood by oil and gas operators. However, these studies have also shown 
that the FEL benchmark score is neither well understood nor considered to be important. Many 
companies allow projects to pass through stage-gates with insufficient levels of FEL.  
Decision-making 
The purpose of the stage-gate process, and thus FEL, is to help make decisions that 
bring value to the people on behalf of whom the decision-makers are acting (e.g. 
shareholders of a company), incorporating the interests of other stakeholders.  
Decision Analysis (DA) is a structured, pragmatic approach (based on Decision Science) 
for creating, evaluating and choosing between options [6]. Its focus is on choosing the 
option that creates the most value and it is particularly suited to situations that involve 
complexity, uncertainty and multiple objectives, such as major project investments. 
Because uncontrollable factors (i.e. uncertainties) play a role in determining decision 
outcomes, DA focuses on the thing we can control, the quality of the decision.  
Decision Quality (DQ) specifies what constitutes a good decision [7]. It is comprised of six 
dimensions, or metrics, which can be assessed before the outcome is known. High DQ 
does not mean maximising the amount of information obtained. Rather, it is about 
balancing the amount of work and information needed (and associated cost) with the 
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values and chances attributed to the possible outcomes. Hence an assessment of DQ 
can be used to inform the decision-maker when enough work has been done to maximise 
the value of the decision. 
A Dialogue Decision Process (DDP) [8] helps to assure high DQ, and efficiency of 
process, when there is organizational complexity. DA and a DDP are the best ways 
known to help decision-makers make high quality decisions – that is, choose options that 
are most likely to deliver the outcomes they desire. 
Given that decision-making is central to the decision gate process, the authors find it 
surprising that there is little literature that ties it, and FEL in particular, to how good 
(value-creating) decisions should be made, i.e. using DA and a DDP. Further, there is no 
evidence that the development of the stage-gate process was founded on the principles 
of high quality decision-making.  A notable exception is Walkup and Ligon [9].  Indeed, 
they [9] identify several aspects of the stage-gate process that run counter to how good 
decisions should be made. For example, emphasis on process compliance and meeting 
the schedule at the expense of value creation.  
In this paper we propose a decision-based FEL process that is grounded in, and thus 
supports, making high quality decisions. Our focus is on two of the six dimensions of DQ: 
1) generating a set of value-creating, doable alternatives, 2) acquiring enough relevant, 
reliable information to make a high quality decision. 
In the remainder of this paper we first review FEL benchmark scores and discuss reasons why 
they should be used more effectively, and reasons why, in practice, they are not.  Next, we 
propose a decision-based approach that is designed to increase the likelihood of delivering 
better project outcomes. It can be carried out internally and provides clarity on the factors that 
drive good FEL. We also propose two simple tools to aid implementation of the approach, one 
for the Concept Select decision and one for FID. This is followed by a discussion that 
compares the relative merits of the FEL benchmarking and decision-based approaches. 
Finally, we state our major conclusions and recommend areas for further research. 
Front End Loading Benchmark Scores 
FEL benchmark scores are quantitative assessments of the extent to which FEL has been 
carried out.  For example, IPA have a Front End Loading Index and CII have a Project 
Definition Rating Index (PDRI). FEL benchmark scores are determined on the basis of a set 
of factors which typically include: 
• Quality and uncertainty of data 
• Status of technical deliverables 
• Conformance with regulatory requirements 
• Status of planning for future phases 
These are evaluated, and then combined in a weighted way to come up with a numerical 
FEL benchmarking score. The weighting of the factors is determined from a database of past 
projects so that it reflects the observed relative importance of the factors in achieving 
forecast outcomes.  
Why FEL benchmark scores should be used more effectively 
IPA have been evaluating projects for over thirty years and have a database of more than 
15,000 projects. They have shown that the level of FEL at FID is a good indicator of the 
likelihood of a project achieving its predicted outcomes, in terms of cost, time and 
production [10-12].  
A considerable amount of research has been carried out on the relationship between 
statistically based predictions and expert judgment. This began in the 1950’s, when 
Meehl [13] reviewed the results of 20 studies that analysed whether predictions by trained 
professional clinical psychologists were more accurate than those calculated using 
statistically based algorithms. The results showed that, even when using a small amount 
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of information and a simple rule, the results are better for statistical predictions than 
expert judgment. 
Since then around 200 studies have been carried out on a wide range of subjects 
including the future value of Bordeaux wines [14], longevity of cancer patients [15] and 
advertising page sales forecasts for Time magazine [16]. About 60% have shown 
significantly better accuracy for algorithms, and the other comparisons generally score a 
draw [17]. Dawes [18] developed Meehl’s work further and showed that even a non-
statistically based model will tend to outperform expert judgment. 
This has interesting implications for benchmark scores such as IPA’s FEL Index, which 
has been shown, based on many thousands of projects, to be a good indicator of the 
likelihood of a successful project outcome, in terms of meeting cost, time and production 
attainment goals. It is much more than a simple model and has demonstrated statistical 
validity. Despite this, a large number of projects are allowed to proceed without having 
completed sufficient Front End Loading. Why is this? 
Why are FEL benchmark scores not used more effectively? 
The reasons for FEL benchmark scores not being used more effectively include: 
• Cognitive dissonance 
• Projects being schedule-driven 
• Lack of understanding of the FEL benchmark score  
Cognitive dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance is the psychological stress experienced by someone who holds two 
or more contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values at the same time. This is triggered when an 
existing belief clashes with new evidence perceived by that person. When confronted with 
facts that contradict personal beliefs, ideals, and values, people will find a way to resolve 
the contradiction in order to reduce their discomfort. This could be by adding new parts to 
the reasoning causing the psychological dissonance, or by actively avoiding situations 
and contradictory information likely to increase the magnitude of the cognitive 
dissonance. 
Festinger’s [19] theory of cognitive dissonance centres around the idea that if a person 
knows various things that are not consistent with one another, they will try to make them 
more consistent. Two items of information (about behaviour, feelings, opinions etc) that 
do not fit together psychologically are said to be in a dissonant relation to each other. It is 
‘cognitive’ because the theory deals with ‘thinking’ about relations between items of 
information in the brain. 
Cognitive dissonance may be experienced in a company when it receives a report on the 
status of Front End Loading that does not align with their own perceptions, expectations 
or desires, e.g.: 
• An external benchmarking organisation has stated that front end loading is 
incomplete and only at a ‘Fair’ level, and recommend the project is not yet ready to 
take FID.  
• The project team believe that they are in good shape, have done all the necessary 
work and are ready to take FID. 
A description of what might result from the cognitive dissonance experienced after 
receiving such an assessment from an external benchmarking organisation is given in 
this extract from a paper by Smith [20]. 
“The biggest challenge, however, is getting commitment and buy-in from the project team 
and company to the IPA assessment. In many instances, IPA reports have been 
summarily destroyed when they identified significant organizational or communication 
gaps or biases in project development. In addition, the downside of using an "impartial" 
third party is that they will be considered an outsider and will have only the information 
that a member of the project team has provided. 
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If IPA identifies project weaknesses or gaps, the business unit or project team may 
consciously or unconsciously side-track the IPA assessment by selectively discrediting 
one area of the analysis where - due to limitations in project data - the conclusion may be 
marginal. This one area will then be exploited to trash the entire effort, rather than 
building on the report to improve project performance.”  
Projects being schedule-driven 
FEL is highly regarded [4]. However, the desire to complete Front End Loading may be 
partially countered by the view that it is important to drive the schedule. Hence, hitting 
project target dates for Concept Select and FID may take precedence over completing 
Front End Loading. A survey of senior personnel from oil and gas operating companies 
[5] showed that over 90% agreed that good Front End Loading leads to better outcomes 
in terms of shorter schedules, lower costs and better production. Yet, in the same survey, 
over 60% said that it is important to drive the schedule, otherwise scientists and 
engineers will continue to do extra work which, in their view, adds little value. 
In another survey [21] of senior personnel from oil and gas operating companies, 97% 
stated that projects are often schedule-driven 
Lack of understanding of the FEL benchmark score  
There is a distrust of the FEL benchmark score due to a lack of understanding of it. In a 
survey [5] 70% of participants agreed that they would rely more on the FEL benchmark 
score if they had a better understanding of how it was derived and what the key factors 
are that influence it. This may be exacerbated by benchmarking companies not providing 
transparency in order to protect their intellectual property. 
FEL for oil and gas projects is often evaluated by an external consultant, who carries out FEL 
benchmarking using an activity-based approach which assesses very similar activities during 
both the Select and Define phases. It is focused on increasing the likelihood of meeting 
forecast outcomes by achieving a good level of definition at FID. Although the approach is well 
proven, it is often not used very effectively for reasons stated earlier, such as distrusting 
assessments by an external party, particularly where there is lack of transparency on how the 
FEL benchmark score is derived.  In addition, it does not have a decision-making (value-
creating) making emphasis, which could help with a) developing other options that might lead 
to higher value outcomes, or b) determining the amount of information needed from a value-
creation perspective rather than a prediction perspective. 
A decision-based approach to evaluating Front End Loading 
An alternative method of assessing FEL is proposed which is decision-based, can be carried 
out internally and provides clarity on the factors that drive good FEL. In addition to assessing 
the status of activities carried out in the phase, the alternative approach emphasises value-
creation by considering key factors that could influence an increase or decrease in Decision 
Quality and thus the value created by the final outcome. Example factors are the range of 
alternatives considered and getting enough information to make good decisions rather than 
accurate forecasts.  The approach also helps to prevent value loss by over-work or acquiring 
information that, whilst it might help make better predictions, does not increase the chance of 
better outcomes. Also, because this approach looks at FEL through a decision-making lens, 
the requirements are different for the Concept Select decision and FID. 
FEL for Concept Select – Decision-based approach 
For the Concept Select decision, a good decision means that the concept is selected that 
creates the most value. However, a concept can only be selected if it has been 
considered in the first place. There needs to be a well thought out range of alternatives 
and then the best of these is selected. Hence, to create the most value, the FEL needs to 
include having an adequate range of options. This range may be inadequate if too few 
alternatives have been considered, or the alternatives being considered were variations 
on a theme, rather than being substantially different. When generating alternatives, it is 
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suggested that consideration is given to ones that range from ‘mild to wild’ and from ‘lean 
to extreme’. ‘Mild’ means taking a standard or conservative approach, and ‘wild’ means 
considering unorthodox ideas from left field; ‘lean’ means a concept that is simple and 
minimal and ‘extreme’ means a complicated design where features have been added to 
make it more effective and efficient. 
The choice being made will depend upon the information that is available. If the 
information is inaccurate, that could lead to an incorrect selection and loss of value. 
Hence there needs to an appropriate level of subsurface definition. This includes factors 
such as whether a suitable analogue exists; the type, quality and quantity of the seismic 
information; the number and location of exploration wells; the level of interpretation; and 
the perceived subsurface complexity.  
How feasible is the overall development concept? The level of definition for the 
development concept needs to be sufficiently accurate, with an appropriate level of 
planning and preparation for the wells, subsea and facilities. In addition, there are other 
factors that will determine whether more of less FEL is required: are the designs simple or 
complex; do they utilise new or proven technology; and is there previous experience of a 
similar concept? 
Finally, having sufficient FEL means that the selected development concept is consistent 
with the realistic range of potential subsurface outcomes, i.e. the development concept 
works over a wide range of possible subsurface outcomes. Realistic means that the 
predicted outcome is consistent with the information and is unbiased. It is neither 
overconfident (i.e. the range of uncertainty is too narrow) nor optimistic (i.e. the likelihood 
of desirable outcomes has been over weighted, and the whole range has shifted in the 
direction of a favourable outcome). A realistic assessment of the level of uncertainty is 
important in enabling an appropriate level of response to be planned for (i.e. options to 
mitigate its downside and or capture its upside) - this is the essence of value creation 
under conditions of uncertainty [22]. 
A simple tool is shown in Fig. 2 which captures the above points. It has four criteria: 
• Alternatives 
• Subsurface definition 
• Development concept feasibility 
• Development concept consistent with the subsurface outcome possibilities 
For each criterion there is a list of factors to be considered in turn. This should be carried 
out by a group of people, including project management personnel and representatives of 
each discipline. A benefit of carrying out this exercise is to stimulate discussion to gain a 
better understanding of each person’s perspective, and their assumptions and 
constraints. This exercise should be carried out during the phase, to determine further 
work to be done and what areas to focus on; and not just at the end of the phase to 
determine readiness for the decision. 
The assessment for each criterion can be Poor, Fair, Good, Excellent or somewhere in 
between these. A guide is provided in Fig. 3 to assist with this assessment. This is a 
subjective assessment. It is important to strive to avoid groupthink [23] or biases such as 
optimism [24] and overconfidence [17]. In order to do this, it is suggested that each 
individual makes their own assessment of the status of FEL for each criterion. These are 
then shared and challenged by the other members of the group. This is not an exact 
science; the important thing is to have the discussion in order to question and appreciate 
the perspective of others. The aim is to provide a better, and hopefully unbiased, joint 
understanding of the status. 
At the end of the exercise there should be an agreed assessment for each criterion, a list 
of further work to do and areas to focus on. The overall assessment of Front End Loading 
is the average of the individual assessments for the 4 criteria (i.e. alternatives, subsurface 
definition, concept feasibility and concept consistent with subsurface outcomes range). It 
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Note that there are some similarities and some differences with the questions asked by 
the FEL benchmarking approach. The main difference is that there does not appear to be 
a similar focus on alternatives with the FEL benchmarking approach. 
There are some similar questions in both approaches on subsurface definition, 
development concept feasibility and whether the development concept is consistent with 
the subsurface outcomes range. The difference is that the decision-based approach asks 
them in a simpler and more high-level way.  
FEL for FID – Decision-based approach 
For the Define phase, the focus is on developing sufficient definition such that the 
outcomes predicted at FID would be realistically achievable and value would be 
preserved by having minimal rework during the Execution phase.  
The factors for the subsurface for the Define phase include: the quantity and quality of 
data, e.g. seismic, logs; the level of analysis, e.g. 2D/3D modelling; the status of permit, 
budget and personnel requirements; and the status of execution planning 
For the wells, the level of definition will depend upon the extent of the planning and 
preparation carried out. However, there would need to be greater definition if there is a 
greater level difficulty for drilling or completions. For example, the extent of well planning 
and preparation would need to be greater if there is a long distance to the well targets, if 
the wells are horizontal and if there are any other drilling issues, such as difficult 
formations to drill through. Similarly, additional planning and preparation would be 
required if there are perceived to be any issues with the formations around the lower 
completion sites, and advanced technologies are required instead of conventional 
technologies. 
For surface and subsea facilities, the extent of planning and preparation required will 
depend on factors such as whether they are simple or complex, whether they are utilising 
proven or new technology, and whether there has been previous experience of a similar 
concept in the company. 
To ensure a successful outcome team integration is important, both within the project 
team and between the project team and the decision maker(s). Is there regular dialogue 
between the decision maker(s) and the project team to bring alignment and clarify 
requirements, which may change over time due to changes in external circumstances? Is 
there good integration within the project team: is there a good understanding between the 
subsurface, wells, subsea and facilities teams of each other’s constraints and 
requirements? 
There are likely to be some changes required during the Execute phase. Changes will 
have less impact upon outcomes if flexibility has been included within the design to make 
changes easier [22]. Hence, the more flexibility to cope with future changes, the less 
value is likely to be lost. Factors that will affect this include whether the wells, subsea and 
facilities have: a narrow or wide operating range; in-built flexibility; provisions for future 
changes included; and how easy or difficult would it be to make any future changes? 
A simple tool is shown in Fig. 4 which captures the above points. It has five criteria: 
• Subsurface definition 
• Wells 
• Facilities / Subsea 
• Team Integration 
• Flexibility 
As for the similar tool for Concept Select, each criterion has a list of factors to be 
considered which should be reviewed by a representative group of project management 
and discipline experts. Again, this is aimed at stimulating discussion and gaining a joint 
understanding of the project status, assumptions and constraints. 
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After reviewing the factors for each criterion, there should be an assessment made of 
whether this is Poor, Fair, Good, Excellent or somewhere in between. A guide is provided 
in Fig. 5 to assist with this assessment. This is a subjective assessment. As for Concept 
Select, it is suggested that each individual makes their own assessment of the status of 
FEL. These are then shared and challenged by the other members of the group. The aim 
is to remove any bias and provide a better joint understanding of the status.  
At the end of the exercise there should be an agreed assessment for each criterion, a list 
of further work to do and areas to focus on. The overall assessment of Front End Loading 
is the average of the individual assessments for the 5 criteria (i.e. subsurface definition, 
wells, facilities/subsea, team integration and flexibility). It is suggested that readiness for 
the decision will have been reached when this average is Good. 
 






Fig. 5 Guide for decision-based FEL tool for the Final Investment Decision 
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As for the tool for Concept Select, there are some similarities and some differences with 
the questions asked by the FEL benchmarking approach. There are similar questions on 
subsurface, wells, facilities/subsea and team integration for both approaches. Again, the 
difference is that the decision-based approach asks them in a simpler and more high-
level way. However, the issue of adding value by including flexibility seems to only be a 
consideration for the decision-based approach. 
Testing the decision-based approach 
It is proposed that the FEL tools for the decision-based approach are tested to determine 
how well they work in practice. In principle, this could be a quantitative or a qualitative 
evaluation.  
A quantitative evaluation could be carried out which is similar to that carried out for FEL 
benchmarking, i.e. to determine whether the level of FEL at FID is a good indicator of the 
likelihood of a project achieving its predicted outcomes in terms of cost, schedule and 
production. However, that would require it to be trialled on a large number of projects in 
order to be statistically significant. In addition, it would not measure whether value was 
gained or lost during the concept select phase.  
Instead, a pragmatic approach is proposed using a qualitative evaluation. This would ask 
questions such as: 
• Was the FEL assessment considered to be beneficial? 
• Has it provided a focus on areas that require more attention? 
• Did it highlight the need for a wider range of alternatives? 
• Has it highlighted where value could be added by providing flexibility? 
• Did it encourage discussion and enhance understanding within the team? 
• Has the FEL assessment led to changes that have added value to the project? 
Discussion 
The two approaches (i.e. the FEL benchmarking approach, such as carried out by IPA, and 
the decision-based approach) are very different. FEL benchmarking is external, objective, 
more bottom up; whereas the decision-based approach is internal, subjective and more top 
down. The FEL benchmarking approach is more detailed, with a large number of individual 
activities assessed, and the progress on these aggregated to provide an overall benchmarking 
score. The decision-based approach is more of a big picture view. 
There are also some more subtle differences between the two. The FEL benchmarking 
approach focuses on the level of project definition by assessing the level of completion of 
various activities. In addition to considering the level of project definition, the decision-based 
approach encourages consideration to be given to areas that could result in value being 
created or destroyed. For example, during the Select phase it highlights the need for sufficient 
and appropriate alternatives to be considered to avoid value being lost. However, although 
there is a relationship between the FEL benchmark score at FID and the project outcome, 
there is no benchmark to measure value lost at Concept Select by not considering sufficient 
alternatives, or by basing the decision on incomplete information. 
During the Define phase the decision-based approach encourages flexibility to be included so 
that less value will be lost if changes are required in the future. Adding in flexibility to make 
changes easier usually costs very little compared to the cost of changes required when no 
provisions have been included. However, there are often cost-cutting exercises running up to 
FID and, generally, the first things to be deleted are ‘unnecessary’ items such as provisions 
for flexibility. This may help get a project over the line by meeting project metric targets, but it 
may well turn out to be a short-term gain for a long-term loss. Hence it is important to challenge 
this and emphasise the importance and value that flexibility provides (or conversely, value 
destroyed by failing to design-in an adequate level of flexibility). 
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The following are the benefits and challenges of each approach:  
Benefits of FEL benchmarking 
• It is carried out by an independent third party, and hence any bias should be minimal. 
• It is a well proven approach that has been used by IPA on many thousands of 
projects. 
• The FEL benchmarking score has been shown to be a good indicator of the likelihood 
of a successful project outcome. There is a statistically significant relationship 
between the FEL benchmark score at FID and project outcomes, in terms of cost, 
time and production attainment.   
• It provides information that identifies gaps in Front End Loading so that these can be 
addressed. 
Challenges of FEL benchmarking 
• FEL benchmarking may be deemed to be costly, even though the cost of an 
assessment is likely to be small compared to the overall project cost. In addition, an 
assessment may be considered to be disruptive, due to the time required to interview 
the project team members. Hence there may be a reluctance to spend the time and 
money required to carry out an assessment. This usually means that only one or two 
assessments are carried out. If only one assessment is completed this is normally 
carried out as a final check prior to FID, rather than during the phase to track progress 
and provide a guide for which activities need to be focused on. 
• The main challenge is gaining acceptance of the report’s outcomes and 
recommendations. As stated earlier, cognitive dissonance may well play a part, 
leading to reasons being found for discrediting the report if the outcomes and 
recommendations are not in line with the company’s own views.   
• There is a distrust of the FEL benchmarking scores due to a lack of transparency on 
how they are derived, and what the key factors are that influence them. 
• FEL benchmarking is focused on whether outcomes predicted at FID are likely to be 
delivered, rather than on increasing value.  
Benefits of the decision-based approach: 
• The project team will take ownership of it, as it is not being done by a third party and 
there is a greater chance of transparency in the way the decision-based approach is 
assessed. 
• It stimulates discussion, leading to a better understanding of the project. It helps build 
team integration through learning the perspectives, assumptions and constraints of 
others. 
• It is relatively quick and easy to review. Hence, it can be reviewed regularly to assess 
progress and determine what areas need to be focused on. 
• It encourages consideration to be given to activities that may result in value being 
created or destroyed; e.g. ensuring there are sufficient and appropriate alternatives 
during the Select phase, and that the benefits of flexibility are taken into account. 
• The focus is on maximising value through good decision-making. 
Challenges of the decision-based approach: 
• The method is not yet proven. It has not been tested on a project, and there is no 
quantitative benchmark data to support the validity of this method. 
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• It is subjective assessment by the project team, hence the possibility of a biased 
assessment with no impartial third party to adjudicate. The challenges made by the 
team on each other’s assessments should moderate this, and reduce the impact of 
any biases. However, this may not be the case if the whole team is under the same 
bias, such as a motivational bias caused by strong schedule pressure. 
 
By reviewing the above, it can be seen that there are different advantages to each approach. 
The two approaches complement each other and can be worked in tandem. They are 
considering FEL from different perspectives and have different benefits. 
FEL benchmarking is well proven, whereas the FEL tools for the decision-based approach 
are still in a development phase and need to be tested and evaluated over a number of 
projects. However, although the decision-based approach is not yet proven, it is considered 
to have significant potential. 
Assessing FEL, whether evaluated by FEL benchmarking or the decision-based approach, is 
not just about achieving a certain score or rating. It provides a basis for discussion to 
generate a better understanding of the project so that improvements can be made, and 
provide a stronger foundation for making a decision. 
Conclusions 
FEL benchmarking is well proven and its use is advocated. The decision-based approach is 
unproven, but it has benefits that are not available from FEL benchmarking, and avoids some 
of the disadvantages. It is considered to be worth testing on a number of real projects so that 
it can be developed further. The benefits of the decision-based approach include it providing 
a focus on areas that could result in value being created or destroyed. This includes 
determining whether the alternatives for Concept Select are sufficient and appropriate, 
checking whether the level of flexibility is suitable and assessing how well the team is 
integrated. Another of the advantages of the decision-based approach is that by working 
through the FEL tools as a project team itself leads to a better joint understanding of the project 
and improves team integration 
The two approaches consider FEL from different perspectives and have different benefits. 
They complement each other, and so the combination of the two approaches is more powerful 
than either on its own. It is suggested that the two approaches are worked in conjunction with 
each other to gain the benefits of both methods, provide a better understanding of FEL, and 
have a stronger basis for decision-making.  
Further Research 
It is proposed that the FEL tools for the decision-based approach are tested on a number of 
projects to determine how well they work in practice, and find out if there any changes to be 
made that would improve their usefulness and make them more effective. The testing would 
be a qualitative evaluation based on a series of questions similar to those in the above section 
on testing the decision-based approach.  
The tools could also be extended to account for other factors. A specific suggestion around 
“relevant, reliable information” is to use an increase in value of the decision’s ultimate 
objectives, rather than accuracy of prediction, to focus the acquisition and analysis of 
information. DA provides a specific tool for this, Value of Information [25].  A second 
suggestion is to explicitly incorporate an assessment of the potential for the presence and 
extent of cognitive and motivational biases, which are known to be a major cause of poor 
project outcomes (biases can never improve outcomes) [26].   
Finally, because our focus has been on just two of the decision quality metrics (creative, 
doable alternatives and relevant, reliable information) there is scope to use the other DQ 
metrics (appropriate frame; clear values; rational thinking; and commitment to action) to 
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specify further improvements to the assessment of FEL, and execution of the stage-gate 
process more generally.   
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5.  Conclusions  
This research and the papers within this thesis provide an understanding of the current perception of 
FEL and DA/DQ, how they are used, how it considered they should be used, and why they may not be 
used that way. This was based on interviews and surveys with development and project personnel 
who are mainly from Australian oil and gas companies or from companies with ongoing Australian 
projects. 
This research determined that proposals to encourage better use to be made of FEL and DA/DQ would 
be welcomed. Two of these proposals were then developed further: the use of short, focused training 
on FEL and DA/DQ and the development of a simple, decision-based approach for assessing the level 
of FEL. 
5.1 Key findings from interviews and surveys   
5.1.1 FEL 
The interviews and surveys showed that the concept of FEL is well understood and is 
considered to be very important by the participants. There is strong agreement that good FEL 
leads to better project outcomes in terms of lower costs, shorter schedules and better 
production.  
However, there are differences between theory and practice. Although FEL is highly regarded, 
it is not considered to be necessary to achieve a certain FEL benchmark score prior to FID. Despite 
the surveys showing agreement that the FEL benchmark scores are considered to be a good 
indicator of readiness for FID, they are not being used effectively in practice. None of the 
interviewees said that the FEL benchmark score was used as a hard criterion (i.e. a certain score 
must be attained before a key decision can be made). A fifth of participants said that it is not used 
at all for decision making, and the remainder said that it is used as a soft criterion or a contributing 
factor. 
A significant reason why more FEL is not being completed prior to key decisions is that projects are 
schedule driven, with 97% of survey participants agreeing that project are often schedule driven. One 
of the factors that contributes to this is that over 60% of participants consider that it is important to 
drive the schedule, otherwise work will be carried out that adds little value. Hence there is a tension 
between the between the need to complete FEL and the desire to drive the schedule. 
Another reason why FEL is not being used very effectively is the interviews showed that FEL 
benchmark scores are not well understood. A contributor to this is distrust of the score due to a lack 
of clarity on how it is put together. The survey showed strong support for the proposition that they 
would rely more on the FEL benchmark score if they had a better understanding of how it was derived 
and what the key factors are that influence it. 
5.1.2 DA/DQ 
The surveys showed that DA and DQ are not used as often as the participants consider that 
they should be. Over 90% think that they should be used for major project decisions, but only 
around 50% said that they are used in practice. 
All participants agreed that it is essential that the decision maker clarifies the frame, scope 
and criteria for the decision up front, and has regular discussions with the project team to bring 
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alignment and clarify requirements during each phase. However, responses indicated that these 
only occur in practice around half of the time. 
The interviews and surveys identified the following reasons why DA and DQ may not be used more 
frequently or more effectively: 
• It is considered that Decision Analysis and Decision Quality are not well understood. Despite 
many participants considering that they are familiar with these, the evidence from 
questions which probed at a more detailed level signified otherwise. 
• People rely mainly on experience and judgment for decision making, rather than using a 
structured process. 
• Projects are schedule driven.  This implies that the desire to pass through decision gates ‘on 
time’ over-rides the desire to create value and ensure readiness to make a decision: that is, 
confirmation that the information on which a decision will be based is sufficiently complete 
and accurate, and that there is a good understanding of the uncertainties and risks, and how 
these will be managed. 
5.2 Proposals to influence decision makers to make better use of FEL and DA/DQ 
There was strong support for all the proposals to increase the likelihood of project outcomes 
by encouraging better use to be made of FEL and DA/DQ: 
• Development of a simple tool to give a pragmatic assessment of FEL. 
• Feedback on key areas to focus on to achieve good FEL and high DQ 
• Information on the likely impact (in terms of cost, schedule and production) of not 
completing FEL. 
• Having performance incentives based on achieving good FEL and high DQ 
• Undertaking training on how to achieve good FEL and high DQ, if given convincing evidence 
that it leads to better project outcomes 
Two of these, training in decision making and development of a simple, pragmatic tool to 
assess FEL were progressed in further studies. 
5.2.1 Training 
An experiment with over 150 participants showed that the way a decision is framed by an 
authority figure (in particular, whether a process-based, neutral or intuition/opinion-based 
approach is advocated) has a strong influence on the participants’ responses, in terms of whether 
a process-based, neutral or intuition/opinion-based approach was used. However, the 
expectation that the responses would have been influenced by training encouraging a process-
based approach was only partially met. For the participants with no prior training, the short, 
focused training just prior to decision making influenced the outcomes for half of the cases and 
partially influenced the outcomes for the other half. The impact was much less for those who had 
received prior training in decision making. 
However, a correlation between framing and training was observed. Training encourages a 
process-based approach to be used for decision making. Framing encourages a processed-based 
approach, a neutral approach or an opinion/intuition-based approach to be used. Hence, framing 
and training can operate at cross purposes; sometimes they may be pulling in the same direction, 
and sometimes they may be working against each other. Hence, one could mask the effect of the 
other. In the same way that framing can offset the impact of watching the training videos, prior 
training can offset the impact of watching the training videos, and one hide the effect of the other 
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The results demonstrate that watching the training videos has an impact. The impact is greater 
when there has been no prior training, however there is still impact in each case, albeit small for 
some. This implies that the benefits of one hour’s training prior to project decision making is more 
valuable for those with no prior training, but still worthwhile for those with prior training. This 
shows that one hour of training can lead to better project decision making by encouraging a 
structured, process-based approach to be taken.     
5.2.2 A decision-based approach for assessing FEL 
A simple, decision-based method of assessing the level of FEL has been developed, which can be 
carried out within the organisation and provides clarity to the project team on what factors are 
important for achieving a good level of FEL. The proposed decision-based approach has yet to be 
tested, but conceptually it has benefits that are not available from FEL benchmarking and avoids some 
of the disadvantages. It is considered to be worth testing on a number of real projects so that it can 
be developed further.  
The benefits of the decision-based approach include it providing a focus on areas that could result 
in value being created or destroyed. This includes determining whether the alternatives for Concept 
Select are sufficient and appropriate, checking whether the level of flexibility is suitable and assessing 
how well the team is integrated. Another of the advantages of the decision-based approach is that by 
working through the FEL tools as a project team itself leads to a better joint understanding of the 
project and improves team integration 
The two approaches consider FEL from different perspectives and have different benefits. They 
complement each other, and so the combination of the two approaches is more powerful than either 
on its own. It is suggested that the two approaches are worked in conjunction with each other to gain 
the benefits of both methods, provide a better understanding of FEL, and have a stronger basis for 
decision-making. 
5.3 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this research, the following are recommendations to encourage more 
effective use to be made of FEL and DA/DQ in order to improve the likelihood of better project 
outcomes: 
• Use benchmark data to set realistic targets. It is important to set realistic targets as if, the project 
becomes schedule driven (which is quite likely), at least the project is being schedule driven 
against realistic targets. However, aggressive targets are frequently set, and the project is 
schedule driven against those. And so front-end loading is often not completed. 
• Assess the level of front-end loading, and only make a decision when the level of FEL is assessed 
as good. This can be assessed using external benchmarking, the decision-based approach or, 
preferably, using both.  
• If a decision is to be made before a good level of FEL has been attained, provide information to 
the decision maker on the likely impact on outcomes in terms of higher costs, longer schedule 
and less production. This can be quantified using the adjustment factors for project outcomes 
based on FEL benchmarking (see Paper 1). 
• Use DA to assist with making key project decisions and DQ to assess whether a decision is good.  
• Provide feedback to the project team on the key areas to focus on to achieve good FEL and high 
DQ. 
• Have performance incentives based on attaining high DQ and good FEL.  
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• Carry out a premortem for key decisions such as Concept Select and the Final Investment 
Decision, as a final check prior to ratifying a decision. 
• Ensure decision makers have received training on project decision making. Ideally the training 
would cover all of the above recommendations. As a minimum, they should receive some short, 
focused training - similar to the 3 training videos used in the experiment – just prior to key 
decisions. 
5.4 Further research 
Further research is proposed as follows: 
i. Develop a practical method by which performance incentives for decision makers 
could be based on attaining high Decision Quality and good Front End Loading 
ii. Test the decision-based tool for assessing the level of FEL on a number of projects to 
determine how well they work in practice, and find out if there are changes to be made 
that would improve their usefulness and make them more effective. 
 
